























This book provides a distinctive and empirically rich account of the European 
Union’s (EU’s) relationship with the Common Market of the South (Mercosur). 
It seeks to examine the motivations that determine the EU’s policy towards 
Mercosur, the most important relationship the EU has with another regional 
economic integration organization. 
In order to investigate these motivations (or lack thereof), this study 
examines the contribution of the main policy- and decision-makers, the 
European Commission and the Council of Ministers, as well as the different 
contributions of the two institutions. It analyses the development of EU 
policy towards Mercosur in relation to three key stages: non-institutionalized 
relations (1986–1990), official relations (1991–1995), and the negotiations 
for an association agreement (1996–2004 and 2010–present).
Arana argues that the dominant explanations in the literature fail to 
adequately explain the EU’s policy – in particular, these accounts tend 
to infer the EU’s motives from its activity. Drawing on extensive primary 
documents, the book argues that the major developments in the relationship 
were initiated by Mercosur and supported mainly by Spain. Rather than 
the EU pursuing a strategy, as implied by most of the existing literature, 
the EU was largely responsive, which explains why the relationship is much 
less developed than the EU’s relations with other parts of the world. 
The European Union’s policy towards Mercosur will benefit academics and 
postgraduate students of European Union Foreign Affairs, inter-regionalism 
and Latin American regionalism.
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 1 
 Introduction: the study of European 
Union relations with Mercosur 
 Introduction 
 This monograph seeks to examine the motivations that determine the 
European Union ’ s (EU) policy towards the Common Market of the South 
(Mercosur), which is the most important relationship that the EU has with 
another regional economic integration organization. In order to investigate 
these motivations (or lack thereof), this volume will examine the contribu-
tion of the main policy- and decision-makers, the European Commission 
and the Council of Ministers, as well as the different contributions of the 
two institutions. This will make it possible to show the degree of 
‘involvement’/‘engagement’ refl ected in the EU ’ s policy towards Mercosur, 
which is the dependent variable in this study. The analysis offered here 
examines the development of EU policy towards Mercosur in relation to 
three key stages: non-institutionalized relations (1986–1990), offi cial rela-
tions (1991–1995), and the negotiations for an association agreement 
(1996–2004 and 2010–present). The degree of engagement will be measured 
as low, medium or high. The outcome of the measure is created by analysing 
two factors: the level of ‘ambition’ and the level of ‘commitment’. 
 ‘Ambition’ refl ects how far the EU is trying to shift from the status quo. 
In order to assess the level of ambition at the different stages, it is necessary 
to contrast:
 •  EU policy pronouncements 
 •  negotiating mandates 
 •  plans for the future of the relationship 
 •  promises to Mercosur 
 with the status quo. Once the ‘ambition’ has been measured, it will be 
possible to analyse ‘commitment’. 
 ‘Commitment’ refl ects how hard the EU is willing to try in order to 
realize its objectives, and how much it is willing to pay in order to achieve 
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these objectives. In order to assess the level of commitment it is necessary 
to pay attention to different indicators:
 •  the frequency of meetings and the importance of those meetings held by 
the EU: offi cial level, ministerial level, heads of state level, 
 •  the amount of aid or funding provided by the EU towards the different 
aspects that compound the relationship is worthy of consideration, 
 •  the willingness to compromise during the negotiations. 
 To complement this analysis, this book compares the different arguments 
in the existing literature on EU policy towards Mercosur in relation to 
the three key stages, in order to examine their explanatory capacity over 
time. 
 The importance of this analysis is based on the fact that EU–Mercosur 
relations are the fi rst of the new phenomenon of inter-regionalism. More-
over, they included the fi rst negotiations for a free trade agreement (FTA) 
between two regions. As such, the EU–Mercosur relationship has a promi-
nent place in the literature on the EU as a global actor. 
 This monograph argues that the dominant explanations for this rela-
tionship in the literature – counterbalancing the US, global aspirations, 
being an external federator, long-standing economic and cultural ties, 
economic interdependence and the Europeanization of Spanish and Portu-
guese national foreign policies – all fail to explain the trajectory of EU 
policy adequately. In particular, these accounts tend to infer the EU ’ s 
motives from its activity. Drawing extensively on primary documents, this 
book argues that the major developments in EU–Mercosur relations – the 
1992 Inter-institutional Agreement and the 1995 Europe–Mercosur Inter-
regional Framework for Cooperation Agreement (EMIFCA) – were initi-
ated by Mercosur. Moreover, an FTA was included in the latter agreement 
whereby negotiations fi nally started in 1999 at the insistence of Mercosur. 
This suggests that rather than the EU pursuing a cohesive strategy, as 
implied by most of the existing literature, the EU was largely responsive. 
This analysis echoes the work of  Jorg Monar ( 1997 ) which suggests that 
third parties were the ones demanding upgrading and policy developments 
from the EU. 
 How the EU responded to Mercosur ’ s overtures, however, has been 
infl uenced by some of the factors highlighted in the literature, most notably 
the Europeanization of Portuguese and, particularly, Spanish foreign poli-
cies. This corresponds with the general debate on EU external relations, 
based on the special links upheld by EU members with their former colonies, 
as is the case of Iberian and Latin American members (for example, on this 
debate see  Ravenhill  2002 and  Marsh and Mackenstein  2005 ). Furthermore, 
the Commission ’ s role as external federator has also infl uenced EU policy 
towards Mercosur, although to a lesser extent. Overall, however, these 
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supposedly causal factors have provided only a very weak impetus for EU 
policy, which in large part explains why the relationship is much less 
developed than the EU ’ s relations with other parts of the world. 
 As mentioned above, according to the literature, the Europeanization of 
Spanish and Portuguese policy, and the role of the Commission as external 
federator are not the only possible infl uences on the EU ’ s actions towards 
Mercosur. There are four other main possible drivers put forward. First, 
the EU ’ s actions could be seen as strategic behaviour to oppose or counter-
balance the US in Latin America. A second infl uence is the development of 
a global agenda by the EU, with Mercosur being part of that global strategy. 
A third is the increase in socio-cultural values shared by the EU and Mer-
cosur after the democratization process in South America. And fi nally, the 
growing economic interdependence of a globalized world which would lay 
the basis for an increase in trade between the EU and Mercosur could be 
a motive for the EU ’ s policy towards Mercosur. In this study, each of these 
factors are considered at each of the three stages of EU policy development 
in order to understand to what extent they could offer a satisfactory 
explanation for the development of EU–Mercosur policy. 
 Beyond providing a distinctive and empirically rich account of the EU ’ s 
relationship with Mercosur, this monograph contributes to the literature on 
the EU as a global player, particularly the extent to which it is a strategic 
actor, and to the literature on the Europeanization of national foreign poli-
cies of member states from a bottom-up perspective, particularly in reference 
to the case of Spain and Portugal. The signifi cance of this work is enhanced 
because it speaks to this wider literature by offering a reinterpretation of 
the EU ’ s relations with Mercosur, the central point of this volume. 
 In order to better understand the Europeanization process, it is necessary 
to explain a concept that is clearly linked to it – path dependence. It starts 
with an historical event that creates a ‘before’ and an ‘after’. The historical 
event creates a path that will be followed and this creates a dependency on 
the path because there is not a second ‘lane’ to follow or a  Plan B. Pierson 
( 2000 : 2) explains that ‘path dependence refers to the causal relevance of 
preceding stages in a temporal sequence’. Pierson also draws on Sewell ’ s 
defi nition of path dependence which suggests that path dependence means 
‘that what happened at an earlier point in time will affect the possible 
outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later point in time’ ( Sewell 
 1996 : 262–263). 
 In the case of Europeanization, this is certainly not a new concept; it has 
been used in many studies. However, very few scholars have tried to provide 
an exact defi nition of Europeanization ( Featherstone and Radaelli  2003 ). 
 Wong  ( 2008 ) argues that the notion of there being a Europeanization of 
foreign policy was initiated by  Ben Tonra ( 2001 ). Therefore, the defi nition 
of Europeanization will echo the defi nition used in the area of foreign 
policy. Tonra ’ s defi nes Europeanization as ‘A transformation in the way in 
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which national foreign policies are constructed, in the ways in which profes-
sional roles are defi ned and pursued and in the consequent internationalisa-
tion of norms and expectations arising from a complex system of collective 
European policy making’ ( Tonra  2001 : 229; cited in  Wong  2008 : 323. 
 A key question in the study of European foreign policy relates to the 
concept of ‘movement’. The concept of Europeanization itself is about 
movement, particularly when speaking of ‘transformation’. When examin-
ing the issue of ‘transformation’, it is important to ask what is actually 
being transformed. In other words, ‘what is changing and what are the 
mechanisms and direction of change (top-down from the EU to the member 
states, bottom-up, or socialization?)’ ( Wong  2008 : 323). As regards ‘what 
is changing’, the discussion is about the changing of either procedures or 
the substance of the foreign policies of individual member states ( Wong 
 2008 ). In line with the discussion above, this relates to the idea of a member 
state trying to infl uence EU foreign policy in a particular area and, as a 
result, the EU uploads the policy. 
 The rest of this book is divided as follows. The next chapter provides 
the analytical framework. It presents an extensive review of the existing 
literature on EU policy towards Mercosur. Also, it examines the links 
between that literature and the arguments related to the EU as a global 
actor. Furthermore, this chapter will also outline the methodological 
approach for this monograph. The discussion in Chapter  3 will focus on 
outlining the EU ’ s policy towards Mercosur by examining how the EU 
internal mechanisms operate in this area. In doing so, the legal basis for 
EU–Mercosur agreements and the consequent policy and decision-making 
rules will be outlined. Chapters  4 to  7 correspond with each of the three 
key stages in the development of EU policy towards Mercosur: the non-
institutionalized relations (1986–1990) will be discussed in Chapter  4 , the 
offi cial relations (1991–1995) will be analysed in Chapter  5 , and fi nally, 
the negotiations of the association agreement (1996–2004) will be examined 
in Chapters  6 and  7 (2010–present). Chapter  8 will sum up the conclusions 
of this work. 
 The remainder of this chapter is divided into sections which aim to 
contextualize broadly the different aspects of this study and to have a clear 
overview of it. In the next section the discussion focuses on the concept of 
the EU as a global actor. This will enable us to assess whether or not the 
EU behaves as a global actor towards Mercosur. The importance of under-
standing this concept for the monograph is vital since this volume assesses 
not only whether the EU has a strategy towards Mercosur but also how 
behaving strategically relates to whether the EU is a global actor or not. 
This will contribute to the discussion in and around one of the most keenly 
contested topics in EU foreign policy – EU global ‘actorness’. After analys-
ing this issue, the discussion will turn to focus on the development of the 
criteria which help us to identify what it means to be a strategic actor. This 
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will provide the necessary framework to enable us to determine whether or 
not the EU can be referred to as a strategic actor. In the conclusion, these 
discussions will be revised and linked to the fi ndings of the book. After that 
a section is dedicated to the historical background; a short historical over-
view of regional politics in Latin America and the links to Spain, Portugal 
and the US until the mid-1980s is provided. Finally, an overview of Mer-
cosur countries and Mercosur institutions is provided. 
 What is understood by EU global ‘actorness’? 
 This section will focus on the discussion of global ‘actorness’. Many con-
sider the EU to be a global actor, and its relations with Mercosur are central 
to this argument. This position assumes a sort of EU activism and strategic 
behaviour. This monograph questions the strategic behaviour of the EU 
towards Mercosur and therefore will make a contribution to the general 
debate about the EU as a global actor. In order to understand the central 
point of the discussion of EU global ‘actorness’ and its assumed strategic 
behaviour, this section is divided into two. The fi rst part will focus on the 
concept of EU global ‘actorness’ through the work of  Bretherton and Vogler 
 ( 2006 ), whereas the discussion in the second part will concentrate on the 
issue of the EU as a strategic actor. 
 The EU as a global actor 
 The discussion of the EU as a global actor emerged over a decade ago with 
the work of  Bretherton and Vogler  ( 1999 and 2006 ).  Bretherton and Vogler 
 ( 2006 : 17) drew upon the work of  Gunnar Sjöstedt ( 1977 ), citing Sjöstedt ’ s 
work in relation to the concept of ‘actor capability’, which he defi ned as 
the ‘capacity to behave actively and deliberately in relation to other actors 
in the international system’ ( Sjöstedt  1977 : 16). According to  Bretherton 
and Vogler  ( 1999 and 2006 ), the EU ’ s presence is almost everywhere, to 
different degrees. Other scholars who focus on the presence of the EU are 
 Hill and Smith  ( 2005 ) and  Soderbaum and Van Langenhove  ( 2005 ).  Sod-
erbaum et al.  ( 2005 ) contend that there are many questions on the nature 
and impact of the EU as a global actor. One of those questions is whether 
the EU is part of the international sphere. At the very least, the EU is 
considered ‘a force’ in the international arena: ‘The EU has become a force 
in international affairs, especially in trade, development cooperation, the 
promotion of regional integration, democracy and good governance, human 
rights and, to an increasing extent, also in security policies’ ( Soderbaum 
and Van Langenhove  2005 : 250). Although it is accepted that the EU is 
involved in all of these areas, this does not imply ‘actorness’ or ‘presence’. 
According to  Bretherton and Vogler  ( 2006 : 27), there are three character-
istics of EU ’ s ‘actorness’: opportunity, presence and capability. 
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 Opportunity 
 [Opportunity] refers to the external context of ideas and events that enable 
or constrain EU action. Our concern, from the outset, has been with the very 
considerable changes to the external environment since the early 1980s. In 
the early years two major sources of international stability – Cold War 
bipolarity and the monetary stability provided by the US-dominated Bretton 
Woods system – combined to ensure that opportunities for and expectations 
of EU external action were relatively limited.  ( Bretherton and Vogler 
 2006 : 24) 
 Linked to this characteristic is the discussion of globalization and inter-
dependence which gained traction in the early 1990s. Mercosur was initi-
ated at the beginning of the end of the Cold War in the mid-1980s and 
took off in 1991. Therefore, the opportunity for the EU to benefi t from the 
increase in complex interdependence became more promising. At the same 
time, by 1991 all Mercosur states were democratic and pursuing, from an 
economic point of view, open regionalism – in contrast to their past of 
import-substituting industrialization. 
 Presence 
 [Presence] conceptualises the ability of the EU, by virtue of its existence, to 
exert infl uence beyond its borders. An indication of structural power, presence 
combines understandings about the fundamental nature, or identity, of the 
EU and the (often unintended) consequences of the Union ’ s internal priorities 
and policies. Thus presence does not denote purposive external action, rather 
it is the ability to shape the perceptions, expectations and behaviour of others. 
 ( Bretherton and Vogler  2006 : 27) 
 In that sense, the size and degree of infl uence of the EU is attractive as well 
as projecting an image of security and effi ciency. It will be interesting to see 
to what extent the EU ’ s presence has had an impact on Mercosur ’ s priori-
tization of its relations with Europe, and, moreover, to what extent Mercosur 
sees the EU as a structural power capable of counterbalancing the US 
structural power in the whole American continent. 
 Capability 
 [Capability] refers to the internal context of EU external action (or inaction) 
– those aspects of the EU policy processes that constrain or enable action and 
hence govern the Union ’ s ability to capitalise on presence or respond to 
opportunity. Our framework has included … the ability to formulate priorities 
and develop policies and the availability of and capacity to utilise policy 
instruments.  ( Bretherton and Vogler  2006 : 29) 
 The capability issue has been discussed elsewhere as part of the capability–
expectations gap discussed by  Hill  ( 1993 ). It seems that in general there 
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is a problem in the EU in terms of using all its potential in the area of 
external relations. The expectations in relation to the capacity of a group 
of countries that involves such a large group with economic and political 
power are large; however, this capacity is not used in the area of EU external 
relations. This argument will be analysed in more detail in the proceeding 
chapters. 
 The EU as a strategic actor 
 It has been shown above what it means to be a global actor and the various 
ways that the EU is expected to behave if it is to aspire to being a global 
actor. This discussion has been developed further in the general literature, 
using the concept of the EU as a strategic actor. In other words, the literature 
studies to what extent the EU is not only an actor that develops external 
relations, but also an actor that plans, organizes and develops a strategy 
for a specifi c objective. As early as 1993,  Hill claimed that the main problem 
of EU external policy was that ‘There is now a large gap between what is 
expected and what can be achieved’ ( 1993 : 326). Hill suggested two changes 
that were designed to cope with this situation. First, the EU needs to be 
more realistic about what it can and cannot do, which involves not trying 
to replace the US in certain crises. Second, the EU needs to accept the 
‘complex interdependence’ that affects foreign policy, therefore the EU will 
have to cooperate with other states. Could Hill have been calling for 
multilateralism? 
 In 2003, the EU launched the European Security Strategy. Much of the 
discussion in the literature about the concept of the EU as a strategic actor 
has been developed in relation to this policy. For example,  Quille  ( 2004 ) 
takes from the European Security Strategy the main goals of the EU as 
being: to tackle perceived external threats, to extend the zone of security 
around Europe and to strengthen the international order. However, he 
argues that the EU is failing as a strategic actor because it does not yet have 
the necessary ‘strategic culture’. It could perhaps be argued that the problem 
now is not necessarily a lack of capabilities but a lack of will. In fact, in 
the European Security Strategy, the EU very much accepts that ‘it should 
be more capable and responsible’ ( Aggestam  2008 : 1). 
 Howorth  ( 2010 ) offers one of the most detailed accounts in relation to 
the concept of the EU as a strategic actor, explaining how the EU has not 
acted in the strategic way that it could have done. Comparing the EU to 
major players, Howorth argues that:
 The big players may make strategic mistakes – even tragic ones – but at least 
they are lucid about their aims and objectives. They are, in short, playing 
chess. The EU, to date, has essentially been playing ping-pong. This is all the 
more regrettable in that the sort of chess game now being engaged in by the 
other players is  not  of the traditional Westphalian type, dominated by military 
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power and territorial acquisition. It is a game which involves the deployment 
of a vast range of instruments in new and unprecedented ways – a game in 
short for which the EU is comparatively well equipped.  ( Howorth  2010 : 
464–465) 
 According to Howorth, the EU has shown a distinct lack of will in terms 
of developing a strategy. This monograph will show how Mercosur is 
another example where the EU does not demonstrate the will to become a 
strategic actor. 
 This study will contribute to this debate by offering an analysis of the 
EU ’ s behaviour towards Mercosur. In order to do so, it is necessary to 
conceptualize the EU as a strategic actor in the area of EU external policies. 
Borrowing extensively from  Michael Smith and Huaixian Xie ( 2010 : 5), 
this book will argue that if the EU is to be referred to as a strategic actor, 
it must comply with the following criteria: ‘It must demonstrate the capacity 
to extract and mobilise resources from its Member States and other relevant 
sources, and to do so consistently over a period of time’ ( Smith and Xie 
 2010 : 5). As far as its relations with Mercosur are concerned, the EU must 
be able to allocate resources for the development of its strategy towards 
Mercosur over time. ‘It must show that it is possible to relate these resources 
to agreed medium and long term objectives and to act positively in line with 
those objectives’ ( Smith and Xie  2010 : 5). I will argue that the EU needs 
to develop long-term objectives towards Mercosur and then use those 
resources for that specifi c policy. ‘It must demonstrate that it is capable of 
generating a strategic narrative that shapes the expectations of both its 
Member States and other EU bodies and also its key international interlocu-
tors’ ( Smith and Xie  2010 : 5). In its policy towards Mercosur, the EU must 
be able to create a strategy that has an impact on all the actors involved in 
EU policy-making and EU decision-making. ‘It must be able to adapt its 
aims, its resource allocations and its strategic narrative to changes in the 
global context and to challenges that emerge from its developing inter-
national activities’ ( Smith and Xie  2010 : 5). The EU must be fl exible to 
accommodate international changes and be able to orientate its strategy 
towards Mercosur according to the international scene at each stage. 
 To sum up, in general terms, the EU strategy towards Mercosur must 
have a plan, an objective(s), the resources to reach that objective, the 
capability to become a ‘EU’ plan in the sense that it involves all the EU 
actors. Also, it must have a strategy that is fl exible enough to adapt to 
changes in the international scene. This book will show that the EU fails 
to do so. 
 However, this defi nition does not cover all the aspects of ‘strategic’ actor. 
Part of the defi nition should be dedicated to the ‘intentionality’ behind the 
strategy. The actor holding a strategy needs to undertake consistently inten-
tional actions. This volume will try to make a conceptual contribution to 
Smith and Xie ’ s defi nition, discussing the importance of ‘intentionality’. 
c01.indd   8 12/15/2016   12:43:57 PM
Introduction 9
 When considering the different defi nitions of ‘strategy’ in the dictionary 
or those used by academics, ‘intentionality’ is central. According to the 
 Oxford English dictionary , a strategy is: ‘In (theoretical) circumstances of 
competition or confl ict, as in the theory of games, decision theory, business 
administration, etc., a plan for successful action based on the rationality 
and interdependence of the moves of the opposing participants’. It is worth 
noting that this defi nition uses the words ‘successful action’, meaning that 
the person expects certain consequences from their actions. ‘Strategy’ comes 
from the Greek word  strategos . Evered explains how its strict meaning is 
‘a general in command of an army: “stratos”  = army, and “ag”  = to lead’ 
( Evered  1983 : 58, cited in  Mintzberg  1987 ). 
 The area of social sciences where the concept of strategy is most devel-
oped fully is in business. Mintzberg continues:
 To almost anyone you care to ask,  strategy is a plan – some sort of  consciously 
intended course of action, a guideline (or set of guidelines) to deal with a situ-
ation … By this defi nition, strategies have two essential characteristics: they 
are made in advance of the actions to which they apply, and they are developed 
consciously and purposefully.  ( Mintzberg  1987 : 11, original emphasis) 
 Mintzberg himself highlights the part of the defi nition that Smith and Xie 
do not develop, ‘consciously intended’. As he says, it has to be developed 
consciously and purposefully. He uses the work of  Drucker  ( 1974 ) on 
‘purposeful action’ and  Moore  ( 1959 ) on ‘design for action’ to emphasize 
this point. It is important to locate the intentionality behind the action in 
order for it to be considered a strategy; otherwise, accidental actions would 
be considered strategies. This would mean that some actors would appear 
to be strategic players when they were not. 
 It is necessary to explain that the development of patterns of behaviour 
without previous preconceptions should not be considered strategies; this 
would contradict Mintzberg ’ s argument: ‘Thus, the defi nition of strategy as 
plan and pattern can be quite independent of each other: plans may go 
unrealized, while patterns may appear without preconceptions. To para-
phrase Hume, strategies may result from human actions but not human 
designs’ ( Mintzberg  1987 : 13). 
 Without getting into philosophical debates, strategies that are a result of 
human actions could arguably come from strategies that the human was 
not conscious of having. In other words, humans can develop some actions 
and strategies of which they had not previously been aware (which does 
not mean that the strategies did not exist). 
 I asked an offi cial from the Commission (interview 14) who was closely 
involved in EU–Mercosur relations the central question of this monograph: 
Why did the European Union develop a policy towards Mercosur? The 
interviewee replied that there is no answer to that question. This was the 
same reply that I received from somebody else (interview 1). If the people 
c01.indd   9 12/15/2016   12:43:57 PM
10 The EU’s policy towards Mercosur
developing the policy believe there is not a reason behind it, it can hardly 
be said that there is a strategy. This does not mean that the policy was 
developed for no reason, rather that the people involved in it did not have 
a strategy and were more likely responding to somebody else ’ s motivation/
interest/strategy. 
 Moreover, in the opposite case, inaction should not be considered a 
strategy either. This book argues explicitly that ignoring Mercosur, or not 
giving Mercosur the attention that would be expected from a global actor 
such as the EU, should not automatically be considered a strategy – the 
strategy of indifference. If the EU was doing so deliberately, it would have 
reasons, and a plan that explained that indifference was the strategy. But 
for us to be able to present this as a strategy, the EU would have to have 
known everything about Mercosur and have had reasons that supported its 
planned indifference. This point will be developed further in Chapter  7 . 
 In terms of ‘interest’, the actor does not need to have interest in the object 
affected by its strategy since it could be part of a bigger plan. In other 
words, the EU could develop a strategy towards Mercosur as part of a 
global EU strategy and have no interest whatsoever in Mercosur per se. 
Mercosur could be the pathway to achieve something, not the end in itself. 
Therefore, ‘interest’ is not a necessary part of the defi nition.
 This section has examined the wider debates that focus on the EU ’ s status 
as a global actor and its potential as a strategic player. The discussion has 
outlined what is understood by the term ‘global actor’, and what is expected 
of the EU in order for it to be considered a global actor in terms of presence, 
capability and opportunity. In relation to the strategic aspects of the EU 
behaviour towards Mercosur, the necessity of plans and objectives and the 
resources to achieve those aims have been stated. The repercussion in the 
external sphere, such as changes in international politics, on that strategy 
must also be considered. 
 Contextualizing the case study: historical review of regional politics 
 This section provides the historical background to the emergence of Mer-
cosur. Since Mercosur involves most of South America, a general under-
standing of regional politics is crucial to comprehend the importance of 
some parts of the EU policy towards Mercosur. This region has been 
infl uenced historically by three countries, Spain, Portugal and the US. After 
this outline of how these have infl uenced politics in South America, the 
next section will focus on a discussion of Mercosur ’ s institutions. This will 
enable us to see not only how Mercosur institutions have evolved but also 
the way in which their evolution has been affected by their dialogue with 
the EU. 
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 The shadow of Spain and Portugal over Latin America 
 Relations between these two regions date from the late fi fteenth century, 
when Christopher Columbus arrived in the Caribbean region on 12 October 
1492. He fi rst arrived at Watling Island (nowadays known as the Bahamas 
group), which Columbus later called El Salvador. Columbus kept sailing 
for a few days towards Cuba, which he ‘identifi ed’ as Japan or China in 
search of the palaces covered in gold that Marco Polo had publicized many 
years before ( Pendle  1963 : 33–34). Leaving aside the incredible way these 
two continents encountered each other, it is crucial to understand that from 
that moment a conquest of Latin America was begun by Spain. Spain was 
soon followed by Portugal, and other European states. Due to the competi-
tiveness between the Portuguese and Spanish kings at that time for ‘owner-
ship’ of the land in the region, Pope Alexander VI established a geographical 
line that divided the Spanish territory from the Portuguese territory ( Pendle 
 1963 ). This line has been crucial for the development of both regions, with 
Brazil on one side and the rest of Latin America on the other. It precipitated 
a different evolution in the Spanish colonies from that of the Portuguese, 
to the point where there was little interaction between them until very 
recently. In fact, Brazil was until the late 1970s in frontier disputes with its 
neighbours. This also demonstrates the power of the Catholic Church in 
Europe which was translated to Latin America, particularly in terms of 
other Portuguese and Spanish invasions of Latin America. Those three 
centuries of colonial dominance by Portugal and Spain meant the imposi-
tion of their languages and their religion, and the creation of a clear 
demarcation between the two colonies which would affect America in the 
long term – so much so that Furtado argues that the ‘essential features of 
what was to become the social structure of the Latin American countries 
originated in the Spanish conquest itself and in the institutions established 
by the Spanish and Portuguese to create an economic base which would 
consolidate their conquest of the new lands’ ( Furtado  1976 : 14). 
 When these territories gained independence in the eighteenth century and 
fi gures such as Simon Bolivar inspired the revolutions that led to the 
independence of Latin American countries, the direction of Spanish and 
Portuguese territories again progressed in different ways. The Portuguese 
territories, through a transition without revolutions, became independent 
and created one nation that became Brazil. Spanish territories experienced 
revolution and were eventually divided into thirteen republics. According 
to  Murilo de Carvalho  ( 1987 : 55–56), this was partly a consequence of 
education policy. The Portuguese did not want universities to be created in 
Brazil. Therefore, the elite would have to come to Portugal to study, which 
led to a generation of graduates from the same university who both knew 
and trusted each other and would eventually lead to this group gaining 
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control of the Brazilian government. In contrast, Spain modelled the uni-
versities in Latin America to resemble the organization of Spanish universi-
ties. More specifi cally, the royal universities replicated the Spanish University 
of Salamanca, whilst the religious universities were modelled on the Spanish 
University of Alcala. Thus, according to  Murilo de Carvalho , the ‘twenty-
three universities were scattered in what eventually would become thirteen 
different countries’ ( 1987 : 56). The infl uence of Spain and Portugal also 
continued in other ways following de-colonialization. 
 In terms of regional politics, Brazil did not start to cooperate with its 
neighbours until the early 1980s. In fact, during the Malvinas/Falklands 
confl ict in 1982, Brazil reacted in a very positive way towards Argentina 
in response to the wider international reaction to the confl ict ( Gomez 
Saraiva and Tedesco  2003 ). Furthermore, in 1985, Argentina and Brazil, 
which until that point were clear adversaries and competitors for the leader-
ship of South America and therefore Latin America, started to develop a 
project of regional integration which would be known later as Mercosur. 
In many ways this development was unexpected, especially when we con-
sider that centuries of rivalry had ended only recently. 
 North America comes along and demands its ‘backyard’ 
 Just a few years after achieving independence in Latin America from the 
European countries (with the exception of Cuba), another great power in 
the making came along and had a dramatic impact on Latin America. The 
US was reaching the size that it is today when it started to infl uence Latin 
American countries internal politics. By the 1890s, the US reached from 
Maine to California and was intent on further territorial increases. In 1898, 
after the short (three-month) Spanish–American War, Cuba came to be 
under US military rule, which lasted until 1902, whilst Puerto Rico passed 
into the hands of the US ( Pendle  1963 ). The US had strategic interests in 
Latin America and was not shy in its attempts to achieve these objectives. 
The ‘creation’ of Panama in just a few weeks through the US ’ s implicit 
intervention and the following ‘concession’ to the US only two weeks later 
by Panama of the right to create the Panama Canal encouraged Roosevelt 
further: ‘In the western hemisphere the adherence of the United States to 
the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in 
fl agrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an 
international policy power’ ( Pendle  1963 : 177). 
 The various actions of the US in Latin America during the twentieth 
century provoked the accusation of imperialist behaviour. There is abundant 
literature which highlights that issue in US–Latin America relations in the 
twentieth century. The most infl uential example of that time was  Ariel by 
 Jose Enrique Rodo ( 1922 , fi rst published 1900), but for more contemporary 
issues see  Chomsky  ( 1992 ), for example. The Cold War and the fear of 
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Latin American countries following Cuba ’ s example, after Castro led the 
revolution in 1959 and made it into a communist state, gave the US the 
perfect excuse for adopting an even more interventionist approach. This is 
somewhat evident in the case of the 1980s Central American crisis. At that 
point the EU intervened in the region for the fi rst time, opening the door 
to different types of relationships between Europe and Latin America, 
among them EU–Mercosur relations. 
 An introduction to Mercosur: the golden boy of regionalism 
in Latin America 
 There have been many attempts to develop regional groups in Latin America: 
for example, the Organization of Central American States in 1951, the Latin 
American Free Trade Association in 1960 and the Andean Pact in 1969. 
However, none of these groups was ever able to achieve the same degree of 
integration as Mercosur. Mercosur has been considered to be not only the 
most integrated regional group in Latin America, but also one of the most 
integrated regional groups in the world after the EU. This section will begin 
by introducing each of the countries that are members of the Mercosur, 
followed by an explanation of the Mercosur institutions which are central 
to the discussion and analysis offered in this case study. 
 Mercosur countries 
 Brazil 
 Brazil is by far the largest of all Mercosur countries, covering roughly 75% 
of the Mercosur geographical territory. Due to both its colonial past and 
the way that it gained independence from Portugal, Brazil ’ s socio-economic 
profi le can be described as a system of oligarchies. This system has had a 
direct impact on the question of land distribution/re-distribution, which in 
turn has had both a continuous and direct impact upon the Brazilian politi-
cal landscape. In the area of politics, there have been a series of shifts from 
democratic to dictatorial governments over time. In very broad terms, one 
period could be seen as running from 1930 to 1964, an era characterized 
at the outset by a quasi-democratic government, but due to economic 
instability the country started to experience social turmoil in the late 1940s. 
 Skidmore  ( 1967 ) provides a comprehensive discussion of Brazilian politics 
during this period. Skidmore also outlines the nature of the US ’ s involve-
ment in the  coup d’état that resulted in a military regime from 1964 until 
1985. At the same time that democracy returned to Brazil, Mercosur was 
beginning to be designed. In political terms, the Brazilian dictatorship 
cannot be compared to the dictatorships of Videla in Argentina and Pinochet 
in Chile because in the Brazilian case it was not a personal dictatorship. 
Rather it was a succession of presidents chosen and installed by the military. 
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Moreover, although it was a dictatorship, it was a government which was 
recognized internationally – unlike Videla ’ s or Pinochet ’ s, which were 
subject to international criticism. 
 The elections of 1985 were not open; instead a very constrained electoral 
team selected the president, but the fi rst non-military president was chosen, 
Tancredo Neves. He died of natural causes shortly after being elected and 
was subsequently replaced by José Sarney, who was not so far from the 
previous regime in political terms. Sarney was involved in ethically ques-
tionable deals, but they did not affect him politically in the same way as 
some of the deals of the next president, Collor de Mello (1990–1992), who 
was accused by his own brother of corruption and consequently resigned 
after two years ( Weyland  1993 ). The level of corruption and the lack of 
full democracy were the defi ning features of Brazil at the time of the creation 
of Mercosur. 
 Argentina 
 In Argentina, the twentieth century saw a switch both from military regimes 
to democratic governments and from democratic governments to military 
dictatorships. ‘Since the 1940s Argentina ’ s political history has been domi-
nated by the military and Peronism, a populist movement with its own 
political party, the Partido Justicialista (PJ), whose corporatist and statist 
tendencies are hard to characterise on a left/right continuum’ ( Waylen  2000 : 
775). 
 In 1976, the last military regime and the most repressive in the history 
of Argentina began when Jorge Rafael Videla instigated a  coup d’état which 
brought about his own personal dictatorship. Videla adopted an extremely 
repressive political line. The Malvinas/Falkland confl ict brought interna-
tional attention to the political situation in Argentina and condemned 
Videla ’ s dictatorship. 
 In 1983 democracy returned to Argentina and Raul Alfonsin consolidated 
the democratic institutions. Alfonsin ’ s victory was possible ‘because (unlike 
the Peronists) it was untainted by the repression and failures of the outgoing 
military regime’ ( Waylen  2000 : 775). Although Alfonsin enjoyed a good 
reputation thanks to his efforts towards the democratization of Argentina, 
economically his policies failed and the next government under a ‘Peronist’, 
Carlos Menem, won elections in 1989. Menem was the president for ten 
years, but just a few years later he was accused of high levels of corruption, 
like his colleague Collor de Mello in Brazil. Menem was the president who 
would sign the Treaty of Asunción that created Mercosur in 1991 on behalf 
of Argentina. 
 Uruguay 
 Although Uruguay also experienced dictatorial rule, from 1973 to 1985, it 
has always been seen as one of the most economically and politically stable 
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countries in South America, to the point that it has been called the Swit-
zerland of Latin America. Apart from the authoritarian government between 
1973 and 1985, Uruguay enjoyed democracy during the whole of the 
twentieth century, and is the Latin America country that has had the longest 
democracy ( Cason  2000 ). 
 Uruguay ’ s dictatorship was not as ruthless as that in Argentina but a bit 
more restrictive than in Brazil in relation to the repression of left-wing 
ideology and activism. It was not a personal dictatorship and during its 
twelve years there were different individuals in power. In 1980 the referen-
dum for the constitution proposed by the military was rejected, but it 
marked the beginning of the transition to democracy because this incident 
forced a programme of elections and in 1984 the Naval Club Agreement 
between the leaders of the political parties and the military made possible 
the elections of 1984 ( Chasquetti and Buquet  2004 ). With Julio Maria 
Sanguinetti (1985–1990) fi rst, and Luis Alberto Lacalle later (1990–1995), 
democratic institutions were re-established. The military were afforded an 
amnesty – considered the price for a stable government in a period of 
transition. This was the situation in Uruguay when it accepted the invita-
tion of Brazil and Argentina to join the project in 1990: a brand new 
democracy, in a country considered to be one of the most stable in political 
and economic terms, and the most democratically advanced in Latin 
America. 
 Paraguay 
 In 1947 a civil war exploded in Paraguay due to huge social inequality. 
From 1947 to 1962 there was only one legal political party, the Partido 
Colorado. The fi rst eight years of this period saw a civilian government, 
but in 1954 there was a  coup d’état by Alfredo Stroessner Matiauda, who 
became the dictator until 1989. This was ‘only the latest in Paraguay ’ s long 
and violent history of dictators, international wars, and army intervention 
in politics’ ( Sondrol  1992 : 128). This dictatorship, known as the ‘ stronato ’, 
was a personal dictatorship, and although the military had helped Stroessner 
with the  coup d’état the military were not the institution ruling the country 
but the dictator kept a close relation with the military ( Sondrol  1992 ). 
However, in 1989 another member of the military, Andrés Rodriguez 
Pedotti, and his supporters challenged Stroessner, who at that time was in 
his seventies, and negotiated his surrender. The  stronato  was by then weak 
and with internal divisions which were only increased when Stroessner tried 
to impose his son Gustavo as his successor. Rodriguez called for elections 
months after the coup and presented himself as a candidate ( Valenzuela 
 1997 ). The fi rst elections were suspected of being fraudulent, but they were 
a fi rst step towards full democratic elections, which fi nally happened in 
1993, when civilian Juan Carlos Wasmosy was chosen in free and direct 
elections ( Valenzuela  1997 ). 
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 Of the four Mercosur members, Paraguay was the state with the lowest 
level of democratization at the time of the Treaty of Asunción. Furthermore, 
it is the most economically dependent of all the Mercosur countries. There-
fore, for Paraguay, the development of Mercosur was crucial. 
 Mercosur 
 In 1985, the Argentina–Brazil Integration and Economics Cooperation 
Programme was established. The fi rst important agreement of this pro-
gramme was the Act of Cooperation and Integration, signed by Argentina 
and Brazil on 29 July 1986. The objective of this programme was to create 
economic cooperation between the biggest countries in South America. On 
29 November 1988, two years after the Act of Cooperation and Integration, 
the same countries signed the Treaty of Cooperation, Integration and 
Development. This treaty was designed to reduce internal tariffs on some 
goods within ten years ( Alvarez  1995 ;  Simancas  1999 ). On 6 July 1990, 
the Act of Buenos Aires was signed, with the intention of establishing a 
common market by 31 December 1994 ( Laporte Galli  1995 ). In the second 
semester of 1990 Brazil and Argentina invited Uruguay, Paraguay and Chile 
to join; Chile declined the invitation ( Manzetti  1994 ). On 26 March 1991, 
the Republic of Argentina, the Federal Republic of Brazil, the Republic of 
Paraguay and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay subscribed to the Treaty 
of Asunción. This treaty created the Common Market of the South. Despite 
consisting of a mere twenty-fi ve pages, the treaty outlined a basic set of 
objectives and the methods by which these objectives would be achieved 
( Bouzas and Soltz  2001 ). One of the main aims was the reduction of the 
tariffs for Brazil and Argentina by 31 December 1994 and the reduction of 
the tariffs for Paraguay and Uruguay exactly one year later. In order to 
achieve this objective, there was an attempt to develop a free circulation of 
goods and services, in addition to the introduction of a common external 
tariff, adoption of a common commercial policy, the coordination of macro-
economics and sectorial policies and the harmonization of the necessary 
legislation to strength the process of integration ( Bouzas and Soltz  2001 ; 
see also  www.mercosur.int ). 
 At the end of June 1992, the institutional structure was established. 
However, it was not until December 1994 that the four members of Mer-
cosur signed the Ouro Preto Protocol (OPP). As a result of this protocol, 
on 1 January 1995, Mercosur received its international legal powers at the 
same time that it signed the Europe–Mercosur Inter-regional Framework 
for Cooperation Agreement (EMIFCA) with the EU. 
 The institutions of Mercosur 
 The institutions of Mercosur have been in a state of continuous change 
since the Treaty of Asunción, which is not surprising since the treaty only 
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had twenty-four articles. The North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) did not have the same political aspirations of integration, yet had 
more than 1,100 pages with 245 articles ( Bouzas and Soltz  2001 ). Figures 
 1.1 and  1.2 provide a timeline and an outline of the organization of 
the Mercosur institutions. As it shows, the decision-making bodies are 
 Figure 1.1  Timeline of development of Mercosur 
1991: Treaty of Asunción
1994: Ouro Preto Protocol




2003: Regulaon of Olives Protocol
2005: Creaon of Funds for the Structural
Convergence of Mercosur (FOCEM) and
constuve protocol of PARLASUR




2009: Creaon of Mercosur Instute of Public
Policies in Human Rights (IPPDH)
2010: Creaon of the office of High Representave
of Mercosur (ARGM) and the Unity of Support for
Social Parcipaon (UPS)
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 Figure 1.2  Mercosur institutions 
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completely inter-governmental, with the ministers of economy and foreign 
affairs the main actors. 
 Three of Mercosur ’ s decision-making bodies, the Common Market 
Council (CMC), the Common Market Group (CMG) and the Trade Com-
mission (TC), meet periodically. The fi rst two were created after the Treaty 
of Asunción and the latter was created at the time of the Ouro Preto Pro-
tocol. The CMC was responsible for the process of integration, and the 
results of its work are decisions. The heads of states are present at CMC 
meetings at least once per year. The CMG is the executive body and is 
responsible for executing the decisions of the CMC through resolutions. In 
addition to this, the CMG is responsible for negotiations with third parties 
in the name of Mercosur. The third decision-making body, the TC, supports 
the CMG and produces directives ( Bouzas and Soltz  2001 ). 
 Mercosur also has three counselling groups: the Joint Parliamentary 
Commission, the Economic and Social Consultative Forum, and the Com-
mission of Permanent Representatives. These groups were created in 2003 
and are very similar to the European Commission in that they are in charge 
of proposals from the CMC regarding the integration of Mercosur. Merco-
sur only has one permanent institution, the Administrative Secretariat, 
which is located in Montevideo (Uruguay). The main function of the 
Administrative Secretariat is to provide the relevant documents and infor-
mation to Mercosur members in relation to the protocols and agreements 
agreed by members ( Manzetti  1994 ;  Bouzas and Soltz  2001 ). The Admin-
istrative Secretariat was created by the Treaty of Asunción in 1991 but was 
improved in the OPP in 1995. The legal sources of Mercosur were defi ned 
in the OPP as the following: the Treaty of Asunción, its protocols, related 
instruments and the agreements reached in the context of the Treaty of 
Asunción and other related instruments and the decisions, resolutions and 
directives issued by Mercosur competent organs (see  www.mercosur.int ). 
 Conclusion 
 In order to uncover these reasons behind the EU policy towards Mercosur, 
the focus of the analysis will be the level of engagement shown by the EU 
policy towards the South American region. This engagement will be meas-
ured by looking at the relation between commitment and ambition. The 
former is related to the EU ’ s will in achieving its objectives. The latter is 
related to the EU ’ s status quo and its efforts at moving away from that 
position. This study will also challenge the value of existing explanations 
in the literature relating to this topic. 
 This case study of EU–Mercosur relations is important since EU–
Mercosur relations were the fi rst case of inter-regionalism in history and as 
such this is a crucial moment in the debate regarding the EU ’ s global 
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‘actorness’ (or lack thereof), one of the most keenly contested topics in 
discussions related to EU foreign policy. 
 This chapter has focused on the introduction of all the aspects of this 
volume, establishing a broad framework for the case study. First, it has 
conceptualized the EU ’ s global ‘actorness’ and linked this concept to the 
discussion of the EU as a strategic actor since the debate about the existence 
of an EU strategy towards Mercosur is key for the argument. The discussion 
then moved on to give some background on Mercosur, starting with a 
review of regional politics in South America and the three main countries 
that infl uenced regional politics, Spain, Portugal and the US. The descrip-
tion fi nishes in the mid-1980s with the Central American crisis, when the 
EU became involved in Latin America for the fi rst time. This EU involve-
ment marked the beginning of EU–Mercosur relations, and therefore the 
discussion is focused on the situation of Mercosur countries in the 1980s. 
Finally, there is a description of the Mercosur institutions. The next chapter 
will move to a concise literature review of this topic. 
 Chapter  2 will critically examine the existing literature in relation to 
EU–Mercosur relations. In doing so, it will outline the six main arguments 
offered to explain the development of EU policy towards Mercosur. In 
addition to this, Chapter  2 will briefl y consider those explanations given in 
relation to the development of EU foreign policy more generally, and how 
these explanations correspond with the arguments given in relation to the 
development of EU policy towards Mercosur. Chapter  2 will also provide 
an account of the methodological approach employed in this study. The 
discussion in Chapter  3 will focus on outlining the various features of EU 
policy-making and decision-making that may have infl uenced the develop-
ment of EU policy towards Mercosur. Building on this, Chapters  4 ,  5 ,  6 
and  7 will analyse the different stages of the policy ’ s development. 
 In the following chapters it will be argued that the EU developed its 
policy towards Mercosur in a responsive way. More specifi cally, it will be 
argued that the EU responded to Mercosur demands that were advanced 
with the intermediation of Spain and Portugal when they became members 
of the EU in 1986. Therefore, the argument put forward here will also make 
a contribution to the general debate about the Europeanization of national 
foreign policies. In addition to this, it will suggest that there has been a 
clear response by the EU in relation to promoting regional integration, 
albeit to a lesser extent. In doing so, this monograph will, therefore, comple-
ment existing contributions by critiquing the various arguments presented 
in the literature which seek to explain the development of EU policy towards 
Mercosur. Here the discussion will critically examine those arguments 
concerning Europeanization and the external federator perspective that see 
it as a proactive process, not reactive as this monograph claims. The other 
arguments are: counterbalancing the US, global aspiration, long-standing 
economic and cultural ties and economic interdependence. 
 2 
 Analytical framework: relations between 
the European Union and Mercosur 
 Introduction 
 This chapter establishes the analytical framework that will be used to 
examine EU–Mercosur relations. It begins by offering a critical review of 
the existing literature. Until now, the literature on EU–Mercosur has been 
very descriptive but not very analytical. It has tended to cover specifi c 
moments of the relations and as a consequence it has forgotten to look at 
the bigger picture. Most authors have chosen to explain EU–Mercosur 
relations by using more than one argument at a time without choosing one 
as the most representative. Furthermore, some authors explicitly say that 
until the end of the negotiations of the association agreement there cannot 
be a fi nal answer. This is hardly a clear and strong debate on a policy. 
 The different arguments presented in the literature will be reviewed in 
this chapter and will also be considered throughout the monograph in order 
to understand to what extent they can offer an explanation of the evolution 
of different stages of the policy. All of the arguments given in the literature 
suggest that the EU has been proactive in terms of developing this policy 
and that the EU has more or less acted in a strategic manner. This study 
questions the proactive perspective by analysing the role of the EU during 
each of the three key stages of policy development outlined above. Never-
theless, the existing arguments shed some light on the extent to which the 
EU has behaved as a global actor, which is also one of the most important 
debates in the area of EU foreign policy. These points will be discussed in 
more detail below. 
 The chapter is divided into the following sections. The fi rst section will 
critically examine the reasons given in the existing literature which seek to 
explain the development of EU policy towards Mercosur. This section will 
also consider those arguments which link the EU ’ s role in EU–Mercosur 
relations to the more general arguments which claim that the EU is a global 
actor. As Grugel points out, the link between EU–Mercosur relations and 
the global ‘actorness’ debate is clear: ‘New regionalism thus offers the EU 
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a chance of reaffi rming its role as a global actor; in creating a relationship 
with Mercosur, the EU also remakes itself’  Grugel  ( 2004 : 622). In the 
second section the discussion moves on to the methodology used, and the 
structure of this book in terms of empirical chapters. 
 Literature review of EU foreign policy towards Mercosur 
 This section will focus on examining previous attempts to explain the 
development of EU policy towards Mercosur from the mid-1980s onwards. 
Since the external relations of the EU have arguably been the last area to 
be developed, there is a shortage of both theoretical and empirical literature 
analysing the actions of the EU abroad in the 1980s. 
 Most of the work on EU–Mercosur, unfortunately, is descriptive (for 
example, see  Sanahuja  2000a; 2003 ;  Kinoshita  2001 ;  Cienfuegos  2006 ). In 
this category has to be placed most of the work produced by the Mercosur 
Chair at the University of Sciences Po, Paris, as well as other studies such 
as  Kirkpatrick et al. ’ s  ( 2006 ) work on the Sustainability Impact Assessment. 
Nevertheless, academic work related to EU–Mercosur relations has grown 
at different times, which also happen to coincide with successes in EU–Mer-
cosur relations, such as the period around 1995 after the signature of 
EMIFCA; circa 1999 after the launch of the negotiations for an association 
agreement, which included an FTA; and circa 2004 when there was a high 
expectation that there would be a successful end to the negotiations for the 
association agreement. The way that the literature has developed in terms 
of analysing EU–Mercosur relations – that is, by focusing on specifi c suc-
cessful moments – tends to avoid a detailed discussion of unsuccessful 
moments. More specifi cally, the existing literature does not focus on the 
lack of agreement or progress or on the reasons for those failures, which 
are just as important to our understanding of the EU–Mercosur relations. 
They are especially important if we are to fully understand the arguments 
which suggest that the EU has behaved as a global actor. Another noticeable 
feature of the existing academic work is the short temporal framework that 
is used. As already mentioned, there is a clear emphasis on studying EU–
Mercosur relations around the time of the 2004 negotiations. This lack of 
long-term analysis fails to engage with discussions of those explanations 
which examine other periods of EU–Mercosur relations. 
 Nevertheless, those works that do look at the situation of the earlier 
relations between the EU and Latin America in general and Mercosur in 
particular agree that there has been a clear change in EU–Latin America 
relations since the mid- to late 1980s (e.g.  Aldecoa Luzarraga  1995 ;  Laporte 
Galli  1995 ;  Anacoreta Correia  1996 ;  Ayuso  1996 ;  Dauster  1996 ;  Piening 
 1997 ;  Cepal  1999 ;  Hoste  1999 ;  Freres  2000 ;  Youngs  2000 ;  Vasconcelos 
 2001 ;  Sanahuja  2003 ;  Smith  2003 ;  Cienfuegos  2006 ). In contrast, other 
authors ( Camino Munoz and Nieto Solis  1992 ;  Bizzozero  1995 ;  Smith 
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 1998 ;  Dinan  1999 ;  Sanchez Bajo  1999 ;  Santander  2005 ) suggest that it was 
the early 1990s that marked the change in EU–Latin American relations. 
 The change in relations at some point between the 1980s and 1990s 
tends to be explained by several issues. Firstly, it has been suggested that 
there was a wave of democratization in South American countries. Secondly, 
it has also been argued that there has been a shift from old regionalism to 
new regionalism across Latin America which has led to a greater degree of 
economic openness in the Latin American markets. Thirdly, others have 
suggested that the change in relations between the EU and Latin America 
came as a direct result of the EU ’ s involvement in Central America. Fur-
thermore, some authors have argued that the membership of Spain and 
Portugal of the European Union instigated a change in EU–Latin America 
relations. Finally, the end of the Cold War and the changes in the interna-
tional balance of power have also been cited by those who claim that the 
change in EU–Latin American relations began in the early 1990s. On the 
surface, all these explanations seem plausible. Nevertheless, although they 
are not incompatible, the fact that they are treated with the same importance 
in terms of explaining the development of EU relations with Mercosur 
demonstrates a degree of ambiguity. Some could claim that EU involvement 
in Central America was a result of Iberian membership of the EU. It is 
unclear, though, why the end of the Cold War would be so signifi cant in a 
region that was already democratic and opening its markets – which did 
not have links with the Soviet Union – and was also so geographically far 
from both Europe and Asia. In addition to this, it is remarkable that the 
change in relations was so dramatic, yet it has attracted so little academic 
attention. It is important to highlight that the mid-1980s were a pivotal 
moment and caused a turning point which changed the trajectory of EU 
policy towards Latin America, a region which had been so blatantly 
neglected in the previous three decades. Therefore, this period requires 
further academic analysis in order to clarify our understanding of the 
development of the relations between the EU and Mercosur. 
 It should be noted that for most of the period up to 1995, EU policy 
towards Latin America was synonymous with EU policy towards Mercosur 
( Aldecoa Luzarraga  1995 ). In the period after 1995, the EU developed 
relations with other regional groups and countries. In the existing literature 
it is common to fi nd scholars using the same reasons to explain both EU 
policy towards Mercosur and EU policy towards Latin America more gener-
ally. These explanations can be grouped into six distinct categories. The 
remainder of this section examines each of these six explanations. 
 This monograph seeks to examine the compatibility of each of these 
arguments across the three distinct periods of policy development. The fi rst 
possible explanation in the literature suggests that over a period of time the 
EU sought to counterbalance the infl uence of the US in the region. It pro-
poses that if the US increased its involvement in Latin America, the EU ’ s 
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involvement would also increase as a direct response. The second explana-
tion that is offered is based on the EU ’ s global aspirations. Here it is sug-
gested that if the EU increased its involvement in international affairs, it 
would be expected that the EU would become further involved in Latin 
America. The third way of explaining the development of EU policy towards 
Latin America is related to the promotion of regional integration abroad. 
This argument suggests that if there is greater regional integration  within 
Latin America, then it is likely that the EU ’ s involvement in the region will 
also increase. The fourth explanation that is offered in the literature relates 
to the EU ’ s long-standing, economic and cultural ties with Latin America. 
This argues that it is to be expected that there will be an increase in the 
EU ’ s involvement in Latin America as a result of there being an increase in 
shared values between both regions. The fi fth explanation given in the lit-
erature, the interdependence debate, is related to the increasing levels of 
globalization. This argument predicts that if there are increasing levels of 
trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) in Latin America, the EU ’ s 
involvement in the region will also increase. Finally, the sixth explanation 
is that the Iberian membership of the EU will result in an increase in the 
EU ’ s involvement in Latin America over time. 
 Counterbalancing the US 
 The most common argument that can be found in the existing literature 
focuses on the notion of competition between the EU and the US over Latin 
America. It suggests that the EU has sought to counterbalance the power 
and strong levels of infl uence that the US exerts in the region ( Smith  1998 ; 
 Bulmer-Thomas  2000 ;  Crawley  2000 ;  Giordano  2002 ;  Holland  2002 ; 
 Santander  2002, 2003 ;  Smith  2003 : 80;  Torrelli  2003 ). This literature tends 
to focus on the last stage of the policy, which takes place from the mid-
1990s onwards. Latin America has been considered the ‘US ’ s backyard’, 
and the infl uence of the US in the entire region was important throughout 
the course of the twentieth century. This argument suggests that, for norma-
tive and economic reasons, the EU is trying to achieve the same degree of 
infl uence in the regions. In relation to economic issues, this argument is 
evidenced by the supposed reaction of the EU to the Free Trade Area of 
Americas project. This US-led project sought to establish economic agree-
ments between the Mercosur and individual Latin American countries. It is 
suggested that the US and the EU would compete to exert higher levels of 
infl uence in Latin America by trying to increase import and export trade 
levels ( Sanahuja  2000b ;  Arenas  2002 ;  Alecu de Flers and Regelsberger 
 2005 ).  Santander  ( 2005 ), for example, specifi cally refers to the EU ’ s  strategy 
against the US. 
 For  Crawley  ( 2000 ), the strategy is sustained by the timing of events on 
both sides of the Atlantic. Crawley suggests that the EU was dealing with 
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Mercosur and trying to get Chile involved in Mercosur, whilst the US was 
trying to get Chile to join NAFTA. The literature suggests that initiating an 
FTA has the same level of impact as the negotiations since it demonstrates 
the ‘intentions’ of the actor offering the trade agreement. In fact,  Crawley 
 ( 2000 ) suggests that something similar happened at the Asia–Pacifi c Eco-
nomic Cooperation meeting in 1995, where discussions were also held 
regarding FTAs. Therefore, it could be argued that the EU and the US were 
fi ghting for access to markets around the world and not just in Latin 
America. Similarly,  Holland  ( 2002 ) also argues that the EU was competing 
with the US in different fi elds at the same time, continuing the EU ’ s global 
policy of free trade:
 For the EU, the proposed Latin American FTA does not signify any departure 
from the dominant economic philosophy of the 1990s: free trade is consistent 
with its global approach and international rivalry with the United States for 
trading dominance. Indeed, the prospect of a USA-led Free Trade Area of the 
Americas (FTAA) composed of a 34-country group from north to south 
proposed for the year 2005 was an additional motivation for the Europeans. 
 ( Holland  2002 : 59) 
 A similar argument is put forward by  Claudia Torrelli ( 2003 ), who shares 
Holland ’ s view that the EU and the US were competing for access to the 
markets of developing countries through the use of FTAs. For some scholars 
this only partially explains the nature of EU policy development in that 
there are also other reasons which explain EU policy towards this region 
(for example, see  Smith  1995, 1998 ). This view is also held by  Bulmer-
Thomas ( 2000 ), who contends that as well as competing with the US, the 
EU ’ s interest in Latin America emerged as a result of an increase in Mercosur 
imports, in addition to the EU seeking better access to the automobile sector 
in Latin America. 
 The notion that there is a growing political competitiveness between the 
EU and the US is advanced by  Grugel  ( 2004 ). Grugel argues, ‘New regional-
ism thus offers the EU a chance of reaffi rming its role as a global actor; in 
creating a relationship with Mercosur, the EU also remakes itself’ ( Grugel 
 2004 : 622). Furthermore, Grugel suggests that the EU has a very specifi c 
way of dealing with Mercosur which is more in line with the EU ’ s project 
on regional integration. The EU is ‘attempting to establish new and deeper 
regional relationships in order to cope with and mitigate the impact of US 
power’ ( Cienfuegos  2006 : 81). In a way, the ‘confrontation’ between the 
EU and the US would be on the normative side, since the EU and the US 
would be presenting different images and presence to Mercosur. And for a 
change Mercosur would be in a position where it would be possible to deal 
with a powerful global actor other than the US. Some writers explicitly 
disagree with the ‘competing’ argument. For example,  Sanchez Bajo  ( 1999 ) 
contends that the EU is trying to integrate developing countries into the 
c02.indd   25 12/15/2016   12:43:59 PM
26 The EU’s policy towards Mercosur
world economy. In contrast to the EU–US competition perspective,  Klom 
 ( 2000 ) argues that regional integration offers a better explanation for the 
development of EU–Mercosur relations. 
 This argument on EU–Mercosur can be linked to other general discus-
sions of EU external relations, such as the discussion on EU trade power. 
Meunier and Nicolaidis argue that:
 The EU is a formidable power in trade. If it is considered as one single 
economic unit, there is little doubt that it has become, since the last 
enlargement, the biggest trading bloc in the world. As a result, its potential 
hegemonic power, based on the capacity to grant or withhold access to its 
internal market, has become as strong as the US.  ( Meunier and Nicolaidis 
 2005 : 265) 
 If the EU is such a powerful actor that it is comparable to the US, then we 
must consider whether the EU will compete with the US. This is a central 
question in the debate and the answer seems clear in the literature. For 
example,  Soderbaum and Van Langenhove  ( 2005 ) argue that the EU is 
already competing with the US and Japan. 
 The fact that the EU does not have a military capacity similar to that of 
the US is a main objection in the debate about whether the EU is a great 
power. However, this does not seem to be a problem:
 The EU is also becoming a power through trade. Increasingly, it uses market 
access as a bargaining chip to obtain changes in the domestic arena of its 
trading partners, from labour standards to development policies. Indeed, one 
of the central objectives of EU trade policy under trade commissioner Pascal 
Lamy has been to ‘harness globalization’ and spread, through the negotiations 
of trade agreements, the European model of society to the rest of the world. 
 ( Meunier and Nicolaidis  2005 : 266) 
 In many ways, this has led to the suggestion that the EU has something in 
common with the US in that the EU is trying to replicate the US ’ s hegemonic 
type of behaviour. The EU is taking the US example in promoting trade 
agreements with regions that are in a weaker position than the EU ( Aggar-
wal and Fogarty  2004 ). 
 Hardacre  ( 2009 ) goes further and draws explicitly on concepts which 
tend to be found in debates on realism such as ‘balancing’ and ‘bandwagon-
ing’ in the area of trade competition. Drawing upon the work of  Rüland 
( 2002a : 3), Hardacre outlines the motivation behind seeking further inter-
regionalism between the EU and Mercosur:
 Power balancing is thus now increasingly linked to mercantilist ideas of 
commercial advance and competition as well as control over international 
institutions … In this view, power balancing is pursued for purely commercial 
reasons, to gain extra preferences, to protect from preference erosion and to 
open new markets.  ( Hardacre  2009 : 37) 
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 In the case of EU–Mercosur, it is argued that the pursuit of inter-
regionalism would be motivated by the EU ’ s desire to counterbalance the 
infl uence of the US in Latin America.  Aggarwal and Fogarty ( 2004 ) contend 
that such a motivation clearly emanates from a desire to counteract Ameri-
can hegemony by promoting the EU as a political and economic power, able 
to guarantee security in the international arena by pursuing a ‘hub and 
spoke’ strategy, a reply to the American approach to the Free Trade Area 
of the Americas (FTAA). 
 Hardacre writes, ‘Closely linked to the balancing is the concept of 
bandwagoning, a related realist concept which describes the joining of 
regional or inter-regional initiatives so as not to be left out, or behind’ 
( Hardacre  2009 : 37). In this instance, EU–Mercosur inter-regionalism 
would be activated on the EU side in order that the EU is not left out of 
the potential success of the FTAA. Furthermore, Hardacre contends that 
‘Balancing and bandwagoning are closely related concepts and can be 
related to inter-regionalism’ ( Hardacre  2009 : 38) and uses  Rüland ’ s work 
( 2002b ) to explain that by being fl exible with each other, regional players 
could help each other if the occasion necessitated it. With the help of 
Rüland ’ s work, Hardacre tries to further extend the debate on the motiva-
tions underlying the EU ’ s interactions with other regions by focusing on the 
EU ’ s foreign policy. 
 Leaving aside the debate on EU foreign policy, this section has discussed 
the argument that the EU has sought to counterbalance US infl uence in 
Latin America. The discussion above has suggested that the EU has inter-
acted with Mercosur by adopting a ‘hub and spoke’ tactic, trying to develop 
agreements with regions in a weaker position to gain infl uence in the region 
as a whole since the EU will be the one setting the agenda. All the authors 
mentioned above who advanced this argument take for granted the notion 
that the EU is a strategic actor. This argument will be critically examined 
in more detail in the following chapters. 
 Affi nity 
 Another set of scholars cite the affi nity between the EU and Latin America 
as the main reason for both the development of relations and for the two 
regions becoming ‘natural’ partners (for example, see  Aldecoa Luzarraga 
 1995 ;  Sanahuja  2004 ;  Freres  2000 ;  Freres and Sanahuja  2005 ). According 
to  Dinan  ( 1999 ), since 1960 the traditional relations between the EU and 
Latin America were the result of the close socio-historical and cultural links 
between the two regions. This perspective also suggests that this relation-
ship would become even closer as a direct consequence of the Iberian 
membership of the EU. However, this did not happen, mainly as a result of 
both the levels of debt and the political instability in Latin American 
countries. This suggests that there are limitations to the ‘affi nity’ argument 
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and the notion that the EU and Latin America would become more intimate. 
In other words, increased levels of closeness were hindered by the debilitated 
state of the economies in Latin America and also as a result of the political 
instability which stems back to the 1960s. This, perhaps, demonstrates that 
concrete events and issues prevented the natural course of events predicted 
by those advocating the ‘affi nity’ perspective from taking place when Spain 
and Portugal joined the EU. 
 Sanahuja  ( 2004 ) also shares the view that convergent objectives and 
values would determine the EU ’ s increasing involvement in Latin America. 
However, he does not offer a further explanation for why this would occur. 
Nevertheless, Sanahuja does provide important information which gives 
insights into the main obstacles that prevented the EU from developing a 
more intimate relationship with Mercosur. He cites the EU ’ s protectionist 
approach to its agricultural markets which were in direct competition with 
the very competitive South American agricultural products, particularly in 
negotiations at the World Trade Organization (WTO). Furthermore,  Freres 
 ( 2000 : 63) interestingly points out that despite the affi nity that is said to 
exist between the EU and Latin America, and although a policy of inter-
regional integration would in fact be in keeping with the EU ’ s wider 
international agenda, such a policy did not emerge because of the ambiva-
lent way that the EU has behaved towards Latin America. 
 Other authors have further elaborated on the notion that there are 
natural links between the EU and Latin America. For example,  Aldecoa 
Luzarraga  ( 1995 ) argues that the structural factors that strengthen the links 
between the two regions are the historical and cultural links of the last fi ve 
centuries. For Aldecoa Luzarraga, these links are evidenced by similarities 
in legal principles, written constitutions and a common patrimony, in addi-
tion to similar social models, patterns of democratization, regional integra-
tion and the improved competitiveness of Latin American economies. 
Aldecoa Luzarraga also suggests that the development of relations between 
the EU and Latin America follows a cause-and-effect mechanism. 
 Drawing upon the work of  Dromi and Molina del Pozo  ( 1996 ),  Kanner 
 ( 2002 ) also argues that the EU and Mercosur are ‘natural’ partners due to 
a series of factors, including the following: a common culture as a result of 
colonialism and a process of immigration between both regions; common 
political values; process of democratization; the development of open 
market economies; and, fi nally, both share a similar respect for individual 
rights and freedoms, the rule of law and have a common model of integra-
tion. However, in contrast to Kanner,  Smith ( 1998 ) argues that it is the US, 
not the EU, that is the ‘natural’ partner of Latin America. More specifi cally, 
Smith argues that this is a result of ‘simple geographic proximity, increas-
ingly a common culture with Latin American elites being trained in the 
United States and Spanish-speaking Latin Americans forming a growing 
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part of the workforce and social landscape of the United States’ ( Smith 
 1998 : 165–166). 
 There is, however, a glaring omission in Smith ’ s argument. She does not 
discuss whether individual Latin American countries actually want to be 
partners with the US due to the historically diffi cult relationship the region 
has had with the US throughout the course of the twentieth century. Without 
getting into the debate about ‘anti-Americanism’ in Latin America, it is, 
however, important to examine to what extent Mercosur was keen to 
develop its relations with the EU – whether doing so was a result of ‘anti-
Americanism’ or whether the Mercosur was looking to place itself in a 
stronger position when it came to future negotiations of the FTAA. The 
progress that Mercosur had been able to achieve in terms of creating 
intra-regional integration also appears to be the best method of advancing 
cooperation with the EU ( Laporte Galli  1995 : 12). Nevertheless, if it was 
Mercosur ’ s intention to make it easy for the EU to establish the fi rst inter-
regional agreement in history, it is also plausible that this could have had 
an effect on the EU ’ s policy towards Mercosur. In this case, it could be 
argued that inter-regionalism was in fact an aim in itself rather than the 
means to achieve something else. 
 Regionalism 
 In contrast to the ‘counterbalancing’ and ‘affi nity’ perspectives discussed 
above, some authors suggest that in general the EU ’ s role as external federa-
tor in Latin America and Mercosur in particular provide the main explana-
tion for the development of the EU ’ s policy agenda towards Latin America 
(e.g.  Hoste  1999 ;  Sanchez Bajo  1999 ;  Klom  2000 ;  Kanner  2002 ;  Carranza 
 2004 ;  Grugel  2004 ;  Botto  2007 ). However, much of this work is largely 
descriptive and fails to offer a satisfactory analysis of what the EU was 
actually trying to achieve by promoting regionalism (i.e. EU civilian power) 
( Hoste  1999 ;  Kanner  2002 ). Here it should be noted that there is a fi ne line 
between EU actions and EU intentions. In other words, Latin America may 
in fact choose to imitate the EU as a model of regional integration, but this 
does not mean that it is the EU that is pushing Latin America/Mercosur to 
follow the EU model. 
 Interestingly, the article by  Andy Klom ( 2000 ), who was, at that time, 
the desk offi cer for Mercosur at the External Relations Directorate General 
of the European Commission in Brussels, confi rms how important the EU 
model of integration was in terms of how Mercosur was constructed. 
Klom also confi rms that the explanation of promoting regionalism 
explains EU–Mercosur relations more clearly. However, what is not clear 
is whether this is in fact the view of the desk offi cer or indeed the position 
of the European Commission as a whole, particularly when taking into 
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consideration just how powerful the director general is within the Com-
mission.  Botto ( 2007 ) brings a more Eurocentric view to the discussion of 
regional cooperation and the promotion of regionalism. According to 
Botto, the move towards regional integration was a consequence of advan-
tages to be gained by dealing with an entire group of countries at the same 
time rather than dealing with each country individually. Furthermore, this 
would also help to ensure that each member state remained committed to 
the group as a whole. In addition to this,  Sanchez Bajo  ( 1999 ) suggests 
that the EU is actually behaving in accordance with its institutional design, 
which prioritizes regional integration in Mercosur over and above its own 
trade interests. However,  Smith  ( 2003 ) is opposed to this position, arguing 
that EU support for regional integration is not the actual aim but in fact 
the means to achieve another goal – a competitive advantage over the US, 
particularly in relation to the FTAA. For  Smith  ( 1998 ), regional integra-
tion is supported but at the same time ensures that the EU had greater 
access to the economic markets of Latin America. 
 Carranza  ( 2004 ) and  Grugel  ( 2004 ) both discuss the promotion of 
regionalism within a wider discussion of the distinctiveness of the EU ’ s 
civilian power in contrast to the US ’ s approach to the region. According to 
Carranza, the difference between the approaches can be found in the fact 
that the US approach has a military component, whereas the EU approach 
is more orientated towards economic development. In contrast, Grugel 
argues that the difference between the EU and the US is that the EU treats 
Mercosur as a partner and respects the latter ’ s wish to pursue regional 
integration. Grugel supports the argument and cites the promotion of 
regional integration through normative values. However, there is a lack of 
supporting evidence for the argument that the EU prioritizes the promotion 
of regional integration. 
 The argument of promoting regionalism abroad can be linked to the 
general debate about EU normative power. There is some discussion which 
argues that the EU is a normative power, and he normative approach is 
related to the idea that the EU model is an example for other regions. This 
argument suggests that the European project has set both an example and 
a standard of regional integration project and stability that promote the 
consolidation of universal values with other regions, especially regional 
integration. 
 The evolution of the EU project has also been linked to Kantian philoso-
phy.  Dunne  ( 2008 ) argues that the EU ’ s identity has been shaped by cos-
mopolitan values. Regarding international relations, the development of the 
EU has also been analysed using the concepts of civilian and normative 
power in terms of the way that the EU behaves in the international context 
(for example, see  Manners  2002 ). However,  Duchene ( 1972 : 9) has used 
the concept of ‘normative power’ in relation to civilian power in order to 
understand the way in which the EU has tried to exert its infl uence in 
c02.indd   30 12/15/2016   12:44:00 PM
Analytical framework 31
international relations. In his article which develops the idea of EU norma-
tive power,  Manners  ( 2002 ) has become one of the strongest defenders of 
the idea of EU normative power. Here Manners argues that the European 
project has challenged the traditional Westphalia system of states and set 
an example to others by behaving as a normative power. More recently, 
 Manners  ( 2008 ) has argued that the notion of the EU as a normative power 
is linked to the following nine substantive normative principles which the 
EU promotes in international politics: sustainable peace, freedom, democ-
racy, human rights, the rule of law, equality, social solidarity, sustainable 
development and good governance.  Manners  ( 2008 ) contends that this form 
of EU normative power is based on a further three primary principles: living 
by example, being reasonable and doing least harm ( Manners  2008 ). 
However, it could be argued that this is a list of what the EU is not rather 
than a checklist of what the EU actually does. 
 In terms of the economic attraction of Latin America to other countries, 
the existing literature questions whether the EU ’ s involvement is related to 
what the EU is capable of doing or to what it has actually done. For 
example, it is argued that the EU ’ s power comes from the size of its markets, 
its levels of capital and technological resources and the soft power that it 
can operationalize diplomatically ( Maull  2005 ). The membership perspec-
tive, however, is the strongest evidence of European infl uence. This 
perspective:
 generally rests on its track records in sustaining peace and creating wealth, 
and in the ideas on which its civilization model is built, its most important 
specifi c source of infl uence is the perspective of EU membership […] Yet it 
needs to be borne in mind that this source of European infl uence mostly rests 
on what the EU has and is, rather than what it can do.  ( Maull  2005 : 782) 
 In addition to the socio-economic weight of the EU, which is used in 
order to exert the EU ’ s infl uence in terms of international relations through 
association agreements, including the use of diplomacy, fi nancial offers and 
the potential to threaten sanctions. However, the most important factor is 
‘the EU ’ s post-modern conceptualization of sovereignty, which has allowed 
it to evolve superior forms of governance of considerable attraction to 
others, and its ability to engage other regions in dialogue and cooperation 
and thus to catalyse regionalism elsewhere’ ( Maull  2005 : 784). 
 This brings us to the third point advanced by Maull: that the EU has 
tried to infl uence the political interaction of states by promoting regional 
cooperation through dialogue or cooperation, or by trying to install the EU 
model as an example which can civilize international relations. This leads 
us to the following question: what has the EU actually done in terms of 
promoting and establishing regional integration? 
 It is generally accepted that the EU is the most integrated regional group 
in the world and is very much a pioneer in doing so. Moreover, the EU 
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actively tries to promote regional integration across the world and promotes 
inter-regionalism. For example, as  Soderbaum and Van Langenhove  ( 2005 ) 
highlighted, in September 2001 the president of the European Council of 
Ministers, Belgian prime minister, Guy Verhofstat, proposed that the G8 
should be replaced by a forum where the EU, the African Union, Mercosur, 
the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and NAFTA are able 
to speak at the same political level. Therefore it is not surprising that the 
EU has been a prominent actor in most cases of inter-regionalism, such as 
the EU–ASEAN, EU–Mercosur and the EU–Central American Common 
Market (CACM) partnerships. The EU has also developed more than 
twenty groups of states through which trade, aid and political dialogue are 
coordinated ( Marsh and Mackenstein  2005 ). There are examples of inter-
regional agreements under different EU treaty articles. The EU agreement 
with the European Free Trade Association was made under Article 113 
for the 1972 and 1973 agreements, under Article 235 (the most popular 
for inter-regional agreements) the joint European Community–Council for 
Mutual Economic Assistance Declaration and under Article 238 the agree-
ment with the African, Caribbean and Pacifi c Group of States (ACP) ( Flaesch-
Mougin  1990 ). Arguably the starting point of the EU ’ s inter-regionalism 
strategy is the association agreement of Yaounde I in 1963 and Yaounde II 
in 1969. These were soon followed by the Euro-Arab Dialogue and negotia-
tions for agreements with ASEAN in the 1970s and in the 1980s with 
discussions with Latin America through the Group of Latin American 
Ambassadors, which met in Brussels ( Regelsberger  1990 ). 
 In terms of examining the different types of inter-regional projects, some 
work has been done by  Aggarwal and Fogarty  ( 2004 ) and  Hardacre  ( 2009 ). 
However, there has been little debate about these in recent years. The discus-
sion is somewhat hindered by the fact that there is not a suffi cient amount 
of information available about when and why inter-regional projects have 
developed as a constituent part of the EU ’ s foreign policy ( Soderbaum and 
Van Langenhove  2005 ). In fact, ‘There is no consensus on the main concept 
in the study of regionalism, and there is even greater disagreement in the 
conceptualization of inter-regionalism’ ( Soderbaum and Van Langenhove 
 2005 : 257). 
 In relation to the suggestion that there is little agreement amongst aca-
demics regarding the ‘conceptualization of inter-regionalism’, an excellent 
book edited by  Edwards and Regelsberger  ( 1990 : 9–10) laid out the initial 
arguments, suggesting that it started some time ago and explaining the 
specifi c reasoning regarding the development of inter-regionalism.  Christo-
pher Hill , for example, argued in  1988 that there is a need for an empirical 
study of the EU ’ s involvement in other regions if we are to truly understand 
the notion of EU civilian power.  Jorg Monar ’ s ( 1997 ) work is another of 
the best works focusing on the early years of inter-regionalism. 
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 Nevertheless, Regelsberger argues that group-to-group relations are the 
result of the EU ’ s internal logic in that this:
 Adds another dimension to the existing multi-faceted picture of a European 
foreign policy. It does not develop in a linear and precisely defi ned manner, 
but more in an accidental and pragmatic dialogue – … the posture of the EC/
Twelve in it … will be determined by similar factors inherent in the complex 
system of intra-European decision-making in general.  ( Regelsberger  1990 : 10) 
 According to Regelsberger, group-to-group relations are the outcome of 
complex and diffi cult intra-European bargaining processes which may have 
different goals but in the end positions converge. 
 The issue of multilateralism versus regionalism is also important because 
the EU publicly promotes the former and at the same time continues to 
develop inter-regional agreements.  Smith  ( 2006 ) points out that according 
to several scholars ( Aggarwal and Fogarty  2004 ;  Young  2004 ;  Meunier and 
Nicolaidis  2005 ), the EU could end up in a diffi cult position as a result of 
the WTO ’ s stipulations.  Aggarwal and Fogarty  ( 2004 ) argue that an analysis 
of inter-regionalism as a process or an outcome is also useful. However, 
 Soderbaum and Van Langenhove  ( 2005 ) see this approach as a policy 
strategy.  Soderbaum and Van Langenhove  ( 2005 ) contend that inter-
regionalism itself is the aim and should also be linked to the development 
of the EU ’ s role as a global actor. In this sense, the EU aims to develop 
inter-regionalism as part of its global strategy, which is not designed to 
achieve defi ned outcomes in those regions which are partners in projects of 
inter-regionalism. However,  Monar  ( 1997 ) offers an alternative explana-
tion: he argues that the dialogues are not set up as a specifi c policy strategy, 
although he agrees that they are without an intended consequence:
 Seen from a historical perspective, the main reason for setting up dialogues 
has been a strong demand from third countries to enter into somewhat more 
structured relations with the emerging political actor, European Political 
Cooperation … This ‘reactive’ component of the dialogues’ origins does not 
mean, however, that there were and are not other good reasons for engaging 
in dialogues on the European side.  ( Monar  1997 : 266) 
 Monar also outlines the characteristics of dialogues with groups: ‘Dia-
logues are very fl exible instruments that can be either precede or comple-
ment economic relations’ ( Monar  1997 : 266). He suggests that dialogues 
can show no clear plan or strategy towards a specifi c region. Instead, he 
argues that relations between the EU and regions develop through more of 
a ‘learn by doing’ approach. The level of ‘commitment is not high with 
decisions on meetings according to time and interest constraints, and even 
freeze the dialogues altogether’ ( Monar  1997 : 272). Thanks to the lack of 
precision, the EU can play a powerful game with the third parties since in 
most of the cases it is the bigger player: ‘They can be useful when pursuing 
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mid or long-term political strategies’ ( Monar  1997 : 272). Monar ’ s argu-
ment also reinforces the suggestion that there are multiple possibilities in 
terms of dialogues between the EU and ‘third parties’ which are continually 
ongoing and display a lack of precise or coherent strategy. Monar also 
argues that the reactive nature of the EU can have unexpected consequences: 
‘It hardly seems an exaggeration to say that many third countries are 
competing for “upgrading” of their dialogues with the Union, asking for 
higher levels of meetings and/or more frequent meetings. There is a serious 
risk that the dialogue system will become the victim of its own success’ 
( Monar  1997 : 272). 
 This section has examined the various arguments which suggest that it 
is the EU that has promoted regional integration. The discussion began by 
examining the existing literature that focuses on EU–Mercosur relations, 
before moving on to discuss the more general debate relating to whether 
or not the EU has actively promoted regional integration. In doing so, it 
was argued that there needs to be a distinction made between what the EU 
is and what the EU actually does. It has also been suggested that there needs 
to be a distinction between what the EU has actually done and what the 
EU is capable of doing. Finally, this section has also outlined another key 
theme in debates relating to the promotion of regionalism – the possibility 
of the EU undertaking a reactive role in promoting regionalism, particularly 
in terms of acting as an external federator in wider international affairs. 
 The European Union ’ s global aspirations 
 Another argument in the literature is related to the EU ’ s global aspirations. 
It could be argued that discussions relating to EU policy towards Mercosur 
should be placed within a broader examination of the EU ’ s agenda regard-
ing external relations. If it is accepted that the EU is developing a global 
agenda, then the case of Latin America, and Mercosur in particular, must 
be included as part of that agenda. This is certainly the view of some 
scholars (for example, see  Laporte Galli  1995 ;  Galinsoga  1995 ;  Smith  1998 ; 
 Freres  2000 ;  Santander  2005 ). The intention of the EU is to play a greater 
role at the international level through inter-regional agreements and that is 
why these arrangements have emerged ( Santander  2005 ). 
 It has been argued by some scholars that the EU ’ s global pretensions are 
not completely separate from the way that the US has sought to infl uence 
international politics (see  Galinsoga  1995 ;  Smith  1998 ). However, it could 
be claimed that this is, in part, a result of the unipolar system that has been 
created following the end of the Cold War, which has seen the US adopt 
the role of the most dominant global political power. Therefore, in order 
to promote its own global agenda, the EU has to respond to the US position. 
As Smith explains, the EU and the US have come together in order to pursue 
their shared interests:
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 The end of the Cold War allowed the Clinton administration to pursue a 
global foreign policy with proactive emphasis on promoting US economic 
security through opening into dynamic regional trading blocs. For its part, 
the EU was compelled to reconsider the adequacy of its economic and political 
strategy vis-à-vis Latin America. The EU and the US share the same economic 
objectives in terms of wanting to create and maintain open markets.  ( Smith 
 1998 : 165) 
 In summary, it could be argued that the end of the Cold War and a 
wider discussion about processes of globalization can partly explain devel-
opments in inter-regional dialogue between the EU and Mercosur (see 
 Doctor  2007 ). 
 The work of  Giordano  ( 2002 ) in this area is somewhat ambiguous and 
fails to present reasons for why the global strategy occurred. Giordano 
focuses only on the reasons behind the negotiation for the inter-regional 
association agreement EMIFCA and presents the explanation for why the 
EU sought to create such an agreement. Firstly, Giordano claims, this 
agreement would allow both regions to deal with a multi-polar global 
governance system. Secondly, this agreement would set an example for the 
European Commission on how to develop trade and cooperation relations 
with other countries and regions. In addition to this, Giordano argues that 
the inter-regional association agreement would also strengthen the historical 
links between Latin America/Mercosur, Spain and Portugal. However, more 
importantly, this agreement would secure a regulatory framework for the 
EU ’ s FDI in the region. 
 Laporte Galli  ( 1995 ) is also somewhat ambiguous in terms of providing 
reasons. According to Laporte Galli, the European Commission wants to 
develop an external policy independent of the individual member states; 
Laporte Galli also suggests that the development of an ambitious external 
policy could not ignore a region of the size and economic weight of Latin 
America, and points also to the importance of the roles of Spain and Por-
tugal even before they were members. In addition to this,  Freres  ( 2000 ) 
adopts an approach which focuses on a more civilian perspective, particu-
larly the notion of ‘world responsibility’. Here, Freres argues that it is 
imperative that the EU consider the development of policy frameworks with 
Latin America if the EU really has global ‘ambitions’. There are, however, 
gaps in Freres’ argument. For example, almost since its creation, the EU 
has developed inter-regional dialogues. This is evidenced by examples such 
as dialogues with the ACP, Mediterranean and ASEAN countries. If the EU 
has developed a new impetus following the end of the Cold War, Freres 
does not offer a rationale which explains dialogues with the other groups 
such as Mercosur and the intimacy of the dialogues between the EU and 
Latin America more generally, which started in the 1980s while the Cold 
War was still ongoing. Furthermore, these dialogues did not dramatically 
alter during the course of the 1990s. 
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 Trade 
 Less common in the existing literature are discussions focusing on globaliza-
tion processes and the impact that these would have on trade relations 
between the EU and Latin America, and whether this would lead to an 
increase in the EU ’ s interest in Mercosur, especially in terms of the FTAs. 
Nevertheless,  Holland  ( 2002 ) contends that the free trade agreement is part 
of ‘the proposed Latin American FTA [that] does not signify any departure 
from the dominant economic philosophy of the 1990s: free trade is consist-
ent with its [EU] global approach’ ( Holland  2002 : 59). Holland argues that 
this is of potential benefi t to European companies. The existing studies 
diverge on this, with some suggesting that the FTA would discourage 
European FDI (see  Robles  2008 ), whilst others claim that the FTA would 
encourage European FDI in Latin America/Mercosur ( Cienfuegos  2006 ). 
 Some of the most analytical work has been carried out by  Faust  ( 2004 ) 
and  Doctor  ( 2007 ). These works are particularly important, bearing in mind 
that in other studies it is common to fi nd a somewhat superfi cial analysis 
of both the nature of and the motives for the way that the EU developed 
its policy towards Mercosur.  Faust  ( 2004 ) tries to explain the EU trade 
strategy using a multi-causal research strategy. He examines the interplay 
of economic interest between groups and political actors and how this 
relates to the wider international context. This leads Faust to classify the 
EU–Mercosur case as an example of the EU ’ s inter-regional trade strategy 
and he concludes that ‘the empirical evidence demonstrates that there is 
no single variable with suffi cient explanatory power to clarify the course 
of EU–Mercosur trade relations’ ( Faust  2004 : 20).  Doctor  ( 2007 ) builds 
upon Faust ’ s attempts to develop a multi-causal framework analysis which 
focuses on international, regional/national and societal/sub-national factors 
in order to understand the processes of EU–Mercosur inter-regionalism. 
In doing so, he links the international factors to processes of globali-
zation and the end of the Cold War bipolarity and also links the strategic 
interests of political actors in both the EU and Mercosur with the interests 
of other economic and societal actors ( Doctor  2007 : 289). From this, 
Doctor outlines the reasons as to why the FTA between the EU and Mer-
cosur was not completed, particular after 2004. It could be argued that 
Doctor has developed a conceptual framework based on inter-regionalism 
which is, to a certain extent, close to a complex interdependence approach. 
This differs from the perspective developed in this study, which aims to 
analyse the actions of the EU, whereas Doctor ’ s work focuses on analysing 
the relationship between the EU and Mercosur rather than the individual 
parties. 
 There is a comprehensive range of data in the existing literature which 
highlights levels of exports, imports and overall trade between the EU and 
Latin America or between the EU and a specifi c country in the region, or 
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on levels of exports, imports and overall trade between the EU and Mer-
cosur. Each of these cases tends to emphasize the economic importance of 
relations with the EU, particularly to what extent trade between the two 
regions is important for Latin America, but they do not highlight the small 
importance for the EU in relative terms.  Cienfuegos  ( 2006 : 275) does 
mention the percentage increase of imports to the EU from Mercosur in 
relative terms, but does not mention the actual volume of that trade. More 
importantly, it ignores the point of how important an increase of 0.023–
0.027% of all the EU imports can be. They are different relative gains rather 
than absolute gains for analytical purposes, as is explained in this mono-
graph. This is particularly important in terms of understanding the real 
economic interest of the EU in this region. 
 The infl uence of Spain and Portugal after they joined the EU 
 The importance of the Iberian countries becoming members of the EU is 
another factor that is cited in attempts to explain the development of EU 
policy towards Mercosur. Across the literature on this topic this argument 
is granted different degrees of importance. The signifi cance of the Iberian 
membership of the EU also tends to be explained alongside other factors 
and not as the principal factor that explains the development of EU policy 
towards Mercosur. It is also clear that those who employ this argument 
tend to refer to the cultural, historical and social links between Spain and 
Portugal and Latin America which are the product of the Iberian countries’ 
role as colonizing powers in the region. 
 Aldecoa Luzarraga  ( 1995 ) mentions the issue of EU membership and 
without further explanation affi rms how important it was that Spain held 
the presidency of the EU in 1995, in terms of improving relations between 
the EU and Mercosur. In contrast,  Ayuso  ( 1996 ) discusses the importance 
of Spain and Portugal becoming members of the EU in 1986 and Spain ’ s aims 
of becoming a bridge between both regions.  Ayuso  ( 1996 ) argues that this 
was somewhat unsuccessful due to the opposition from both the UK and 
France, which had their own vested interests in their own former colonies. 
Crucially, Ayuso also claims that Latin America has always been a secondary 
area of interest compared with the Mediterranean and the Eastern and 
European countries. Unfortunately, however, Ayuso does not provide a 
detailed discussion of these points or detailed research on this topic. There-
fore, there is a lack of evidence to support the argument. 
 Grabendorff  ( 1987 ), an expert in EU–Latin America relations since the 
1970s, wrote about the importance of the role of Spain and Portugal as 
early as 1987. He explains that the EU did not fully support Spain and 
Portugal ’ s efforts to develop their interests in Latin America. In doing so, 
Grabendorff argues that Spain and Portugal would require an alliance of 
countries if they were to achieve substantial progress:
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 Biregional relations have not have not displayed any substantial change up 
to now. Spain has distinguished itself within the Community by focusing 
greater attention on the problems of Latin America, functioning not so much 
as a broker who acts as an advocate or, at the least, critic, but more as a 
defender of the region within the EC, a role previously played – to a certain 
extent – by Italy, and by the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany].  ( Graben-
dorff  1987 : 70) 
 It is extremely interesting just how clear and precise Grabendorff ’ s predic-
tions were at such an early stage. It is also unfortunate that Grabendorff ’ s 
study only takes us up to 1987. 
 Piening  ( 1997 ) argues that it is not a surprise that there is a link with 
Latin America after Spain and, to a lesser extent, Portugal joined the EU. 
In fact, Piening suggests that this is typical for the EU to try and develop 
links with the former colonies of its member states. This also provides 
reasons as to why the EU intervened in the Central American peace process 
since 1984. ‘Above all, the return to Latin America of democracy and a 
measure of political stability, along with the attractions of an emerging 
market, combined to make the consolidation of relations irresistible’ 
( Piening  1997 : 123). 
 Sanahuja  ( 2003 ) also explains how the EU ’ s interest in Latin America 
has varied over time. According to Sanahuja, since the 1970s there has been 
a network of economic and political relations which has been given new 
impetus following the Iberian membership of the EU. The extent to which 
this network of relations is important is somewhat debatable as it has not 
been discussed by other authors studying EU–Latin American relations 
prior to Spain and Portugal joining the EU. 
 Sanahuja argues that the EU became a strong counterweight for Latin 
America in the latter ’ s dealings with the US, which is something of an 
exaggeration. According to Sanahuja, in the 1990s the EU developed a 
strategy towards Latin America which displayed a clear emphasis on trade. 
 Hoste  ( 1999 ) argues that, in addition to the economic reasons, there were 
also political motivations for the EU to develop a new policy agenda towards 
Latin America. For example, Hoste makes reference to the end of the Cold 
War and, in particular, Spain and Portugal becoming members of the EU, 
which, as already mentioned, was consistent with the EU ’ s traditional focus 
on developing relations with the former colonies of EU member states. 
 In relation to this,  Baklanoff  ( 1996 ) makes two very interesting points 
when analysing relations between Spain and Latin America during the 
1980s and early 1990s. Firstly, Baklanoff argues that the massive FDI in 
Latin America during this period should be understood as a ‘reconquest’. 
Crucially, he suggests how Spain ’ s membership did improve the relations of 
Latin America with the EU as well as how the membership had an effect 
on Spain, since membership automatically halted any economic preferential 
agreements with Latin America. 
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 One of the richest studies on the relationship between Spain, Latin 
America and the EU was carried out by  Richard Youngs ( 2000 ). In his 
article ‘Spain, Latin America and Europe: the complex interaction of 
regionalism and cultural identifi cation’, Youngs also questions the idea that 
Spain has benefi ted from EU membership in relation to its policies towards 
Latin America. Although this is not the primary focus of this monograph, 
Youngs ’ s study does unearth important empirical data and confi rms the 
importance of Spain and Portugal joining the EU. This data will be used 
in this book to explore relations between the EU and Mercosur.  Kennedy 
 ( 2000 ) also confi rms the strategic importance of Latin America for Spain 
and the way that this has enabled Spain to try and exert a greater degree 
of infl uence within the EU since becoming a member state in 1986. He 
also argues that Spain was unsuccessful in infl uencing the EU, but a lack 
of empirical data undermines this claim. Furthermore, unlike this study, 
Kennedy ’ s work focuses on Latin America rather than trying to explain how 
Spain and Portugal played a role in developing EU policy towards Mercosur. 
 By far the most comprehensive empirical study in this area has been 
conducted by  Klaus Dykmann ( 2006 ) in his book  Perceptions and politics: 
the foreign relations of the European Union with Latin America . This 
extraordinary piece of work analyses a vast amount of empirical data. 
Dykmann examines Spain ’ s role in developing EU foreign policy towards 
Latin America, as well as demonstrating that there were other countries 
involved in developing the EU ’ s foreign policy in the region. Unfortunately, 
his study only focuses on the last few years of policy development and 
therefore fails to examine the role that Spain has played since the 1980s. 
Furthermore, Dykmann uses very few documents or written statements and 
there is a degree of bias in that the evidence is mostly based on the informa-
tion gathered from the interviews conducted. For example, the discussion 
of the shutdown of the Institute of European–Latin American Relations 
(IRELA) is not completely convincing. In addition to this, his study would 
have benefi ted from comparing the development of EU foreign policy 
towards Mercosur with other contexts in the international system, such as 
the WTO and the development of external relations between the EU and 
other regions similar to Latin America. 
 Vasconcelos ’ s  ( 2001 ) work is also very persuasive and develops a clear 
understanding of the differences in terms of the preference of the EU 
member states and institutions in relation to Latin America. According to 
Vasconcelos, historical factors explain why Spain, Portugal and Italy priori-
tized Mercosur, while the potential of investments in the region explained 
Germany ’ s prioritization of Mercosur in EU foreign policy.  Vasconcelos 
( 2001 : 146) suggests that France has an incoherent political line due to its 
position in the agricultural sector, its particular view of Mexico, and its 
acceptance that Mercosur has a place in a multi-polar world. Vasconcelos 
also argues that the interest of other EU countries in Mercosur only relates 
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to trade. Therefore, when Spain and Portugal became members of the 
EU it gave new impetus to EU–Latin America relations at the same time 
as the wave of democratization in the region and the establishment of 
regional groups. However, it is not clear why wealthier and more power-
ful nations within the EU such as Italy and Germany did not previously 
develop relations with Latin America at an earlier stage. Once again, the 
issue of trade interest does not seem very defi nitive if attention is given to 
the lack of importance for the EU trading with Latin America in relative 
terms. 
 In contrast to those who support the idea that EU–Latin America rela-
tions developed when the Iberian countries joined the EU, Smith argues that 
Spanish and Portuguese membership of the EU did not impact on EU policy 
towards Latin America:
 The Latin American states were not reassured by the entrance of Spain and 
Portugal into the EC [European Community] in 1986. There was concern that 
the Iberian accession would mean more diffi culties for Latin American agri-
cultural exporters … Neither has Spain evolved as a signifi cant political 
interlocutor for Latin America as had been predicted by some sectors of 
European and Latin American opinion.  ( Smith  1998 : 166) 
 Similarly,  Ribeiro Hoffmann  ( 2004 ) also questions the degree of importance 
that can be attached to the infl uence of Spain and Portugal, particularly in 
the area of FDI since Spain and Portugal would deal with this at a national 
level. 
 In broader debates relating to the infl uence of individual member states 
on EU policies, the discussion also refers to the Europeanization of national 
foreign policies of EU member states. 
 Historical institutionalism and Europeanization 
 The concept that ‘history matters’ is the starting point of historical institu-
tional approaches emphasizing the importance of the Europeanization of 
national foreign policies. Initial decisions about the way that an institution 
is created will affect the future but decisions taken at a particular moment 
of history by an institution can also be a factor that can determine the future 
of the protagonists of those events. By transporting the idea that ‘history 
matters’ into the framework of historical institutionalism, the concept is used 
to follow the idea that historical events can produce institutional change. In 
order to chart the evolution of certain events within institutions, this approach 
starts from an explanation of the historical event. Here it is argued that the 
historical event will create a path dependence as explained in Chapter  1 , 
relying on the work of  Pierson  ( 2000 ) and  Sewell  ( 1996 ). 
 More generally, ‘Institution-based approaches emphasise the role of 
existing institutional confi gurations as independent explanatory factors in 
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the analysis of political outcomes and institutional development’ ( Knill 
 2001 : 21). This means that the explanation of a policy outcome – for 
example, the outcome of an EU policy towards a region – needs to be linked 
to the way that the EU institutions are confi gured. In other words, the way 
EU institutions work helps to explain the processes which are directly linked 
to the outcome of a particular policy. In the case of historical intuitionalism, 
time and timing are key. Drawing upon the work of  Skocpol  ( 1992 ) and 
 King  ( 1995 ), Peters explains, ‘the policy choices made when an institution 
is being formed, or when a policy is initiated, will have a continuing and 
largely determinate infl uence over the policy far into the future’ ( Peters 
 2001 : 63). 
 The link between historical institutionalism and the concept of European-
ization is based on the idea that Europeanization, broadly speaking, is 
related to the infl uence of or infl uence in EU institutions. As a consequence 
of this ‘infl uence’, EU institutions upload a national idea/policy and ‘insti-
tutionalize’ the idea/policy to the point that it is taken up by other EU 
member states. Nevertheless, whether it is through a process of download-
ing or uploading, EU institutions provide the framework in which a policy 
is developed. In other words, EU institutions ‘matter’ in terms of the way 
this policy is taken up or downloaded. EU institutions are also an independ-
ent variable during the development of a policy. More specifi cally, under-
standing the nature of EU institutions helps to explain why the policy is 
created and the way that it is either downloaded at the national level or 
uploaded at the EU level. And fi nally, EU institutions matter in terms of 
historical context, particularly the way that it takes a historical event to 
initiate a policy or a process of path dependency. However, the historical 
event does not need to be something unusual or totally unexpected but 
rather a critical juncture where the success of a policy is determined by 
being in the right place at the right time. In other words, if the policy had 
emerged at a different time and place, the nature of the policy would be 
quite different. 
 Europeanization is certainly not a new concept; it has been used in many 
studies. However, very few scholars have tried to provide an exact defi nition 
of Europeanization ( Featherstone and Radaelli  2003 ). In the area of foreign 
policy,  Wong  ( 2008 ) argues that the notion of there being a Europeanization 
of foreign policy was initiated by  Ben Tonra ( 2001 ). Therefore, the defi ni-
tion of Europeanization will echo the defi nition used in the area of foreign 
policy. Tonra defi nes Europeanization as: ‘A transformation in the way in 
which national foreign policies are constructed, in the ways in which profes-
sional roles are defi ned and pursued and in the consequent internationalisa-
tion of norms and expectations arising from a complex system of collective 
European policy making’ ( Tonra  2001 : 229, in  Wong  2008 : 323). 
 A key question in the study of European foreign policy relates to the 
concept of ‘movement’. The concept of Europeanization itself is about 
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movement, particularly when speaking of ‘transformation’. When examin-
ing the issue of transformation, it is important to ask what is actually 
transforming. In other words, what is changing and what are the mecha-
nisms and direction of change (top-down from the EU to the member states, 
bottom-up, or socialization)? ( Wong  2008 : 323). In relation to ‘what is 
changing’, the discussion is about the changing of either procedures or the 
substance of the foreign policies of individual members states ( Wong  2008 ). 
In line with the discussion above, this relates to the idea of a member state 
trying to infl uence EU foreign policy in a particular area and, as a result, 
the EU uploading the policy. 
 Finally, the last aspect of the Europeanization approach to consider is 
the different processes of Europeanization within the EU. This is outlined 
in Table  2.1 Firstly, the national projection relates to the foreign policy of 
member states. In this instance, EU countries will try to upload their own 
foreign policies to the EU level and as a consequence their infl uence within 
the EU will increase. In addition to this, the country initiating the policy 
will be able to infl uence other EU countries, especially those countries that 
 Table 2.1  The Europeanization process in an EU member state ’ s foreign policy 
Aspects of Europeanization National foreign policy indicators
 1.  Adaptation and policy
 •  Harmonization and 
transformation of a member 
state to the needs and 
requirements over of EU 
membership (‘downloading’). 
 a)  Increasing salience of European political 
agenda. 
 b)  Adherence to common objectives. 
 c)  Common policy outputs taking priority 
over national domain ’ s reserves. 
 d)  Internationalization of EU members and 
its integration process (‘EU-ization’). 
 2.  National projection 1 
 •  National foreign policy of a 
member state affects and 
contributes to the development 
of a common European foreign 
policy (‘uploading’). 
 a)  State attempts to increase national 
infl uence in the world. 
 b)  State attempts to infl uence foreign 
policies of other member states. 
 c)  State uses the EU as a cover/umbrella. 
 d)  Externalization of national foreign 
policy positions onto the EU level. 
 3.  Identity reconstruction
 •  A result of above two 
dimensions. Harmonization 
process tending towards middle 
position; common EU interests 
are promoted (‘crossloading’). 
 a)  Emergence of norms among policy-
making elites. 
 b)  Shared defi nitions of European and 
national interests. 
 c)  Coordination refl ex and ‘pendulum 
effect’ where ‘extreme’ national and EU 
positions are reconciled over time. 
 Source :  Wong  ( 2008 : 326). 
 Note :  1 Emphasis added. 
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have not yet formed a coherent or strong policy towards a region or 
country. This can enable a country to hide behind the EU ’ s umbrella, which 
can, therefore, allow that country to feel more powerful. 
 There is a more extensive literature dedicated to the topic of EU–Mercosur 
relations. This part of the literature is not relevant to the questions that will 
be addressed in the following chapters, but nevertheless, before discussing 
the methodological approach that will be taken to address these questions, 
a brief overview of this literature is appropriate. Firstly,  Cuadros Ramos et 
al.  ( 1999 ) analysed the commercial relations between the EU and Mercosur 
by looking at exports from the EU to Mercosur between 1967 and 1995. 
In doing so, Cuadros Ramos et al. concluded that the dynamic period of 
the early 1990s can be linked to the process of liberalization between the 
two regions thanks to EMIFCA. Other works describe the diffi culties that 
occurred during the negotiations for the FTAA (for example, see  Sanahuja 
 2000b ;  Bizzozero  2001 ;  Cienfuegos  2006 ). In addition to this, the EU and 
Mercosur blocs have also been compared from an economic-institutional 
perspective (see  Bologna  2003 and  Martinez  2005 ). In fact,  Martinez dedi-
cates a whole book to the study of Mercosur institutions and at times 
compares these institutions to EU institutions ( 2005 : 61). There is also a 
discussion in the existing literature which focuses on the Mercosur point of 
view of EU–Mercosur relations. For example,  Alemany  ( 2004 ) focuses on 
the importance of the diplomatic efforts of Mercosur in terms of developing 
the EU–Mercosur relationship whilst others have focused on the EU in the 
sense that it has acted as a model of integration for Mercosur to follow (for 
example, see  Sanchez Bajo  1999 ;  Vasconcelos  2001 ;  Kanner  2002 ). 
 In summary, this section critically examined the main arguments in the 
existing literature which attempt to explain the evolution of the relationship 
between the EU and Mercosur. The discussion above has also linked these 
debates to the more general literature which focuses on other more general 
EU external policy debates. In doing so, the discussion has identifi ed and 
critiqued six potential arguments which have been used to explain the 
developing relation between the EU and the Mercosur, as well as examining 
those previous efforts which attempted to explain the way in which the EU 
has developed a policy towards Mercosur. The discussion will now turn to 
outlining the methodological approach that will be undertaken in order to 
investigate the ability of these perspectives to explain the development of 
the EU ’ s policy towards the Mercosur during the course of the three distinct 
stages of policy development discussed above. 
 Methodology 
 Having looked closely at the existing literature, it is clear that there was a 
‘boom’ in publications between 1995 and 2004. It could be argued that this 
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is a consequence of the two key moments in policy development which 
occurred at this time. By focusing only on policy outcomes, key questions 
have been ignored, particularly: what could have happened but did not take 
place due to opposition? Why did it take so long for those events to happen? 
More crucially, however, by concentrating on the outcomes, studies have 
failed to develop a more indepth analysis of how everything started between 
the EU and Mercosur countries; therefore, key issues that affected the 
development of the policy are not covered. This has led to overly simplistic 
and misleading attempts to explain the relationship. Therefore, it is neces-
sary to take a long-term approach which examines the nature of policy 
development. 
 A review of events in the 1980s between the EU and Mercosur countries is 
key. A regional group like the one in South America could not have suddenly 
been created in 1991 out of nowhere. Neglecting the study of the lead-up to 
the creation of Mercosur in 1991 misdirects the study of EU policy towards 
Mercosur. In 1985, Argentina and Brazil started to create the project that 
would later become Mercosur. The fact that the EU policy towards Mercosur 
started a month after its creation (1991) makes it diffi cult to believe that 
nothing relevant to the EU–Mercosur relationship occurred prior to 1991. 
In other words, the EU did not suddenly begin to develop a policy towards 
Mercosur for the fi rst time in 1991. This study also covers the two launches 
of the negotiations of EMIFCA, in 2001 and 2010. 
 The analysis of the dependent variable 
 In order to investigate the motivations (or lack of motivations), this mono-
graph will examine the contribution of the main policy- and decision-
makers, the European Commission and the Council of Ministers, as well 
as the different contributions within the two institutions. This will make it 
possible to show the degree of ‘involvement’/‘engagement’ refl ected in the 
EU ’ s policy towards Mercosur, which is the dependent variable in this study. 
Similar measures are implication, participation and contribution, to explain 
the same issues: what the EU has really done and not done in relation to 
Mercosur. 
 In order to assess this concept, two criteria which characterize involve-
ment have been chosen: ‘ambition’ and ‘commitment’. I have already sug-
gested that EU policies should be explained in relative terms rather than 
absolute. Therefore, these two criteria should be measured in relative terms 
– top, high, medium, low and none – instead of absolute terms – yes or no. 
 Ambition is related to aspiration, desire, and purpose. It is, in other 
words, related to what an actor wants to do. In this case, it concerns how 
far the EU is trying to shift from the status quo. In order to assess the level 
of ambition at the different stages, it is necessary to contrast with the status 
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quo: EU policy pronouncements; negotiating mandates; plans for the future 
of the relationship; promises to Mercosur. The link between ambition and 
engagement is that if ambition is present, it is easier to measure engagement, 
even if the policy fails. If there is ambition, there is intention in the policy, 
there is interest, and if the policy does not advance then it could not be 
concluded erroneously that it was because the EU did not care, but rather 
because the policy was not possible. On the other side, if there is no 
ambition and only low involvement, it will be easy to understand the lack 
of interest of the EU in Mercosur. 
 Once the level of ambition has been measured, the analysis will move to 
the second criterion, commitment. ‘Commitment’, in general terms, is 
synonymous with obligation and intention. It is related to what an actor 
has promised to do or say, and a revision of what is promised and what is 
delivered is essential. In this case it refl ects how hard the EU is willing to 
try to realize its objectives, and how much it is willing to pay in order to 
achieve those objectives. In order to assess the level of commitment it is 
necessary to pay attention to different indicators: the frequency of meetings 
and the importance of those meetings given by the EU (offi cial, ministerial 
or head of state level); the amount of aid or funding provided by the EU 
for the different aspects that compound the relationship; and the willingness 
to compromise during the negotiations. 
 The link between commitment and engagement is that you need the fi rst 
one to have the second. This is especially the case in an area such as South 
America which has been ignored for decades. The more concise and less 
abstract the commitments, the more verifi able they are, which helps to 
assess engagement. If there is no commitment, the involvement will come 
as a reaction to the other players or as an unintentional action. It is 
important to note the existence or absence of strategy. 
 Ambition 
 In relation to ambition the different levels are as follows: 
 Top: 
 •  Offers of negotiations mandates or agreements 
 •  EU offi cial policy pronouncements 
 •  Promises to Mercosur 
 •  Plans for a potential relationship. 
 High :
 •  EU offi cial policy pronouncements 
 •  Promises to Mercosur 
 •  Plans for a potential relationship. 
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 Medium: 
 •  Promises to Mercosur 
 •  Plans for a potential relationship. 
 Low :
 •  Plans for a potential relationship. 
 None: 
 •  The EU does not have any intention to do anything for Mercosur, the 
EU will not shift from its status quo. 
 Once ambition has been measured, the analysis will move to the second 
criterion, commitment. 
 Commitment 
 The same clarifi cation is necessary for commitment, the indicators of the 
different levels of this criterion are as follows: 
 Top :
 •  Independence, prioritization of negotiations over other agreements/
negotiations 
 •  Substantial content of agreements and of offers during the negotiations 
 •  Aid, funding, or technical help provided by the EU 
 •  Meetings either offi cial or unoffi cial at any level: civil servant level, 
ministerial level and/or head of state level. 




Scenario 2: HighEU official policy pronouncements
Scenario 3: MediumPromises to Mercosur
Scenario 5: None
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 High: 
 •  Substantial content of agreements and of offers during the 
negotiations 
 •  Aid, funding or technical help provided by the EU 
 •  Meetings either offi cial or unoffi cial at any level: civil servant level, 
ministerial level and/or head of state level. 
 Medium: 
 •  Aid, funding or technical help provided by the EU 
 •  Meetings either offi cial or unoffi cial at any level: civil servant level, 
ministerial level and/or head of state level. 
 Low: 
 •  Meetings either offi cial or unoffi cial at any level: civil servant level, 
ministerial level and/or heads of state level. 
 None: 
 •  The EU does nothing for Mercosur; there are no or almost no meetings 
and/or funding. 
 If there is more ambition than commitment, the EU ’ s behaviour could be 
described as having more strategy than interest, or pretending to be more 
interested than it really is. If there is more commitment than ambition, it 
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indicates there is more interest than strategy and it will appear that the EU 
was not very organized. Altogether, ambition and commitment will show 
the real engagement of the EU. 
 The level of engagement will be affected by a lack of strategy, plans, and 
ideas but also by the lack of actual  content in those plans and agreements. 
The outcome of engagement will be the lowest common denominator of 
commitment and ambition since both parts are needed to create engage-
ment. Both, commitment and ambition have to be present to have a clear 
engagement. 
 Table  2.2 will be used at the end of each empirical chapter as a gauge 
to measure the dependent variable and to evaluate the six competing 
explanations. 
 Competing arguments and the dependent variable 
 When these concepts – engagement, commitment and ambition – are 
explained it will help to evaluate the six competing explanations. Table  2.3 
demonstrates how measuring EU policy will help to show if the six compet-
ing explanations can explain the different stages of the policy. 
 Sources 
 The information has been gathered following an exhaustive collection of 
primary and secondary resources in both Spanish and English, together with 
interviews conducted in Spanish or English in both Europe (Belgium, France 
and Spain) and Latin America (Uruguay and Argentina). It is important to 
understand the different perceptions on either side of the Atlantic about 
several issues in general and the fact that the author is of Spanish nationality 
 Table 2.2  Measurement of the dependent variable: engagement 
 Ambition
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based in a different European country, which can have an impact on the 
way interviewees interact with the interviewer. 
 Conclusion 
 This chapter has provided both a comprehensive overview and critique of 
the existing literature that focuses on EU–Mercosur relations and policy 
development. It has been argued that this literature can be characterized as 
superfi cial and fails to reach any fi rm conclusions. In addition to this, it has 
been suggested that explanations provided in previous studies are limited 
because they have failed to undertake a longitudinal analysis in relation 
to EU–Mercosur relations and the development of EU policy towards 
Mercosur. 
 This chapter has also established the analytical framework needed to 
undertake a longitudinal study of the motivations behind EU policy towards 
Mercosur. By outlining the different arguments in the EU–Mercosur litera-
ture, as well as linking these arguments to the more general discussions 
focusing on the EU role in external relations, this investigation aims to 
contribute to several important debates. The contribution of this monograph 
is clearly linked to more than one debate, particularly the following: EU 
policy towards Mercosur, EU external relations, and the EU as a global and 
strategic actor and the Europeanization of foreign policies. In order to 
examine the real explanatory potential over time, this chapter has also 
outlined the six key arguments that will be analysed in the following 
chapters. The next chapter will outline the necessary concepts relating to 
EU policy-making, therefore making it easier to understand the evolution 
of EU policy towards Mercosur. 
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 European Union policy-making 
towards Mercosur 
 Introduction 
 The EU is not a state and is not a traditional international organization. It 
is common to characterize it as a hybrid system with a federal component, 
but nothing comparable exists at this point in time. To understand EU 
policy-making towards Mercosur it is important to understand the internal 
system of the EU, its internal policy-making and the internal system of 
Mercosur, particularly given that Mercosur has tried to replicate the insti-
tutional design of the EU. 
 Since its creation in 1957 in the Treaty of Rome, the EU has changed 
dramatically in a variety of ways in a short period of time. The discussion 
here will examine these changes over the period between 1985 and 2015. 
It is also important to note that the number of EU member states has 
quadrupled since it was created in 1957. It could be argued that this has 
resulted in a decline in the power held by each individual member state. In 
1986 Spain and, to a lesser extent, Portugal brought a Mediterranean 
infl uence into EU politics. This was later balanced out by further enlarge-
ment in 1995 which saw Austria, Finland and Sweden joining the EU. 
However, the single largest enlargement in the history of the EU took place 
in 2004 when ten Central and Eastern Europe countries became EU 
members. From 1989 until the enlargement in 2004, the end of the Cold 
War and the breakup of the Soviet Union into several independent republics 
had been the main focus EU external relations, to the point that it had an 
effect on other external relations, including external relations with Latin 
America. The enlargement of the EU in 2007 is not discussed in any detail 
here because it did not have an impact on the EU policy towards 
Mercosur. 
 The Treaty of Rome introduced legal frameworks that would inform the 
creation of EU policies. Since then, the EU has introduced further new 
treaties which have modifi ed these legal foundations. These changes will be 
discussed here because they have played a crucial role in terms of affecting 
c03.indd   51 12/15/2016   12:44:01 PM
52 The EU’s policy towards Mercosur
policy-making and/or decision-making procedures. The Single European 
Act of 1986 was crucial because it brought changes to policy-making in the 
area of EU external relations. However, it was the Treaty of Maastricht in 
1992 that brought some of the most important policy changes in external 
relations. In contrast, changes incorporated by the 1997 Treaty of Amster-
dam, the 2001 Treaty of Nice and the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon did not alter 
EU policy-making towards Mercosur. It should be noted that the term EU 
is used consistently throughout, in an attempt to avoid the confusion that 
would arise from the use of European Community or European Union, 
depending on whether the discussion concerns pre- or post-Maastricht 
events. 
 EU policy-making towards Mercosur 
 EU policy towards Mercosur is a key part of the EU ’ s more general policy 
towards Latin America. It could be argued that for many years EU policy 
towards Mercosur was in fact the most important part of EU policy in the 
region, and the following section contextualizes this by briefl y discussing 
EU policy towards Latin America. At this point, however, it should be 
acknowledged that EU policy towards Mercosur involves a mixture of 
trade, cooperation and association agreements. Therefore, it is important 
to start this study by looking at those agreements, especially since they 
provide the legal framework, and consequently the internal rules, for both 
policy-making and decision-making. This outline of the introduction of the 
legal framework is followed by a discussion of policy-making processes. 
This will enable us to develop a greater understanding of the sequence of 
events which occurred during the course of those agreements. The fi nal 
section of the fi rst part of this chapter will provide an analytical account 
of the various roles of the actors involved in the creation of trade, coopera-
tion and association agreements, particularly the nature of their interactions 
with one another. This will help us to understand how different actors have 
different types of room for manoeuvre, whilst acknowledging that the EU 
Commission and the EU Council are the most important actors because 
they have most of the power when developing these types of policies. 
 First, however, it is necessary to explain why the EU prioritized Mercosur 
for a period of time, particularly since the study of EU–Latin American 
relations overlaps the study of EU–Mercosur relations for some of the 
time-frame. Until 1995, the overlapping of EU–Latin American relations 
and EU–Mercosur relations was so signifi cant that it could be considered 
to be the interchangeable, or at least the most important feature of EU–Latin 
America relations, as explained in the previous chapter. 
 During the 1980s, the EU was an exceptional witness through the EU–Rio 
Group meetings of Mercosur advances in regional integration which gained 
momentum in 1985 with Argentina and Brazil signing their fi rst agreement. 
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With that agreement, Argentina and Brazil played a fundamental role in 
terms of developing a project that would promote regional integration in 
Latin America. The fi rst EU–Mercosur inter-institutional cooperation agree-
ment was reached in 1992. Through this agreement the EU provided techni-
cal help such as know-how. The following year, the EU and Mercosur 
considered a further upgrading of their relations once Mercosur was a 
customs union, and in 1995 the framework for the negotiation of an associa-
tion agreement between the EU and Mercosur came into force as Mercosur 
became such a union (albeit an imperfect one). Basically, EU policy-making 
increased over time and through these different agreements. 
 Political process 
 EU policy, according to Wallace and Young, is:
 a kaleidoscope of changing patterns of participation in the collective process 
of European policy-making on issues of market regulation and policies for 
industry. Participation in the European arena constitutes a shift in two dimen-
sions. First, the European policy model marks a distinct departure from 
patterns of policy-making in national arenas. Second, the European policy 
process is in fl ux, varying between policy areas and over time.  ( Wallace and 
Young  1997 : 235) 
 In order to explain the different aspects of this kaleidoscope, it is useful 
to look at the political system in both its horizontal and vertical aspects. In 
terms of the vertical separation of powers, it was noted at the beginning of 
this chapter that the EU could be described as a form of federal system. At 
the time of its creation, the transfer of power from individual nation states 
to the European ‘government’ was carried out in a series of phases rather 
than in one single transfer. This was designed to minimize the opposition 
from the national governments that Jean Monnet had anticipated ( Pollack 
 2005 : 28). Trading policy was transferred to the EU straightaway. In con-
trast, powers that related to international security policy remained in the 
hands of individual member states. The fact that this is still the case today 
explains why certain agreements with Mercosur are negotiated by the 
Commission – who have been responsible for dealing with matters of trade 
policy since the Treaty of Rome – and why other matters are negotiated by 
the Commission and the national states’ representatives. The distribution 
of power between the EU and its member states resembles a federal system 
in many ways ( Pollack  2005 ). However,  Pollack ( 2005 ) argues that the way 
that this is expressed in such vague language implies that most policy areas 
are dealt with at both the national and the supranational levels. The vague 
nature of this institutional arrangement enables the European Court of 
Justice to clarify the limitations that are not established in the Treaties. 
Consequently, whenever there is disagreement, the European Court of 
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Justice will decide who – according to the treaties – should have a further 
increase in their competence in that specifi c area. In other words, when 
there is a disagreement between the states and the Commission, the Euro-
pean Court of Justice will have the fi nal say. 
 As well as the vertical separation of powers in the EU, there is the hori-
zontal separation of powers in the EU. The legislative system is often 
referred to as a bicameral system. The agenda-setter in this system is the 
Commission, although the legislative powers of the European Parliament 
(EP) have been growing since the 1980s ( Pollack  2005 ). However, as will 
be demonstrated in the discussion below, the EP has no real powers in terms 
of infl uencing EU–Mercosur relations and policy development. In relation 
to these matters, the most signifi cant institutional arrangement is the rela-
tionship between the Commission and the Council, especially if the Com-
mission is seen as an agenda-setter: ‘Deciding what to decide is a crucial 
part of the policy-making process and one that often takes place in a context 
where there is a great deal of uncertainty. Deciding what to decide actually 
involves two steps in the policy cycle: agenda-setting and policy formation’ 
( Young  2010 : 115). 
 The agenda is set through a series of pre-selection of issues or debate 
about alternatives before a particular policy is chosen and before the discus-
sion moves on to the actual formulation of policy. This is crucial in terms 
of understanding not only how some policies actually go ahead, but also 
why some policies are not taken forward. To a certain extent, this can also 
be infl uenced by hidden political reasons. During the process of pre-selection, 
the Commission has considerable power. In October 1994, the Commission 
produced a document which elaborated on the possible scenarios and 
options that were available to the EU in relation to upgrading EU–Mercosur 
relations. At that particular moment in time, the Commission could have 
included other issues: for example, the Commission could have developed 
other major and/or more specifi c ways in which it could have become 
involved in the political side of EU–Mercosur relations. This, however, was 
not the case, possibly because the Commission was aware that this could 
lead to future problems in terms of the relations between the Commission 
and the Council of Ministers further down the road. In summary, the 
Commission does not have absolute power in relation to preparation of 
documents and proposals, and therefore the Commission must consider in 
advance how its proposals will be received by the Council. 
 Policy formulation also attracts other actors who are not involved in the 
agenda-setting ( Young  2010 ). This is interesting in the sense that it demon-
strates just how infl uential the Commission has been when preparing the 
policy-making agenda. Irene Bellier contends that:
 European civil servants are the fi rst to recognize the infl uence of pressure 
groups over certain items of European legislation (notably directives), but they 
tend to be most conscious of the role of national negotiators and the way 
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they are able to promote the preferences of large national consortia from 
farming, industry, and fi nancial services. It is a hard distinction to pin down 
if we want to assess the patterns of infl uence; it requires us to distinguish 
between the factors that belong to the policy process and those which arise 
from the operation of markets.  ( Bellier  1997 : 108) 
 The European business associations with interests in Mercosur were in 
favour of the association agreement between the EU and Mercosur and 
asked for a liberalization of the markets of both Mercosur and the EU. 
What is not clear is whether the Commission considered the liberalization 
of the markets in its October 1994 proposal to upgrade EU–Mercosur 
relations as a result of any pressure from the business associations or 
whether this was simply due to the EU ’ s general support of opening up 
markets in other countries. It could be argued that the Commission was 
infl uenced by the business associations because the 1995 agreement included 
a free trade agreement. However, it should be noted that the Commission ’ s 
general agenda also promoted free trade. Interestingly, other sectors such 
as agriculture also lobbied the Commission in order to express their opposi-
tion to a free trade agreement and in the end words such as ‘free trade’ 
were taken out of the Council directives passed to the Commission for the 
negotiation of the agreement. The claim that the Commission was infl uenced 
needs substantive evidence in order to carry any weight. Furthermore, 
Bellier claims that
 There is a fi ne line between giving out information on its plans, to which the 
Commission puts up little resistance, and allowing infl uence over which 
options are chosen: but it is here than the distinction is drawn between a 
decision to promote an overall European interest and the satisfaction of 
narrower concern, whether national or private.  ( Bellier  1997 : 108) 
 The bottom line is that the Commission has a key role to play, both in 
setting the policy-making agenda and in the actual process of policy for-
mulation. This gives the Commission a great deal of power in terms of 
shaping EU policies ( Young  2010 ). In the area of executive politics, the 
rational-choice and principal-agent analyses are the dominant approaches 
in the existing literature ( Pollack  2005 ;  Young  2010 ). 
 The Commission can take a different course of action from that expected 
by member states. This was already suggested above when discussing 
whether or not the Commission can be infl uenced by other actors when 
creating a policy agenda. Obviously the Commission may have its own 
‘ambitions’ or ideas that it might try to develop within the region. In 
relation to EU–Mercosur relations, the Commission has demonstrated a 
degree of interest in Mercosur and has, therefore, tried to reach an agree-
ment with the Council. It is also clear that not all members of the Com-
mission or the Council agreed with the policy towards Mercosur. 
Nevertheless, an agreement was reached. However, some states felt that the 
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Commission had gone too far and there was a discussion about the Com-
mission ’ s proposal in the Council at the time when the directives were being 
prepared in the Council for the Commission. 
 The EU ’ s legal basis 
 In relation to the legal basis for EU agreements with other regions or 
countries, the use of one or other article implies a different division of power 
in the areas of policy and decision-making. This does not mean that differ-
ent types of EU agreements are completely separate from each other and 
cover entirely different policies in practice. They are different mainly in the 
sense that different legal frameworks are used according to the type of 
agreement. The main types of agreements are trade, cooperation or develop-
ment cooperation and association ( Nugent  2003 ;  Smith  2003 ). The Common 
Commercial Policy (CCP) since the Treaty of Rome provides the basis for 
economic agreements. Article 133 is the fi rst legal framework involved 
when developing economic agreements. However, the creation of trade 
agreements in isolation from other types of agreement is in fact quite rare 
because simple economic agreements are somewhat limited and there are 
other types of agreements which tend to be favoured by third parties ( Smith 
 2003 ). Therefore, Article 133 tends to be used in conjunction with other 
articles in order to reach a combination of trade and economic cooperation 
agreements or association agreements. 
 It is also common for trade and economic cooperation agreements to be 
developed under Articles 133 (CCP) and others such as Article 181 (ex 
130y) and 300 (ex 228): ‘For example, in the case of trade agreements with 
developing countries, Articles 177 and 181, which are related to develop-
ment matters, could be employed as part of the legal basis of trade negotia-
tions which are designed to create preferential trade agreements’ ( Aggarwal 
and Fogarty  2004 : 28). 
 As this study focuses on policy development between 1985 and 2007, it 
tends to be the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, alongside other subsequent changes 
in the EU ’ s legal framework, which form the legal basis for developing 
agreements. For example, the 1995 EMIFCA continues to be the basis for 
EU–Mercosur relations today. This agreement was formulated after the 
Maastricht Treaty. Boxes  3.1 and  3.2 provide an overview of the offi cial 
text related to the articles that are involved when developing EU agreements 
with Mercosur. Boxes  3.1 and  3.2 also include changes that emerged when 
developing new treaties. 
 In the case of EU–Mercosur policy, the legal basis for the agreement 
signed in 1995 was Articles 133, 181 and 300. Furthermore, association 
agreements are covered by Article 310 (ex 238). These are outlined in Boxes 
 3.1 ,  3.2 and  3.3 . Since different agreements create different divisions of 
labour in terms of policy-making and decision-making, the various actors 
c03.indd   56 12/15/2016   12:44:01 PM
EU policy-making towards Mercosur 57
 Box 3.1  Article 133 (ex Article 113) 
 1.  The common commercial policy shall be based on uniform prin-
ciples, particularly in regard to changes in tariff rates, the conclu-
sion of tariff and trade agreements, the achievement of uniformity 
in measures of liberalisation, export policy and measures to 
protect trade such as those to be taken in the event of dumping 
or subsidies. 
 2.  The Commission shall submit proposals to the Council for imple-
menting the common commercial policy. 
 3.  Where agreements with one or more States or international 
organisations need to be negotiated, the Commission shall make 
recommendations to the Council, which shall authorise the Com-
mission to open the necessary negotiations. 
 The Commission shall conduct these negotiations in consultation 
with a special committee appointed by the Council to assist the 
Commission in this task and within the framework of such directives 
as the Council may issue to it. 
 The relevant provisions of Article 300 shall apply. 
 4.  In exercising the powers conferred upon it by this Article, the 
Council shall act by a qualifi ed majority. 
 5.  The Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Com-
mission and after consulting the European Parliament, may extend 
the application of paragraphs 1 to 4 to international negotiations 
and agreements on services and intellectual property insofar as 
they are not covered by these paragraphs. 
 Amendments included in the Treaty of Nice: 
 This article was amended by the Nice Treaty to extend the scope of 
commercial policy and, as a result, of qualifi ed majority voting for 
agreements in the fi elds of trade in services and the commercial 
aspects of intellectual property. There are still, however, some excep-
tions to this principle:
 •  The Council may not conclude agreements which entail harmoni-
sation of national legislation in fi elds such as culture, education or 
human health (fi elds in which the Community does not have 
internal powers of harmonisation); 
 •  The Council must act unanimously where the agreement includes 
provisions for which unanimity is required for the adoption of 
internal rules (parallelism) or where it relates to a fi eld in which 
the Community has not yet exercised its internal powers; 
 •  This article does not apply to the fi eld of transport. 
 Source :  European Communities (2002). 
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 Box 3.2  Article 181 (ex Article 130y) 
 Within their respective spheres of competence, the Community and 
the Member States shall cooperate with third countries and with the 
competent international organisations. The arrangements for Com-
munity cooperation may be the subject of agreements between the 
Community and the third parties concerned, which shall be negoti-
ated and concluded in accordance with Article 300. 
 The previous paragraph shall be without prejudice to Member 
States’ competence to negotiate in international bodies and to con-
clude international agreements. 
 Source :  European Communities (2001). 
 Box 3.3  Article 300 (ex Article 228) 
 1.  Where this Treaty provides for the conclusion of agreements 
between the Community and one or more States or international 
organisations, the Commission shall make recommendations to 
the Council, which shall authorise the Commission to open the 
necessary negotiations. The Commission shall conduct these 
negotiations in consultation with special committees appointed by 
the Council to assist it in this task and within the framework of 
such directives as the Council may issue to it. 
 In exercising the powers conferred upon it by this paragraph, the 
Council shall act by a qualifi ed majority, except in the cases where 
the fi rst subparagraph of paragraph 2 provides that the Council shall 
act unanimously.
 2.  Subject to the powers vested in the Commission in this fi eld, the 
signing, which may be accompanied by a decision on provisional 
application before entry into force, and the conclusion of the 
agreements shall be decided on by the Council, acting by a quali-
fi ed majority on a proposal from the Commission. The Council 
shall act unanimously when the agreement covers a fi eld for which 
unanimity is required for the adoption of internal rules and for 
the agreements referred to in Article 310. 
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 By way of derogation from the rules laid down in paragraph 3, 
the same procedures shall apply for a decision to suspend the applica-
tion of an agreement, and for the purpose of establishing the positions 
to be adopted on behalf of the Community in a body set up by an 
agreement based on Article 310, when that body is called upon to 
adopt decisions having legal effects, with the exception of decisions 
supplementing or amending the institutional framework of the 
agreement. 
 The European Parliament shall be immediately and fully informed 
on any decision under this paragraph concerning the provisional 
application or the suspension of agreements, or the establishment of 
the Community position in a body set up by an agreement based on 
Article 310.
 3.  The Council shall conclude agreements after consulting the Euro-
pean Parliament, except for the agreements referred to in Article 
133(3), including cases where the agreement covers a fi eld for 
which the procedure referred to in Article 251 or that referred to 
in Article 252 is required for the adoption of internal rules. The 
European Parliament shall deliver its opinion within a time-limit 
which the Council may lay down according to the urgency of the 
matter. In the absence of an opinion within that time-limit, the 
Council may act. 
 By way of derogation from the previous subparagraph, agreements 
referred to in Article 310, other agreements establishing a specifi c 
institutional framework by organising cooperation procedures, 
agreements having important budgetary implications for the Com-
munity and agreements entailing amendment of an act adopted under 
the procedure referred to in Article 251 shall be concluded after the 
assent of the European Parliament has been obtained. The Council 
and the European Parliament may, in an urgent situation, agree upon 
a time-limit for the assent.
 4.  When concluding an agreement, the Council may, by way of dero-
gation from paragraph 2, authorise the Commission to approve 
modifi cations on behalf of the Community where the agreement 
provides for them to be adopted by a simplifi ed procedure or by 
a body set up by the agreement; it may attach specifi c conditions 
to such authorisation. 
Box 3.3 Article 300 (ex Article 228)—cont’d
Continued
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hold different levels of power, refl ected in the types of decision rules that 
apply to each of them, according to the different potential scenarios. 
 Over the years, there have been several changes to the treaties in relation 
to the EU ’ s legal framework and there have also been corresponding modi-
fi cations to the division of powers. In relation to the CCP, further legal 
specifi cation was necessary over the years in response to the development 
of trade in different areas such as services or intellectual property and their 
importance at international level. In other words, trade became more 
interconnected. In the 1990s, the Commission started to put pressure on 
individual EU member states to expand the framework of Article 133 to 
include the trade of services and intellectual property ( Nugent  2003 : 410). 
In 1994, the European Court of Justice decided that there should be a degree 
of shared responsibility between the EU and the member states. This matter 
was not resolved by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 but was, to a certain 
extent, addressed in the Treaty of Nice. As a result of this treaty, trade in 
services became an exclusive competence of the Commission, although in 
some areas it required unanimity and some issues were excepted ( Nugent 
 2003 : 410). However, trade issues continued to produce a degree of con-
troversy, particularly issues that were related to environmental and labour 
standards ( Smith  2003 : 34–35). 
 With regard to external agreements, it is also common for Article 300 to 
be used. In addition to this, there is a tendency for Article 181 to be used 
because it is specifi cally designed for matters relating to the development of 
cooperation ( Nugent  2003 ). Over time, trade and cooperation agreements 
can include many issues which have previously not been thought possible 
 5.  When the Council envisages concluding an agreement which calls 
for amendments to this Treaty, the amendments must fi rst be 
adopted in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 48 
of the Treaty on European Union. 
 6.  The Council, the Commission or a Member State may obtain the 
opinion of the Court of Justice as to whether an agreement envis-
aged is compatible with the provisions of this Treaty. Where the 
opinion of the Court of Justice is adverse, the agreement may enter 
into force only in accordance with Article 48 of the Treaty on 
European Union. 
 7.  Agreements concluded under the conditions set out in this Article 
shall be binding on the institutions of the Community and on 
Member States. 
Box 3.3 Article 300 (ex Article 228)—cont’d
 Source :  European Communities (1997). 
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either because of the lack of development of EU external relations or 
because of the situation of the third parties. Therefore, it is common for 
policy development to begin with a simple agreement that is subsequently 
further developed or upgraded with the intention of developing free 
trade agreements, or to include, for example, certain political conditions 
such as human rights, which has been the case since the 1980s ( Nugent 
 2003 ). 
 In terms of association agreements, it has already been noted that differ-
ent types of political agreements bring different conditions. Association 
agreements are a specifi c kind of agreement that is produced with particular 
countries or regions in mind. In some cases they are produced in regard to 
those preferred countries that will become members of the EU in the future. 
These agreements are developed in relation to Article 310 (ex Article 238). 
This was noted by Nugent, who claims that ‘The Community may conclude 
with one or more states or international organisations agreements establish-
ing an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common 
action and reciprocal procedure’ ( Nugent  2003 : 411). 
 In the case of EU–Mercosur relations, the ongoing negotiations, which 
include a free trade agreement, are part of an association agreement that 
was launched in 1999. As will be explained in the next section, association 
agreements require unanimity among the member states, and the approval 
of the EP granted by a majority vote before they can become offi cial 
( Woolcock  2005 ). Association agreements also include trade issues and in 
some cases they can encompass aid from the EU and loans from the 
European Investment Bank (EIB). In these instances, agreements will estab-
lish an association council consisting of a minister from either side who will 
come together to discuss common issues ( Smith  2004 : 55). This demon-
strates that association agreements have a different, if not higher, level of 
political meaning from agreements which are designed to facilitate inter-
regional cooperation. The different decision-making procedures are 
explained in the following section. 
 Policy processes 
 The policy process for creating trade agreements under Article 133 is dif-
ferent from the policy process that is followed when creating association 
agreements. The Commission considers the option of a trade agreement 
with a third party; then the Commission seeks to receive a mandate from 
the Council. This is done by gaining a recommendation from the General 
Affairs and External Relations Council. After that, the Committee of Per-
manent Representatives (COREPER) of the Council works on this recom-
mendation and passes it to the Council. At this point, the Council can 
modify the directives or guidelines with the help of COREPER, and if the 
Council fails to reach an agreement a decision is reached using the qualifi ed 
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majority voting (QMV) rule. Once a mandate has been secured, the Com-
mission will lead the negotiations. Different members such as commissioners 
and director generals can intervene in the negotiations. For example, the 
commissioners and director generals of agriculture, development and/or 
trade can intervene in these negotiations. The degree of freedom that the 
Commission has to negotiate on behalf of the EU depends on each case, 
linked to the different positions of different member states on that issue 
( Nugent  2003 : 413). Some countries will favour protectionism, whilst 
others will favour free trade, and therefore the Commission ’ s fl exibility is 
limited. However, the Commission can use this situation as a spur for 
negotiation and can blame the Council for deals that they do not want to 
accept ( Nugent  2003 : 413). Moreover, the Council monitors the negotia-
tions through a committee, as specifi ed in Article 133. This committee is 
composed of offi cials from individual EU member states and ministries and 
meets frequently. The committee can even modify the mandate, but if the 
mandate relates to a sensitive issue the fi nal decision will be made by the 
COREPER or the Council ( Nugent  2003 : 413). Once the agreement has 
been fully negotiated with the third party, the next step is to pass it to the 
Council for approval or rejection. 
 Therefore, it is important to examine why the Council, as part of an 
association agreement, would delegate the negotiation of an FTA with 
Mercosur to the Commission. In relation to this agreement we should also 
consider whether these directives were ambitious. In this instance, it is 
possible that the Commission would try to go further than the Council 
wanted in terms of developing agreements with Latin American in general 
and with Mercosur in particular. It is also possible that the Commission 
would use trade agreements in order to gain the support of the Council 
and, in doing so, achieve its own particular goals – such as increasing the 
Commission ’ s power to negotiate agreements with third parties. On the 
other hand, it is also possible that the Commission was following not just 
its own agenda, but was in fact promoting Mercosur ’ s agenda. 
 It also seems that – depending on the sensitivity of the topic, for example, 
agriculture – the Council will seek to have more power than the Commis-
sion. However, if the issue is somewhat less sensitive – for example, the 
issue of cooperation with a region like Latin America – then the Council 
tends to be more likely to give the Commission more autonomy to negotiate 
agreements and policies. 
 Qualifi ed majority voting 
 By the 1980s, the EU consisted of twelve member states. With a view to 
increasing the number of decisions accepted avoiding vetos, the Single 
European Act (1986) started to introduce changes such as QMV in relation 
to issues such as trade in goods. With each enlargement of the EU, more 
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countries are involved and as a result, the level of power held by each 
individual member state is diluted. However, due to the fact that mixed 
agreements are very common and they require ratifi cation by each govern-
ment, the QMV rule is less relevant in relation to issues of cooperation and 
association agreements. According to  Aggarwal and Fogarty  ( 2004 ), QMV 
works in favour of those countries which are more pro-free trade than those 
countries who favour a more protectionist position. However, ‘the prevail-
ing status of unanimity vis-à-vis QMV shapes trade policy by determining 
the extent to which interest groups and member governments have the scope 
to bend voting outcomes in the Council to their will – whether towards free 
trade or protectionism’ ( Aggarwal and Fogarty  2004 ). 
 It has already been noted that association agreements tend to be offered 
to preferred partners. Association agreements are considered to be more 
important than trade and cooperation agreements. Over the course of the 
last few years, association agreements have become increasingly common. 
 Articles 310, 133 (ex 113), 130W and 300 (ex 228(3)) relate to different 
areas of the decision-making process.  Wessels  ( 1997 ) outlines the 
following:
 •  Article 310 (ex 238): according to the EEC Treaty, association requires 
unanimity in the Council and in the EP assent with absolute majority of 
members; 
 •  Article 133 (ex 113(3)): according to the EEC Treaty, trade agreements 
require a qualifi ed majority from the Council and there is not active 
participation of the EP; 
 •  Article 130W: according to the Maastricht Treaty, development coopera-
tion requires a qualifi ed majority from the Council and cooperation 189c 
from the EP; 
 •  Article 300 (ex 228(3)): according to the Maastricht Treaty, agreements 
with third countries require a qualifi ed majority from the Council and a 
simple majority of votes cast from the EP. 
 Regarding the process of reaching an agreement with Mercosur, the EU 
pointed out that although there were three areas which had to be negotiated 
– trade, cooperation and political dialogue – no individual agreements 
would be reached until agreements had been reached for all three areas. 
The interconnection of the three areas implies that there would be higher 
levels of interaction between negotiators from the Commission and from 
the member states. 
 EU institutions 
 Now that the ‘what’ and ‘how’ of the EU policy process has been explained, 
it is essential to explain issues related to ‘who’. There are several actors 
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from various EU institutions that are involved in the development of EU 
trade policy, such as the Commission, the Council of Ministers and the EP. 
This section aims to analyse how these different institutions interact. Here 
the discussion will focus on how much room each institution has for 
manoeuvre in terms of their powers and the role they play in the develop-
ment of trade, cooperation and association agreements. The debate will be 
framed in terms of who has the most power. It has already been suggested 
that the Council is the most powerful of all the EU institutions (for example, 
see  Westlake  1995 ;  Cini  1996 ;  Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace  1997 ;  Thomson 
and Hosli  2004 ;  Schalk et al.  2007 ). However, this is contested by  Meunier 
 ( 2000 ), who claims that the Council is the central institution in this policy 
process because it manages to aggregate the preferences of the member 
states, whilst the Commission is responsible for acting as the negotiating 
agent of the Council. In addition to this,  Thomson and Hosli  ( 2004 ) 
contend that there is also a perception that the Commission and the EP 
have more power than they really have. 
 The most important relationship in terms of policy development is that 
between the Council and the Commission. This is due to the fact that these 
two EU institutions are more involved in the process of policy development 
than other EU institutions. The power balance between the Commission 
and the Council is not the most settled ( Nugent  2003 ). On the one hand, 
the Council tries to control the Commission. On the other hand, the 
Commission tries to play its role in the development of policy by gaining 
as much autonomy from the Council as possible ( Nugent  2003 ). On occa-
sion this can produce negative outcomes for the EU, particularly when 
negotiating with third parties.  Paemen and Bensch ( 1995 ) suggest that there 
are three problems in the policy process: fi rstly, the so-called ‘lowest 
common denominator’, as the way the EU agrees on issues in its internal 
negotiations, takes power away from the EU; secondly, because internal EU 
negotiations are conducted in public they can give information to third 
parties about the various positions being adopted within the EU; thirdly, 
the control of the Council versus the Commission does not allow the 
Commission negotiators to take instant decisions. In reference to this third 
point raised by  Paemen and Bensch ( 1995 ), the Council can slow the 
momentum of negotiations when there is diffi culty in terms of developing 
a clear and coherent position in relation to a particular policy. 
 Leaving aside the issue of which EU institution is the most powerful for 
the moment, there are additional issues related to how the Commission and 
the Council manage to exercise power. It is crucial that this is understood 
if we are to comprehend how the EU develops trade policies. Understanding 
the relative power of the Council, Commission and EP is useful for this 
( Thomson and Hosli  2004 ). The Commission, being in charge of developing 
and putting forward draft proposals, is able to infl uence the content of 
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proposals. However, these proposals can also be amended by the Council. 
According to  Nugent  ( 1999 ), the Commission tried to expand its power 
under Article 133 by citing the changes in EU trade that have occurred since 
the Treaty of Rome was introduced in 1957. It could be said that the 
Commission has tried to develop as many negotiations as possible in order 
to expand its levels of infl uence both inside and outside the EU ( Aggarwal 
and Fogarty  2004 ). Aggarwal and Fogarty also suggest that the Commission 
tries to exert its infl uence by having a close relationship with interest groups 
which will participate in the development of EU policies. According to 
 Thomson and Hosli  ( 2004 ), research has been done on the procedural rules 
in terms of the opportunities or obstacles faced by institutions and the 
different outcomes they produced. Thomson and Hosli claim that this is 
due to the different ways that procedural rules have been interpreted. 
Therefore, even when informal institutions are included in the analysis of 
the balance of power between the Commission, the Council and EP, differ-
ent conclusions have been drawn ( Thomson and Hosli  2004 ). In addition 
to this, the power/role of informal institutions must be considered if we are 
to understand the different levels of power held by different actors within 
the context of EU policy development ( Thomson and Hosli  2004 ). 
 The European Commission 
 The Commission is the institution that deals with most of the day-to-day 
trade relations with third parties. In other words, the Commission is the 
‘face’ of the EU when third parties deal with the EU on a frequent basis 
( Smith  2003 ). The internal organization of the Commission has changed 
over time. There are also different directorate generals which can intervene 
in international trade issues. For example, there is a directorate general 
responsible for external relations which works closely with the high repre-
sentative of the common foreign and security policy since it was created in 
2003 following the Treaty of Nice. This is yet another reason why the 
Commission and the Council have to work closely to make international 
agreements possible. With regard to the Council ’ s relationship with the 
Commission, it can be said that, over time, the Commission has developed 
more political infl uence, especially during the Delors Commission ( Aggar-
wal and Fogarty  2004 ). This had an effect on the balance of power within 
the EU. For example, the presidents of the Commission can produce key 
changes in the EU general integration project, as well as providing more 
power to the Commission. Furthermore, a strong president can lead to a 
stronger, more unifi ed Commission. However, this does not necessarily 
result in members of the Commission having or sharing a united policy 
agenda ( Nugent  2003 ;  Aggarwal and Fogarty  2004 ). The Commission is 
composed of different commissioners and director generals which intervene 
to varying degrees in the development of international agreements. These 
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commissioners and director generals may indeed have their own individual 
agendas and aims, shaped by the specifi c national interests of the country 
which they represent ( Aggarwal and Fogarty  2004 ). 
 Individual commissioners can also have their own particular reasons for 
the way that they try to infl uence agenda-setting. For example, a commis-
sioner could have his or her own personal political ambition which has led 
them to bring a certain issue or policy to the table ( Peters  2001 ). National 
pressure could also be a reason why an individual commissioner may give 
special emphasis to a particular policy ( Peters  2001 ). The informal rule of 
commissioners supporting each other ’ s ideas and portfolios in front of other 
institutions or in the general public domain is another feature of the way 
the commissioners highlight certain issues when trying to set the policy-
making agenda ( Christiansen  2001 ). In order to bring those issues to the 
fore, the Commission relies upon expert knowledge on many different issues 
( Christiansen  2001 ;  Smith  2006 ), whilst being aware of the political nature 
of trying to infl uence agenda-setting. It is not an easy task for the Commis-
sion to infl uence the policy-making agenda when it does not have suffi cient 
resources to do so ( Christiansen  2001 ). This is further complicated by issues 
such as access to administrative expertise and political preference ( Chris-
tiansen  2001 ). 
 The question of national interest also has to be carefully considered in 
an institution where European and not national vision has been established 
on the remit of civil servants. However, on some occasions this is not always 
the case. For example, Bellier argues that
 In 1992–3 few Spanish fi rms were selected in the tendering procedures of DG 
VIII (Co-operation and Development), in contrast to British, German, French, 
and Italian fi rms, all coming from countries marked as former colonial 
powers. Thanks to the commissioner in charge of this sector, the Spanish set 
about extending Community co-operation to Latin American countries, a 
shift which fuelled the debate on the philosophy of development aid.  ( Bellier 
 1997 : 108) 
 This brought into the open the question of whether national biases, pro-
moted by the nationalities of those responsible for calls for tender, were the 
cause of a weakness, known in Euro-jargon as the ‘rate of return’. This is 
calculated in relation to member states’ fi nancial contribution to a particular 
budget line, in this case the European Development Fund. According to 
Commission offi cials and the Spanish Secretariat of State for European 
Affairs, enquiries showed that Spanish fi rms, cushioned by their national 
markets in the run-up to the Olympic Games and the World Fair, were not 
competitive ( Bellier  1997 : 108). 
 The Council of Ministers 
 The different Councils are composed of different ministers emanating from 
the respective member states in charge of a particular area. In the case of 
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EU external relations, the General Affairs Council was created in 2002 
by the European Council in order to increase cohesion. When it comes to 
international agreements, the different enlargements have contributed to 
different countries bringing very varied ideas to the table. This is something 
that can be seen in discussions in the Council. For example,  Nugent  ( 2003 ) 
contends that countries such as Spain, Italy and France are more protection-
ist than the UK, whilst countries such as the Netherlands, Denmark, Finland 
and Germany have a somewhat ambiguous position ( Woolcock  2005 : 390). 
According to Woolcock this can be dependent upon the topic under discus-
sion. For example, ‘Ireland is liberal on trade in manufacturing, investment, 
but protectionist on agriculture … Germany is liberal on trade in goods, 
but less so on the liberalization of agricultural or services’ ( Woolcock 
 2005 : 390). 
 In terms of enlargement, when it became a member of the EU in 1973, 
the UK came to the table with a very liberal view. In contrast, when the 
Iberian countries became members of the EU in 1986, Spain and Portugal 
came to the table advocating a more protectionist agenda ( Woolcock  2005 ). 
This was further complicated when the Nordic countries became members 
of the EU in 1995, although this was somewhat neutralized when the EU 
enlarged further in 2004. More specifi cally, the countries that joined in 
2004 tended to advocate a less liberal position compared to the Nordic 
countries ( Woolcock  2005 ). Therefore, it can be argued that the more 
countries that have joined the EU the more complicated it has become to 
develop a clear and coherent policy agenda ( Woolcock  2005 ). Finally, 
special interest has been identifi ed by sectors. More specifi cally, EU trade 
policy is affected by those interests, and the work of lobby groups in the 
area of business or agriculture is important because they are strongly 
organized and are able to exert pressure at both the national and supra-
national (Commission) level ( Woolcock  2005 ). 
 Other sources of power 
 A way of achieving extra power within the EU is when a member state 
holds the presidency of the EU. The presidency of the Council is based on 
a rotational system whereby member states take turns in holding the EU 
presidency for six-month periods. The Council also needs to be represented 
when interacting with the other institutions and organizations such as the 
media or bodies outside the EU. In part, this was why the presidency was 
created ( Westlake and Galloway  2004 ). The EU presidency has a wide 
remit. For example, the president of the EU is ‘at one and the same time 
manager, promoter of political initiatives, package-broker, honest broker, 
representative to and from the other Community institutions, spokesman 
for the Council and for the Union, and an international actor’ ( Westlake 
and Galloway  2004 : 46). In sum, the EU president has many responsibilities 
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without having a great deal of power ( Westlake and Galloway  2004 ). In 
EU foreign affairs, the president of the Council plays a key role. This has 
had a signifi cant impact in terms of dealing with other institutions in 
relation to external issues. Helen Wallace contends that ‘Often the Council 
and the Commission presidencies have to work closely together, for example 
in external negotiations where policy powers are divided between the EU 
and the national levels’ ( Wallace  2000 : 19). 
 Wallace also demonstrates that the Commission and the presidency have 
a close and interactive relationship. The level of interdependence is also 
related to the country that holds the presidency, further complicated by the 
fact that each country has different needs, agendas or approaches ( Johnston 
 1994 ). For example, older and larger powerful member states might not 
need so much interaction since they are used to holding the presidency and 
have the resources to carry out this role more effectively and also produce 
more coherent and popular proposals in contrast to the Commission. The 
different interests of the country that is holding the presidency are also 
refl ected, letting the Commission be more or less active, depending on 
whether it is in favour of the country holding the presidency ( Johnston 
 1994 ). 
 Since the president is responsible for preparing the agenda for the meet-
ings of ministers, there is a fear that the presidency could be used to promote 
national interests rather than European interests. Wallace argues that:
 In the legislative fi eld it is the Council and EP presidencies that have to work 
together to reconcile Council and parliamentary legislative amendments. A 
recurrent question is how far individual governments try to impose their 
national preferences during the presidency or whether the experience pushes 
them towards identifying with collective EU interests.  ( Wallace  2000 : 19) 
 Although, the country holding the presidency is expected to be impartial 
( Talberg  2006 cited in  Schalk et al.  2007 ), holding this position can impart 
some extra infl uence. The role is particularly important for smaller EU 
member states ( Smith  2003 ), and the extra infl uence that can be gained is 
useful in terms of developing the policy agenda and also in having access 
to information ( Warntjen  2008 ). However, the pressure that these countries 
face from other member states can often lead to the smaller member states 
making concessions ( Warntjen  2008 ). The president, in theory, is supposed 
to be able to broker deals and facilitate negotiations, which is the opposite 
of being able to use this position in order to pursue specifi c national 
interests. Some authors also contend that countries holding the presidency 
have a low success rate in terms of pursuing their own domestic agendas 
(for example,  Cini  1996 ;  Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace  1997 ). In contrast, 
others consider holding the presidency to be an opportunity to infl uence 
decision-making (for example, see  Westlake  1995 ;  Peterson and Bomberg 
 1999 ). In addition, it is also argued that the stage of policy development 
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determines whether the president is able to have any infl uence, it being more 
benefi cial to receive the policy at the voting stage instead of at the beginning 
of the policy ( Schalk et al.  2007 ). 
 As far as EU–Mercosur relations are concerned, arguably the most 
important moment in the development of this relationship occurred during 
the course of the Spanish and Portuguese presidencies. For example, in 
1992, the fi rst cooperation agreement was negotiated and agreed during the 
Portuguese presidency. In 1995 the EMIFCA was signed during the Spanish 
presidency. In addition to this, during the course of the Spanish presidency 
in 2002 a fi nal calendar was agreed in terms of developing EU–Mercosur 
relations, and in 2004, during the Portuguese presidency, the negotiations 
between the EU and Mercosur were planned to end. During the Spanish 
presidency of 2010 the negotiations were launched again. 
 Conclusion 
 This chapter has discussed many of the different aspects that need to be 
considered when examining the development of EU policy-making towards 
Mercosur. It has demonstrated that the political process within the EU 
involves different delegations of power which can have varying degrees of 
impact at different points during the course of the three distinct stages of 
policy development. In this sense, the delegation of power from the Council 
to the Commission was necessary in order to develop policies which Mer-
cosur had offi cially started in the second stage (1991–1995). 
 Different agreements between the EU and Mercosur have to be negoti-
ated within different legal frameworks. This suggests that there are different 
processes in terms of decision-making in the course of policy development. 
This is particularly relevant in relation to developing the association 
agreement between the EU and Mercosur, which required unanimous 
support from the Council. This left little room for disagreements between 
EU member states. Having outlined the institutional structure of the 
EU, I have shown that the Commission and the member states are the main 
actors involved in shaping EU policy towards Mercosur. Attention will now 
turn to the fi rst of three empirical chapters that will examine the non-
institutionalized relation of the EU and Mercosur between 1985 and 1990. 
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 4 
 Non-institutionalized relations between 
the EU and Mercosur 
 Introduction 
 This chapter covers the fi rst stage of EU–Mercosur policy relations by 
focusing on the period 1985 to 1990. At this stage, policy relations were 
not institutionalized. Policy relations began in 1985 for several reasons. 
Firstly, the EU signed the Treaty of Accession of Spain and Portugal which 
marked the beginning of a new direction in policy towards Latin America, 
including the Mercosur countries; this is a clear refl ection of the creation 
of a ‘commitment’ towards Latin America, although at a very low level due 
to the low ‘ambition’ towards the region. Secondly, in 1985, Mercosur 
countries also started their own regional integration programme. This stage 
proved to be key in the development of EU–Mercosur relations because it 
established a new emphasis on EU policy towards Latin America by estab-
lishing channels for communication between the two regions, particularly 
through the development of the annual EU–Rio Group meetings; without 
this engagement, the EU and Mercosur would not have developed their 
relationship, and the fact that it came at this point helps to explain the 
events of the following stages. By the time Mercosur was offi cially launched 
in 1991, the EU was fully aware of the integration movement in South 
America thanks to these years of EU–Latin America relations. The outcome 
of the engagement of the EU towards Mercosur results from low ambition 
and commitment on the European side. This stage of the policy shows the 
lowest engagement of the three stages, but the level of engagement is cer-
tainly superior to the pre-Iberian membership era. 
 The accession of Spain and Portugal to the EU marked the emergence of 
a new EU attitude towards Latin America, creating a path which was fol-
lowed until 2007. This was a critical juncture. A decision taken (an Iberian 
emphasis on Latin America) at a particular moment in the history (Iberian 
membership) of an institution (the EU) can be a factor that determines the 
future of the protagonists (EU, Iberian countries and Mercosur) and of 
those events (the policy). The Iberian countries already had an offi cial 
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declaration in support of improving EU–Latin America relations. New 
cooperation guidelines for Latin America were discussed and elaborated as 
Felipe Gonzalez, president of Spain at that time, had demanded in 1986. 
The EP then held a series of meetings with the Rio Group in 1987, a regional 
group which at that time covered mainly South American countries, whereas 
now this group includes virtually the whole of Latin America. Created in 
Brazil in 1986, the Rio Group consisted of eight members: Argentina, 
Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. Today 
the Rio Group includes twenty-three Latin American countries, including 
Cuba. In 1990, the EU acceded to another set of Latin American demands 
which sought the institutionalization of the EU–Rio Group meetings. The 
‘critical juncture’ is part of the historical institutionalism discussion, as is 
Europeanization, since the latter represents historical institutionalism in a 
very specifi c institution, the EU. The term ‘Europeanization’ relates to the 
infl uence of or in the EU. At this stage of the policy, the infl uence of the 
Iberian membership in the EU policy towards Mercosur is clear. 
 The already-mentioned path dependence created in 1986 is often over-
looked by authors who study EU–Mercosur relations. Sewell explained the 
concept concisely when he claimed that ‘what happened at an earlier point 
in time will affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of events occurring 
at a later point in time’ ( Sewell  1996 : 262–263, cited in  Pierson  2000 ). And 
continuing the analysis of Sewell ’ s work, Pierson claims that Sewell ’ s ‘defi ni-
tion involves no necessary suggestion that a particular path is diffi cult to 
exit. Rather, the claim is that we cannot understand the signifi cance of a 
particular social variable without understanding “how it got there” – the 
path it took’ ( Pierson  2000 : 252). The explanations in the existing literature 
for this stage of EU–Latin America relations are quite poor and inconsistent 
in that the majority of studies tend to focus on the period after 1991. Few 
works focus on the new EU attitude towards Latin America as a result of 
the Iberian membership of the EU, the democratization of Latin American 
countries and the way that Latin America embraced open economies. This 
monograph argues that without the study of this stage of EU–Mercosur 
relations, many scholars have underplayed the infl uence of the Iberian 
countries in changing the EU ’ s mentality towards the region. Previous 
studies have also overlooked how Mercosur was initiated in 1985 and why 
this has had a profound effect on the policy from that point onwards; it is 
clear that Mercosur has undertaken a proactive role, whilst the EU has 
played a reactive role. 
 Finally, this chapter also explains how the EU fi nally developed a con-
tinued channel of communication with Latin America at this stage in the 
development of EU–Mercosur relations. This has proved to be critical in 
terms of the fi rst stages of EU–Mercosur agreements. In this stage, the basis 
for the development of EU–Mercosur relations was established, and this 
ensured that the agreements in the second stage were achieved more quickly. 
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In other words, if this stage had never existed, it would have taken longer 
to develop these agreements because those trying to develop EU–Mercosur 
relations would have had to start from scratch. 
 This chapter is divided into different sections. The fi rst section discusses 
the impact of Spain and Portugal becoming members of the EU and the 
consequences of this for both the EU and the new EU member states. It will 
be argued that policy development and developments in EU–Mercosur 
relations were very much a bottom-up process because it can be demon-
strated that the Iberian countries were a progressive infl uence in the years 
that followed their membership. Finally, although the tendency in the litera-
ture is to suggest that Spain and Portugal have shown similar actions, 
infl uences and preferences towards Latin America, it has also been argued 
that it was Spain rather than Portugal that showed the most interest in 
developing relations and policies with Latin America ( Gomez Saraiva  2004 ; 
 Dykmann  2006 ). In other words, it was Spain rather than Portugal that 
wanted to continue the special relationship with the region. Even in the case 
of Brazil, a former colony of Portugal, the political and economic ties with 
Spain were much stronger than with Portugal ( Wiarda  1989 ) – so much so 
that Spain also became a credit-lender for Brazil ( Baklanoff  1985 ). 
 The relationship of the EU and Latin America before and after 1985 
 The central discussion in this section will focus on the change in the rela-
tions between the EU and Latin America after 1985 when the Iberian 
countries joined the EU. This is crucial for the discussion of the critical 
juncture created with the Spanish and Portuguese membership which will 
help in the analysis of the degree of Europeanization. In order to appreciate 
the degree of change it is crucial to compare EU relations with the region 
before 1985 with EU relations with the region after 1985 and see how deep 
(or not) the path created is. 
 There are different potential outcomes in this analysis. If it is the case 
that there was a high degree of change after the Iberian countries joined 
the EU, it will support the argument that Iberian countries were the main 
reason for the changes in the attitude within the EU. On the other hand, a 
low degree of change would support the argument which claims that the 
membership was just one of many reasons behind the EU ’ s new policies 
towards Latin America and that there are also other more important factors 
such as access to the markets. An intermediate degree of change would 
support the argument that suggests that the Iberian countries’ membership 
of the EU was crucial for the new policies but that policy development also 
needed something else in order to make this process possible. For example, 
these changes would not have been possible had Mercosur not had its own 
set of demands. This will be the central argument advanced in this mono-
graph. However, none of these three outcomes denies the importance of the 
c04.indd   72 12/15/2016   12:44:03 PM
Non-institutionalized relations between the EU and Mercosur 73
Iberian membership, which can confi rm the creation of the path at this 
point. 
 This section will also explain the degree of progress in the relationship 
between the EU and Latin America over time in order to assess the progress 
after the Iberian membership of the EU. In order to do so, EU–Latin 
American relations will be compared before and after 1985. The analysis 
below will also consider changes in terms of policy-makers, agreements 
and the outcomes of important areas of political dialogue, cooperation and 
trade which are the key dimensions of EU–Latin American relations and 
EU–Mercosur relations. 
 EU–Latin American relations before the Iberian membership 
 Throughout the course of this chapter there will be a discussion of why the 
EU did not displayed any sort of interest towards Latin America prior to 
1985. The lack of interest in the region prior to the Iberian membership 
can be seen in the poor relations between the EU institutions and Latin 
America. The increase of Commission offi ces in Latin America after the 
membership ( Aldecoa Luzarraga  1995 ) is just one of many examples of 
how basic logistic tools necessary for a fl uent relationship were not yet in 
place. Another example was the fact that the EU documents relating to 
Latin America were either in English or French until 1986 ( IRELA  1996 ) 
in an area where Spanish and Portuguese are the predominant languages. 
It is true that English and French are the offi cial languages of the EU, and 
even today much information that is considered important for the relations 
between both regions is in French ( Freres and Sanahuja  2005 : 46), when 
this information could also be easily translated into Spanish and Portuguese 
now that the Iberian countries are members of the EU. Without overestimat-
ing the importance of these examples, they do suggest that there was an 
overall lack of real effort or interest in progressing relations with Latin 
America both before the membership in 1986, and to a certain extent after 
Spain and Portugal became members of the EU, although it changed to 
some extent after it. 
 The lack of interest in Latin America also comes from the asymmetrical 
relations of the EU and Latin America due to both regions having different 
interests and different geopolitical priorities, rather than because the EU 
showed differing degrees of preference in favour of Africa and Asia in the 
area of development ( Grabendorff  1987 ;  Hoste  1999 ). Moreover, the 
protectionism that the EU showed towards the European agricultural sector 
was also a serious component of political relations ( Grabendorff  1987 ; 
 Hoste  1999 ). In addition to this, the presence of the US did not help 
the potential EU–Latin American relations because an alliance with this 
North American country was also considered to be of more importance 
than developing a new policy towards Latin America ( Grabendorff  1987 ). 
c04.indd   73 12/15/2016   12:44:03 PM
74 The EU’s policy towards Mercosur
Furthermore, developing EU–Latin America relations was hindered by a 
lack of the necessary resources to facilitate cooperation, and the limitations 
placed on imports into the EU ( Hoste  1999 ). It has also been suggested that 
a lack of relations between both regions was a consequence of the complex-
ity of the EU ’ s internal institutional framework. For example, Grabendorff 
contends that ‘When the Community uses the argument of lack of adequate 
Latin American intermediaries, the Latin Americans frequently respond by 
citing a lack of interest by the EC and the complexity of the latter ’ s decision-
making apparatus’ ( Grabendorff  1987 : 78). 
 It is unclear whether the complexity of the EU ’ s institutional framework, 
especially its policy-making and decision-making mechanisms, made it dif-
fi cult for other regions such as Latin America and other countries to be able 
to get the most out of these relations. It could be argued that this is 
something of an exaggeration and that Latin American countries used it as 
way of defending themselves from the accusations of the EU. This could 
have affected the EU policy towards the regions. 
 With regard to political dialogue, the Commission ’ s report to the Com-
munity Council on ‘Relations with the Latin American countries’ in July 
1969 was its fi rst signifi cant action towards Latin America since its concep-
tion. This is important in the sense that this was the fi rst time that ‘relations’ 
with Latin America were recognized at an offi cial level. However, it should 
also be acknowledged that this report is purely a diplomatic document. 
Nevertheless, it did have an effect on the other EU institutions. For example, 
the fi rst resolution from the EP came one month after the fi rst Council of 
Ministers’ Declaration about the region in November 1969, and six months 
after the Commission ’ s original report to the Community Council ( EP 
 1969 ). One year after the Commission ’ s report to the Council, Latin 
America responded to these political statements through the Declaration of 
Buenos Aires. Exactly one year later the Council responded positively and 
as a consequence this was followed by regular contact between the Latin 
American ambassadors to the EU and offi cials from the Commission 
( Ribeiro Hoffmann  2004 ). 
 The EP is the EU institution that has traditionally shown the most 
political interest towards the region and has in fact produced many declara-
tions in favour of collaboration with the region. The EP acknowledged that 
the EU did not consider Latin America to be particularly important in terms 
of the EU ’ s interests in a resolution that was signed the day after Spain and 
Portugal signed their Act of Accession, 12 June 1985. This resolution said 
that the EP: ‘Deplores the low priority that LA [Latin America] has been 
for the EU having in mind the necessities of the region and the traditional 
links with the continent’ ( EP  1985 ). 
 The fi rst document from an EU institution related to Latin America was 
the maritime report from the EP in 1964. However, this can hardly be 
considered to be a signifi cant political statement about the region, even 
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though it does prove that the EP was one of the fi rst EU institutions to enter 
dialogue with the region. This argument is further supported by the EP ’ s 
support for the region through the inter-parliamentary conferences between 
the EP and the Parliament Latino (Parlatin – Latin American Parliament). 
These conferences were fi rst held in 1974 and have been held every two 
years since 1975. They were suspended during the Malvinas/Falklands 
confl ict before being resumed a couple of years later.  Ayuso  ( 1996 ) claims 
that these conferences had little infl uence on the EU since the EP itself did 
not have much infl uence in those early days and in the 1980s had none. 
The resolutions of the EP–Parlatin meetings showed which topics were 
discussed and that the discussion was not very different from the resolutions 
the EP passed to the Council and the Commission in support of developing 
relations with Latin America. This is demonstrated in the following quota-
tion: the EP ‘Invites the Community to stimulate the efforts of regional 
integration and congratulate the creation of the Latin American Economic 
System (SELA) the 18th of October of 1975 with the purpose of creating 
economic and commercial cooperation among Latin-American and Carib-
bean countries’ ( EP  1976 ). 
 Nevertheless, integration in Latin America seems to have been a signifi -
cant issue for the EU. As mentioned, the EU ’ s lack of involvement in the 
region had been justifi ed by the lack of appropriate intermediaries on the 
Latin American side ( Grabendorff  1987 ). However, at this time there was 
at least one intermediary: there were discussions in the EP–Parlatin, which 
was a forum for biregional discussions (see Boxes  4.1 and  4.2 ). Therefore, 
it could be argued that the EP was the bridge between Latin America and 
the EU since no other EU institution had such permanent contact and 
discussion with the region. 
 In relation to aid, the fi rst time that the EU created a programme for 
fi nancial and technical cooperation with Asia and Latin America was on 
15 March 1976 ( Anacoreta Correia  1996 ;  Ayuso  1996 ). This programme 
lasted for a period of four years and focused on non-associated developing 
countries and the distribution of funding, which was set around 75% for 
Asia, 20% for Latin America and 5% for African countries. When Denmark, 
the UK and Ireland became members of the EU in 1973, it prompted discus-
sions about the EU ’ s external relations which had previously been ignored 
due to French pressure ( Ayuso  1996 ;  De Pablo Valenciano and Carretero 
Gomez  1999 ). However, pressure from the UK blocked the decision on the 
budget for ACP countries until a programme for fi nancial and technical 
cooperation with Asia and Latin America was decided ( Ayuso  1996 : 5). In 
many ways it was this move that led to the change in direction of EU policy 
towards Latin America ( Ayuso  1996 : 5). It will be demonstrated later in 
this section that this strategy was later copied by Spain. In 1981 this pro-
gramme for fi nancial and technical cooperation with Asia and Latin America 
was renewed. It was the fi rst piece of legislation to be dedicated to 
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 Box 4.1  The European Parliament ’ s support for links with 
Mercosur at the political and economic level 
 At the political/diplomatic level 
 Support for the regular contacts started between tge regions ( EP 
 1976 ). 
 Support for the creation of institutions that will help the promo-
tion and the provision of information about the potential of these 
countries ( EP  1976 ). Support for the creation of an institute that 
promotes the relations between the regions with two headquarters, 
one in Latin America and one in the EU. 
 Support for cooperation between the two regions, keeping in mind 
the major economic, political and social differences among the Latin 
American countries; therefore a differentiated policy towards Latin 
America adjusted to the real needs of the different problems of the 
region will let the EU appreciate the Latin American reality ( EP  1983 , 
 1985 ). 
 At the economic level 
 Support for the generalized system preferences (GSP) for Latin 
America which would help the increase of exports from Latin America 
to Europe at the same time as regional integration ( EP  1976 ,  1982 ). 
The EP points out the decreased participation in the GSP and asks 
for an improvement in the system for Latin American countries ( EP 
 1983 ,  1985 ). 
 Support for help with external debt ( EP  1983 ). Ask the Commis-
sion and IRELA to study the solutions to the external debt ( EP  1985 ). 
 Source :  EP ( 1976 ,  1983 ,  1985 ). 
non-associated countries ( Birochi  1999 ). ‘The Council ’ s guidelines priori-
tised agriculture sectors and humanitarian aid. However, this was not 
considered to be very innovative or even signifi cant when looking at the 
amount of aid offered by the EU’ ( Hoste  1999 ). 
 It is crucial to look at the EU and individual countries in Latin America 
before Spain and Portugal joined the EU. The most important aspect of the 
relations between the EU and individual countries in Latin America was the 
creation of a few short-reaching trade agreements – the ‘fi rst generation 
agreement’. In addition to this, the inclusion of some Latin American 
countries into the generalized system of preferences (GSP) also helped the 
development of this relationship. The relationship between the EU and 
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Brazil started rather sooner thanks to an agreement on the peaceful use of 
nuclear energy in 1961 ( EEC  1961 ;  Smith  2001 ). In 1973, Brazil achieved 
the status of ‘most favoured nation’ by the EU, which gave the South 
American country preferential treatment on the exports of cocoa butter and 
soluble coffee ( EEC  1973a ). ‘Although the fi rst cooperation agreement did 
not happen until 1980 as part of the so-called “fi rst generation agreement”, 
this agreement brought about cooperation between both parties, the EU 
and Brazil, on the trade and economic areas’ ( EEC  1980 ). 
 In relation to Argentina, a similar agreement to the one with Brazil was 
reached in 1971. However, when the Malvinas/Falklands confl ict started in 
1982, relations between the EU and Latin America were affected. Argentina 
was put under an economic embargo and the inter-parliamentary confer-
ences were suspended for some years. This was the fi rst time that there had 
been strong disagreement within the EU regarding Latin America but the 
 Box 4.2  European Parliament resolutions supporting the relations 
between the EU and Latin America 
 Regionalism 
 Support for: a global EU policy towards Central America; the opening 
of an offi ce in Central America; the use of the EIB in Central America; 
the acceptance of the international agreement on sugar ( EP  1982 ). 
 Support for integration and intraregional cooperation in Central 
America as well as supporting the collaboration of Venezuela and 
Mexico with Central America in terms of funding for development, 
provision of energy and industrial cooperation ( EP  1982 ). Support 
for regional integration and regional groups such as the Latin Ameri-
can Economic System, the Central American Common Market and 
the Andean Pact and favouring the creation of programmes or 
projects with those regions ( EP  1985 ). 
 Cooperation agreements 
 Support for cooperation agreements with Mexico, Argentina, Brazil 
and Uruguay and the support for bigger agreements with those 
countries. Support for cooperation agreements with other Latin 
American countries that are interested ( EP  1976 ). 
 Support for the continuation of the relations between Argentina 
and the EU and the conclusion of a cooperation agreement with that 
country ( EP  1985 ). 
 Source :  EP ( 1976 ,  1982 and  1985 ). 
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EU sided with the UK. It could be argued that this shows that relations 
with Latin America were not that important to the EU because, even though 
they disagreed with the behaviour of the UK, the EU did not dare to 
challenge the embargo. The same kind of agreement was secured with 
Uruguay in 1973 ( EEC  1973b ) and Mexico secured a cooperation agree-
ment in 1975 ( EEC  1975 ). 
 The relationship between the EU and Chile was based on EP resolutions 
regading the  coup de état ( EP  1973 ), the anniversary of the coup, opposition 
to human rights abuses carried out by Pinochet ’ s regime ( EP  1983 ) and in 
relation to the political situation in the country in 1983 and 1984. Although 
the European Commission ’ s declarations in opposition to Pinochet ’ s regime 
were the fi rst political statements made by the EU towards the region, they 
were nothing more than declarations and not a defi nitive policy against the 
Chilean coup ( Dykmann  2006 ). Furthermore, the few agreements with 
Brazil and Mexico had a minimum impact in the development of these 
countries ( EP  1985 ). 
 The discussion so far has shown that there were biregional economic 
agreements reached with Latin American countries, such as Brazil, Argen-
tina, Uruguay and Mexico, which were considered to be either more 
developed and/or politically stable. Since the three fi rst countries were part 
of Mercosur, and Mexico achieved a bilateral agreement with the EU almost 
at the same time, it seems that over time the EU has shown preference 
towards developed and politically stable countries in Latin America. This 
undermines, to a certain extent, the normative view of EU actions towards 
Latin America. 
 In summary, prior to Spain and Portugal becoming members of the EU, 
the EU had virtually no relationship with Latin America. The EU institution 
involved in developing dialogue was mostly the EP, which in those years 
had very little power, even in the area of aid, where Latin America drew 
much attention for traditionally being the region receiving the lowest 
amount of aid from the EU compared to other regions in the world. It was 
not until the 1970s that the EU developed offi cial links with Latin America. 
The EU had very narrow commerce agreements with some Mercosur 
countries, such as Brazil, which were not considered to be especially impor-
tant. For most other developed countries in Latin America at this time, 
particularly in the area of aid, it was not until the 1970s that the EU 
developed a policy that covered Latin American countries as part of a 
general approach to the EU ’ s external relations agenda by including Carib-
bean countries in the Lome Convention that was pursued by the UK when 
it became a member of the EU. From the creation of the EU until 1985, 
relations between the EU and Latin America were virtually non-existent. 
 A new scenario was created for EU–Latin America relations after Spain 
and Portugal joined the EU. The attempt by Spain and Portugal to infl uence 
in the EU in relation to Latin America and the acceptance of such behaviour 
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by the EU was clear even before they offi cially joined. For example, Spain 
and Portugal played an important role during the Central American crisis 
in the mid-1980s. Bilateral relations politicized the relationship, starting 
with EU actions during the crisis ( Grabendorff  1987 ). 
 The fi rst institution that showed a new interest in Latin America was the 
EP. One of the many pieces of evidence that show the creation of a new 
policy path regarding this region is the development of inter-parliamentary 
meetingns. Grabendorff argues that ‘Besides publishing a considerable series 
of really constructive reports regarding desirability of improving relations 
with Latin America it [the EP] clearly indicated a high degree of fl exibility, 
at the inter-parliamentary meetings held in Brasilia in 1985 and in Lisbon 
in 1987, toward a more positive development of joint relations’ ( Graben-
dorff  1987 : 78). 
 This does not, however, mean that the parliaments were powerful or 
infl uential in their respective homelands. Therefore, there was not a direct 
action–reaction relation during these biregional discussions and/or during 
the EU ’ s actions to Latin America at this stage. Nevertheless, these inter-
parliamentary conferences in 1985 and 1987 welcomed the presence of 
Spain and Portugal and declared that they expected that with this event the 
relations between the EU and Latin American would only get stronger. 
According to  Grabendorff  ( 1987 ), the EU had at least started to show 
movement towards improving relations between the two regions after the 
Iberian membership. 
 Leaving the EP aside for the moment, there are also other issues that 
showed that the EU was starting to develop a new approach towards Latin 
America. For example, the opening of the IRELA, funded by the Commis-
sion, was an indicator of EU intentions, since it created an instrument for 
cultural, political, economic and scientifi c cooperation between both 
regions. The IRELA was created in Madrid in 1984 with the aim of promot-
ing and strengthening relations between the two regions. This is further 
evidence of an EU institution following the new path towards Latin America. 
The Commission was aware of how much change the historical event of 
the Iberian membership was likely to produce, therefore it developed an 
institution that would be a source of information on a region that had 
traditionally been ignored. The institute served as a forum for dialogue and 
a centre for contact. Its principal functions were: fi rstly, to provide advice 
and undertake specifi c consultancy activities, principally for regional insti-
tutions in Europe and Latin America; secondly, to organize conferences, 
seminars and workshops, and to arrange training programmes on issues of 
common interest, primarily for European and Latin American politicians, 
offi cials, diplomats, academics, journalist and businessmen; thirdly, to 
promote, coordinate and undertake specifi c research on relations between 
Europe and Latin America, and to make information and analysis available 
to the opinion-formers and decision-makers of both regions. 
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 In the area of aid and cooperation, and on the issue of drugs, there was 
a change towards Latin America which can be attributed to the creation of 
this new path. The fi rst credits to fund workshops and seminars in different 
places were given in 1987 ( Blanco Garriga  1992 ). It seems obvious to say 
that funding workshops and seminars is not a particularly important policy 
nor part of a highly developed strategy towards the region. However, it 
should not be forgotten that in most areas EU–Latin American relations 
had been non-existent before Spain and Portugal became members of the 
EU. In other words, although these workshops and seminars do not appear 
to be very ambitious, these events played an important role in initiating EU 
policy towards Latin America. This had been an area where there was not 
much knowledge of either how these issues could potentially be developed 
or how basic problems could be overcome. In relation to the issue of aid, 
Dykmann claims
 It is evident that the peninsular authorities and their representatives are very 
present in institutions concerned with European policy towards Latin America 
as ‘l ’ Amerique latine occupe dans la politique espagnole de cooperation une 
place toute aussi centrale que celle occupée en France par l ’ Afrique’ [Latin 
America is of central importance for the Spanish policy of cooperation in the 
same way that Africa is for France]… Additionally, some critics say that Spain 
indeed determines the development cooperation of the EU with Latin America 
to a large extent, but does not provide proportional contributions to respec-
tive EU funds.  ( Dykmann  2006 : 92–93) 
 In relation to combating drugs, Spain was the leader within the EU. Abel 
Matutes, the Spanish commissioner in charge of relations with these regions, 
recognized the benefi ts of eliminating restrictions on the exports of Colom-
bian goods, which was also extended to Bolivia and Peru ( El País 
 13/10/1990 ). This plan was fully supported by all the governments of the 
EU apart from France. The president of Colombia considered Spain to be 
the leader at the EU level with the socio-economic measures proposed ( El 
País  13/10/1990 ). 
 Another important piece of evidence supporting the argument that an 
interest had been created towards Latin America was the fact that even the 
European Council of Dublin Declarations of June 1990 discussed issues 
related to Latin America. These declarations brought the EU together to 
discuss environmental issues and to ask the Commission to develop plans 
for consultation with countries close to the Amazon, giving special attention 
to Brazil ( Blanco Garriga  1992 ). To what extent these declarations and 
proposals had any real infl uence is a matter of debate. For example, when 
the new programme for cooperation with Latin America and Asia was 
approved for the period of 1991–1995, it was agreed that the amount of 
aid given to develop cooperation with Asia and Latin America would be 
doubled. On this occasion, Latin America would receive 30% of the  € 2,300 
million ( El País  9/5/1990 ). Abel Matutes pointed out that there was a fear 
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of ‘Eurocentrism’ concerning the high levels of attention dedicated to the 
Eastern European countries ( El País  9/5/1990 ). This issue will be discussed 
in more detail in the following section. 
 In the area of political dialogue, the level of change has not been as 
impressive as it could have been, which supports the claims that the changes 
created with the Iberian membership were necessary but not suffi cient: this 
is the central argument of this monograph. When EU political dialogue with 
Latin America did not properly take off, both regions tended to blame one 
another. On the one hand, Latin America criticized the EU for not showing 
interest in the region, as well as citing the diffi culty the Community ’ s 
institutional framework created for decision-making. On the other hand, 
the EU tended to cite Latin America ’ s lack of intermediaries for the lack of 
development of inter-regional relations ( Grabendorff  1987 ). It could be 
argued that the fact the EU cites the lack of Latin American intermediaries 
is an indication that the EU was expecting some kind of representation from 
the entire region. This is interesting because the Rio Group and Mercosur 
were being created at around the same time as Grabendorff was highlighting 
the issue. This gives support to the argument that Mercosur countries, and 
Latin American countries as a whole, tried to develop regional groups which 
could provide a forum where dialogue with the EU was possible. However, 
conversely, the EU was not trying as hard to deal with its failures in relation 
to Latin America. This issue has been developed more fully in more recent 
research. 
 In discussing to the interest in the region within the EU, Grabendorff 
highlights the differences in terms of the degree of interest (or lack of 
interest) the different institutions have shown. He explains how the EP is 
by far the most interested in the region, as well as being the most active 
and showing a great deal of fl exibility during the course of the inter-
parliamentary meetings. Other than the EP, it would appear that it was only 
the EU ’ s Council of Ministers that showed any real interest in Latin America 
( Grabendorff  1987 ). This illustrates a problem that will affect EU policy 
towards Mercosur in the long term: the lack of interest of most EU states 
towards Mercosur. 
 The third area of EU–Mercosur relations is in trade, where the lack of 
signifi cant change leads us to underestimate the importance of the Iberian 
membership in EU trade with Mercosur. Table  4.1 below suggests that levels 
of trade have, in relative terms, remained very much the same. 
 To summarize: the three areas of EU policy towards Mercosur show 
differing degrees of change which helps to explain the medium importance 
of the Iberian membership in relation to the policy towards Mercosur. As 
mentioned in the introduction to this chapter,  Sewell  ( 1996 ) claims that the 
importance of some event in the future is due to the path dependence that 
was created. In this case, the Iberian membership had an impact that would 
become apparent in the long-term, not so much immediately. 
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 So far the evidence has shown a low level of ambition and commitment 
on the EU ’ s side, implying a low level of engagement. But the fact that there 
is some ambition, and some commitment – as has been seen with the aid 
part of the policy especially, and the political dialogue to some extent – 
means that it would not be accurate to say that there is no engagement. 
This engagement is critical to the central argument of this book; there was 
progress due to the Iberian membership and the interest on the part of Latin 
America in engaging with the EU. 
 It is important to discuss EU relations with other regional groups in Latin 
America to understand the position that Mercosur achieved. EU policy 
towards Mercosur developed out of the EU ’ s more general policy towards 
Latin America as soon as it was materially possible. During the fi rst stage 
of Mercosur (1985–1990) there was still very little development that was 
capable of meriting an individual relationship with the EU. Therefore, any 
dialogue that did take place tended to occur on an informal basis through 
the Rio Group. This was made possible thanks to the pressure that Spain 
exerted in order to get the EU more involved, fi rst, in Central America and 
then in other areas at a later date. However, the dialogue covered most 
issues related to Latin America, and under that same umbrella were the 
dialogues between the EU and the Rio Group. 
 The hard experience of the Central American confl ict of 1979–1985 and 
the complex redemocratization of the 1980s reshaped the principles of 
a Latin American politics of cooperation. The creation of the Rio Group 
and the links with the Contadora group (a group created by Colombia, 
Mexico, Panama and Venezuela to deal with the Central American crisis) 
helped the consolidation of the peace process in the region. Those groups 
created the necessary trust in the new political context which helped to 
develop a permanent political dialogue between the EU and Latin America 
and to improve the democratic credibility of the Central American countries 
( Duran  2009 ). The approach of Latin American and Caribbean countries 
to Europe is asymmetrical; the urgency of having access to bigger and more 
stable markets is on the Latin American and Caribbean side. For the 
Europeans, trade with Asia, Oceania and the special emphasis on the US is 
the priority. The fact that this region is not a priority for Europe does not 
mean that the EU does not accept a move towards Latin America and the 
Carribbean for strategic reasons ( Duran  2009 ). 
 It is important to point out that EU–Mercosur dialogues did not offi cially 
take place until 1991, only a few years after the process of integration 
between Brazil and Argentina had started to emerge in 1985. The process 
was then later extended to Paraguay and Uruguay. Because these states 
formed the bulk of Mercosur ’ s membership, these relations are referred to 
as EU–Mercosur dialogues. EU–Mercosur dialogues during this period 
continued to experience problems primarily as a result of the lack of integra-
tion between Mercosur countries. At the end of the 1980s Brazil was still 
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reluctant to advance on a sub-regional agreement with the EU ( Bizzozero 
 1995 ). It seems that the EU ’ s cooperation on regional integration and the 
consolidation of Mercosur enabled EU–Mercosur agreements to really take 
off in the early 1990s ( Bizzozero  1995 ). According to  Grabendorff  ( 1987 ), 
the obstacles the EU encountered in South America compared with the other 
EU–Latin American sub-regional groups were not a surprise. They were 
caused by two main issues: fi rstly, relations between the EU and Argentina 
over the Malvinas/Falklands confl ict continued to make EU–Mercosur rela-
tions diffi cult; secondly, there was still the long-standing competitive rivalry 
between Brazil and Argentina in terms of which would be Mercosur ’ s 
external representative. 
 The highest profi le dialogue between the EU and a regional group was 
the dialogue between the EU and Central America. The EU ’ s peaceful 
intervention in the Central American crisis with the development of the San 
José process was an important step in terms of furthering Central American 
relations with the EU, but only to a limited extent.  Hoste ’ s  ( 1999 ) argument 
that this was due to the lack of economic or political interest is understand-
able. However, what is more diffi cult to accept is Hoste ’ s contention that 
the EU developed relations with Central America in order to gain access to 
Latin America more generally. These Central American countries had very 
little infl uence over Latin America and an unstable political situation that 
had been created by suffering several decades of civil wars, as in the case 
of El Salvador. Moreover, most of the EU intervention was done through 
the French, Spanish and German embassies in Central America. In addition 
to this, Spain and Portugal were part of the San José dialogue even though 
they were not members of the EU when the dialogues began. They were 
involved, nevertheless, because of both the interest and the pressure that 
was expressed in the EU by Spanish President Felipe Gonzalez. ‘The coop-
eration between the EU and Latin America was already one of the most 
important precedents to understand the project of relations between regions, 
at the Latin American and Mercosur level’ ( Caetano et al.  2010 : 200). 
 The more general lack of interest in Latin America did not suddenly 
change completely after the EU ’ s initial contact with Central America, but 
the contact did mark the beginning of a sort of relationship between the EU 
and Latin America. It is more likely that the policy with Central America also 
happened due to the seriousness of the situation that was being created by 
the international confl ict with the US, which had contributed to destabilizing 
the region. I would argue that what is also interesting is that the EU had 
found, quite accidentally, an interlocutor for the region in the shape of the 
Rio Group. Political dialogue with the Rio Group was then later extended 
to become political dialogue with the whole of Latin America:
 Political dialogue was also established with the countries which organised to 
promote peace in the region and created the Contadora Group (in January 
1983) and later became known as the Rio Group (in 1986). Those early 
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meetings were fi rst designed to establish peace and had therefore an agenda 
focused on democracy, peace, confl ict resolution.  ( Dykmann  2006 : 44) 
 The San José dialogue also brought into being a new set of institutional-
ized relationships between the EU and other regions ( Smith  1995 ). However, 
the institutionalized dialogues with the Rio Group became the most suc-
cessful. By 1989, the Rio Group covered approximately the same geographi-
cal territory as the former Latin American Association of Integration and, 
therefore, became a permanent political forum and the main interlocutor 
substituting for other broader regional integration groups ( Ayuso  1996 ). 
 The dialogue between the EU and the Rio Group soon developed to cover 
more than just political issues. The meeting of March 1986 covered a dis-
cussion of the external debt, whilst the 1990 meeting of the Rio Group 
proposed cooperation between both regions at technological and com-
mercial levels ( Hoste  1999 ). As a consequence of this new dialogue there 
were now more delegations of the Commission in the region and there was 
a move from bilateral towards multilateral dialogue between the EU and 
Latin America ( Aldecoa Luzarraga  1995 ). In the early 1990s, the number 
of delegations doubled from four to eight ( Hoste  1999 ). There was still a 
limit to the dialogues between the two regions. According to Dykmann: 
‘Since the Rio Group has no rigid institutionalised organisational structure, 
no organic dialogue with the EU evolved and no real negotiations took 
place’ ( Dykmann  2006 : 45). 
 At this point, we also need to consider the infl uence of the long-standing 
lack of relations between these regions, which affected the speed of the 
changes in the fi rst stage. Dykmann argues that the real goal of this forum 
at this particular time was ‘to create an atmosphere of trust, which should 
lead to common positions and harmony between the regions and it strength-
ened the position of Latin American countries relative to third parties’ 
( Dykmann  2006 : 45). 
 Another sign of the importance of Latin American demands to the EU 
in order to advance the EU–Latin American relationship was the behaviour 
of the ambassador of Chile in Brussels regarding the institutionalization of 
the dialogues with the EU. He played a key role in convincing the other 
ministers from Latin America to seek a common declaration from the EU. 
As a result of the Chilean ambassador ’ s efforts, the Declaration of Rome 
institutionalized a dialogue which meant that the Rio Group would be 
formally recognized as the EU ’ s main partner in Latin America ( Dykmann 
 2006 : 45). This would not be the fi rst time that the EU needed specifi c 
demands from Latin America in order to develop policies towards the latter. 
According to Dykmann, the EU was satisfi ed with this dialogue because 
‘the European Union is especially happy about the Rio Group because it 
enables dialogue among four dozen entities but requires only two voices’ 
( Dykmann  2006 : 45). In the following chapter the dialogue between the 
c04.indd   86 12/15/2016   12:44:03 PM
Non-institutionalized relations between the EU and Mercosur 87
EU and the Rio Group, particularly in terms of its importance in the 
development of EU policy and relations with Mercosur, will be further 
discussed in relation to the fact that: ‘More weight has also been given to 
development of relations with Latin American regional associations such as 
the Andean Pact and Mercosur, relations which became autonomous after 
having been developed unoffi cially on the margin of the meetings with the 
Rio Group’ ( Hoste  1999 : 4). 
 The main point of this section is how important an earlier event – such 
as the pressure Spain, among other actors, put on the EU to intervene in 
Central America – became to the blossoming of EU–Latin American regional 
groups’ dialogue, as well as affecting that dialogue, the beginning of the EU 
policy towards Mercosur. This is absolutely crucial for the development of 
EU–Mercosur and therefore for the understanding of EU policy towards 
Mercosur. The link between EU involvement in Central America as a 
consequence of the Iberian membership which infl uenced the future EU–
Latin American and EU–Mercosur relations has been ignored in the literature 
that focuses on the EU policy towards Mercosur of the late 1990s and early 
2000s. 
 In terms of ambition and commitment, again this section shows a low 
degree of both, which produces a low level of engagement. This should not 
be confused with no engagement, since the EU did have a sort of ambition, 
as the institutionalization of the EU–Rio Group meetings shows, and a sort 
of commitment shown by the launching of several political dialogues with 
the region. 
 The Iberian countries’ membership of the EU 
 On 1 January 1986, Spain and Portugal joined the EU. This event has 
proved to be crucial for the development of EU relations with Latin America, 
becoming a historical event which created a path. It also had effects for 
Spanish and Portuguese foreign policy towards Latin America. The degree 
of Europeanization from a bottom-up and top-down perspective happened 
at the same time as the EU membership of Spain and Portugal. This 
re inforces the central argument that explains that the membership of Iberian 
countries was necessary but not suffi cient to create the policy, since they 
did not manage to get the EU uploading the policy. In relation to Spain 
more specifi cally, it was a turning point for Spain ’ s own foreign policy from 
the very moment that Spain ’ s membership of the EU was being considered. 
Spain was aware that it had to make a choice between belonging to the EU 
or Latin America, and in the end it chose the former, but that does not 
mean that it forgot about Latin America. 
 This section analyses to what extent the EU agreed to incorporate the 
Spanish foreign policy agenda in relation to Latin America, and to what 
extent Iberian countries sacrifi ced their national foreign policy objectives 
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towards Latin America as a result of becoming members of the EU. This 
analysis considers the work of  Reuben Wong ( 2008 ) on Europeanization 
which has been discussed in Chapter  2 . In this case, two aspects of Euro-
peanization are considered. 
 First, ‘adaptation and policy’ which is considered the ‘downloading’ 
aspect: ‘Harmonization and transformation of a member state to the needs 
and requirements of EU membership’ ( Wong  2008 : 326). The most impor-
tant indicator for the discussion here is: ‘Internationalization of EU members 
and its integration process’ ( Wong  2008 : 326). By looking at the way the EU 
has downloaded its views on Latin America to Spain and Portugal we can 
see how much the membership did not achieve in relation to Latin America. 
 And second, ‘national projection’ which is considered the uploading 
aspect: ‘National foreign policy of a member state affects and contributes 
to the development of a common European FP [foreign policy]’ ( Wong 
 2008 : 326). And the most important indicator for this is ‘externalization 
of national FP positions onto the EU level’. By looking at the way the EU 
uploaded the views of Spain and Portugal it will be evidenced how much 
the membership achieved in relation to Latin America. 
 Reasons for membership 
 This section will focus on the reasons for membership to see which entity, 
the EU or Spain and Portugal was in an easier position when negotiating 
the issue of Latin America. It was clear that the UK was already a very 
powerful country when it joined the EU, which favoured its demands for 
its former colonies. The discussion below will consider whether the same 
can be said in the case of Spain and Portugal. 
 Spain and Portugal joined the EU for both economic and political reasons. 
The reasons behind Portugal ’ s desire to join the EU were political. Portugal ’ s 
aim was to include its former African colonies in the Lome Convention, as 
well as using the EU to adapt Portugal to the international changes and 
develop the country ( Medeiros Ferreira  1993 : 177). In relation to the Lome 
Convention, Portugal also aimed to have Portuguese recognized as an 
offi cial language in the Convention, where up until now only English and 
French were the offi cially recognized languages ( Medeiros Ferreira  1993 ). 
Medeiros Ferreira claims that in doing so ‘The introduction of linguistic 
criteria for the promotion of regional cooperation could enable those 
African countries whose offi cial language is Portuguese to take better 
advantage of fi nancial assistance under the Lome Convention’ ( Medeiros 
Ferreira  1993 : 177). 
 This would also enable Portugal to receive assistance for its former colo-
nies in terms of generating stronger levels of cooperation at the regional 
level. As a consequence, it would also increase Portugal ’ s infl uence in the 
Lome Convention due to Portugal ’ s special relationship with the former 
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colonies. In a way, this made it possible for Portugal to acquire a more 
powerful position in one of the most developed areas of EU external rela-
tions. In other words, thanks to its EU membership and its special member-
ship with the former colonies, Portugal would end up in a more powerful 
position than would have been possible had it not been a member of the 
EU. Economically, however, trading with Europe was the most important 
issue because Portugal, like Spain, had already started to move towards 
integrating its economy with the European market during the 1960s and 
1970s ( Wiarda  1989 : 192). 
 Similarly, in terms of political issues, Spain was also pursuing EU mem-
bership for many reasons. It is undeniable that the EU provides a model of 
democracy, liberty and progress to Spain and Portugal and that the mod-
ernization of the Iberian countries had to be based on integrating their 
countries into the European club ( Royo  2006 : 211). However, this process 
was more diffi cult for Spain than for Portugal because Portugal had an 
easier time than Spain at an international level. Portugal was admitted to 
the United Nations (UN) earlier than Spain, and even became a NATO 
member while Spain was being treated as something of an outcast ( Wiarda 
 1989 : 192). This was most certainly a product of Spain ’ s recent political 
history which had generated strong feelings against Spain within the EU 
( Wiarda  1989 : 192). This strong dislike of Spanish politics in the twentieth 
century was generated by events such as the Spanish Civil War and Franco ’ s 
alliance with Hitler. It could be argued that this put Spain in a relatively 
weak position when it was trying to become a member of the EU. The 
negotiations of Spanish membership with the EU will be discussed below, 
but the important point to make here is that at the international level Spain 
was looking to strengthen its historical links with Latin America, as well 
as its links with the Arab world ( Holmes  1983 : 165). 
 In terms of the EU ’ s position in relation to Spain and Portugal becoming 
members, it is clear that the EU had developed a clear agenda. According 
to  Wiarda  ( 1989 ), the EU ’ s political agenda was far more developed, 
although somewhat overblown at times:
 The belief of the German Social Democrats, the French left, British Labour, 
and Benelux and Scandinavian Socialists that the continuing ‘Fascist’ regimes 
of Spain and Portugal were unacceptable in the European community of 
democratic and social democratic nations … Much evidence shows that 
political leaders in France and Germany especially feared the potential for 
domestic upheaval in their own nations, which the Portuguese revolution 
seemed to inspire … Fearing a repeat of the revolutionary events of 1968, or 
worse, the European leaders sought to moderate Portugal ’ s revolution (and 
prevent one in Spain) by pushing for their entry into the EEC. Although the 
fear that France or Germany might explode as Portugal did seems ludicrous 
in retrospect, at the height of the Portuguese revolution in 1974–1975 the 
threat of upheaval elsewhere seemed real.  ( Wiarda  1989 : 194) 
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 Fear of political uprisings in other EU member states was not the only 
reason why EU member states were interested in integrating Spain and 
Portugal into the EU. For example, there was a belief that by bringing the 
Iberian countries into the EU, the EU would be able to prevent Spain and 
Portugal from going ‘Communist’, and ‘who knows about Italy, Greece, 
and Turkey – perhaps the entire southern fl ank of Europe’ ( Wiarda  1989 : 
194). As the author explains, with even a little of knowledge of the Spanish 
and Portuguese systems of that time, these fears would seem ridiculous, 
nevertheless there was discussion of the possibility of a ‘red Mediterranean’ 
at many levels, including academic and government ones. The US was also 
very keen on the Iberian countries becoming members of the EU for 
similar reasons. This argument is supported by the fact the US transferred 
funds to European parties ( Wiarda  1989 : 194). Wiarda also claims that 
the Iberian membership was used as a mechanism to secure political 
changes at the national level such as democratization – a crucial point in 
relation to the issue of EU–Mercosur relations since this is also an indica-
tor of the US ’ s infl uence in European politics at the time, never mind US 
infl uence in its own backyard. This issue will be discussed in more detail 
later on. 
 Although there were general political and economic reasons for allowing 
the Iberian countries to become members of the EU, not all the EU countries 
were equally in favour of doing so. This is especially the case in relation 
to economic issues, particularly around the time that it seemed likely that 
Spain and Portugal would become members of the EU. For example, France 
was not very excited that the Iberian countries might become members 
of the EU, principally because of the effect this would have on France ’ s 
agricultural sector. The focus of the discussion will now turn to examine 
the actual process of negotiating the Iberian countries ’ inclusion into 
the EU. 
 For both economic and political reasons, the negotiations lasted seven 
years. During the fi rst years, the political obstacles were the main problem. 
Interestingly, some EU countries helped or desired concrete political out-
comes during this time. Germany, for example, went as far as giving aid to 
Felipe Gonzalez ’ s political party PSOE (Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party) 
( Holmes  1983 ), which would go on to win Spanish national elections from 
1982 to 1996. However, the EU demanded more than just political changes. 
Once some form of democracy had been put in place in both countries, 
Spain and Portugal were denied membership once again. This produced 
dismay in both countries, especially because it was France ’ s idea to postpone 
and review their membership ( Wiarda  1989 : 198). The main problem was 
the potential effect that the Iberian countries would have on the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) because both Spain and Portugal ’ s economies 
were heavily weighted towards producing agricultural products. The UK ’ s 
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rebate only served to further complicate the negotiations ( Heywood  1995 ). 
The UK ’ s rebate referred to the economic contribution that the UK was 
providing to the EU which the newly elected British prime minister, Mar-
garet Thatcher, considered too big a contribution. It was linked to the CAP, 
which would make demands on a high percentage of the EU budget which 
the UK would not benefi t from as much as other countries, such as France. 
In addition to this, Germany was also unwilling to spend money on olive 
oil when it could be spent on butter ( Holmes  1983 : 165). The entrance of 
Iberian countries would mean a percentage of funding from the CAP would 
go towards the production of olive oil, instead of subsidizing other agricul-
tural products such as butter. Holmes suggests that other EU member states 
were cautious about allowing Spain and Portugal to become members of 
the EU because of its agricultural production. As a result, negotiations 
relating to the Iberian countries’ membership were hard fought. According 
to  Heywood  ( 1995 ), this is an important issue that tends to be overlooked 
in the existing literature. Furthermore, he argues that in the end, Spain 
agreed to:
 Opening its markets to EC competitors and bringing down external tariffs on 
industrial goods from third countries to the Community average within a 
period of seven years. In return, it would take ten years for the most competi-
tive sectors of Spanish agricultural output –fresh fruit, vegetables and olive 
oil – to be phased into the CAP.  ( Heywood  1995 : 270) 
 The French opposition was also linked to the CAP, particularly the effect 
that Spanish products would have in this area ( Royo  2006 ). As Wiarda 
discusses, this event reminded the Iberian countries of the old complexes, 
prejudices and inferiorities, which made them reconsider being part of 
Europe and also question their future economic relations with third world 
countries such as Latin America and Africa ( Wiarda  1989 : 198). This ‘Plan 
B’ (stay with Latin America) was not so attractive, though, and it could be 
argued that Spain and Portugal were not in a strong enough position to 
defend their interests during the negotiations in many areas, particularly 
their special relationship with Latin America. However, Spain did use its 
relationship with Latin America as a way of exerting some pressure or at 
least positive infl uence when making its application to join the EU ( Wiarda 
 1989 ). As highlighted by  Dykmann  ( 2006 ), though, it is diffi cult to accept 
the idea that the Iberian members were accepted into the EU because of 
their relationship with Latin America. More specifi cally, Spain had pro-
moted the idea that it could act as a bridge between Europe and Latin 
America as far as possible. At the same time, Spain was unsuccessful in its 
attempts to ensure that its former colonies would be elevated to the same 
status as former British and French colonies ( Baklanoff  2001 ;  Dykmann 
 2006 ).  Baklanoff  ( 2001 ) claims that Spain was forced to sign a ‘pre-nuptial 
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agreement’ whereby Spain would enter into a new marriage with the EU, 
from which Latin America would be excluded. This supports the view of 
low (if any) uploading by the EU. 
 It has already been argued in this monograph that Spain had, from the 
beginning, chosen to prioritize its regional relations in Europe rather than 
develop inter-regional relations with Latin America. However, this does not 
mean that Spain completely abandoned developing relations with Latin 
America. It is even debatable whether Spain did not explore this issue for 
its own benefi t. 
 Nevertheless, although Spain decided to prioritize its relationship with 
the EU over Latin America from the very beginning, it did not mean that 
Spain would give up on Latin America. Wiarda argues that ‘While negotiat-
ing with the EEC Spain also tried strenuously to resurrect its special rela-
tionship with Latin America … These ties are to be built not on the older 
bases of Hispanismo implying Spanish paternalism and superiority toward 
its former colonies but on the basis of a “partnership” whose precise 
dimensions have never been fully articulated’ ( Wiarda  1989 : 200). Never-
theless, strategic attempts to use the EU to enable Spain to become more 
infl uential in Latin America and the other way around – Spain using Latin 
America to become stronger inside the EU – did not end with the negotia-
tions for membership. In fact, it continues to be an important feature of 
Spanish foreign policy today. As this section will show, there were some 
small achievements which show a small but important infl uence of the 
Iberian countries, how much they achieved is at the centre of the discussion. 
The following section will examine just how much Spain and Portugal were, 
in the end, able to achieve in terms of developing relations and policies that 
would benefi t Latin America. It could be argued that these were only 
crumbs from the table. Nevertheless, this does not mean that relations and 
policies with Latin America could not be developed over time. Paraphrasing 
Sewell one more time, the events at a particular time will affect the events 
later on. 
 Sustaining these views are the following examples: two months before 
the signature of the Act of Accession, Spain and Portugal tried to negotiate 
their contribution to Lome. One of the issues that Spain highlighted during 
the negotiations was keeping zero tariffs on some products from Latin 
America. In fact, Manuel Marin (the chief negotiator for the Spanish team) 
mentioned that this was an obstacle two months before the signature of the 
accession treaty ( El País  27/4/1985 ). Spain suspended the issue of the tariffs 
from Latin America on the contribution of  € 3.6 million to the third Lome 
Convention ( El País  23/7/1985 ). 
 The discussion below will examine whether Spain and Portugal were able 
to create enough pressure that there would eventually be improvements in 
relations between Latin America and the EU once they had become members 
of the EU. 
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 The outcome of negotiations for Iberian membership 
 This section will show the low but important level of EU uploading towards 
Mercosur. Spain and Portugal signed the Treaty of Accession in Madrid on 
12 June 1985. The same day, the ‘Joint Declaration of Intent on the 
Development and Intensifi cation of Relations with the Countries of Latin 
America’ was also signed by the EU member states (see below Box  4.3 ). 
This joint declaration was the result of Spain and Portugal ’ s attempts to 
raise the status of their former colonies to the same level as the former colo-
nies of Britain and France, as stated in the Lome Convention ( Dykmann 
 Box 4.3  Final Act, Joint Declaration of Intent on the Development 
and Intensifi cation of Relations with the Countries of Latin America 
 The Community:
 •  confi rms the importance which it attaches to its traditional links 
with the countries of Latin America and to the close cooperation 
which it has developed with those countries; 
 •  recalls in that context the recent ministerial meeting at San José in 
Costa Rica; 
 •  on the occasion of the accession of Spain and Portugal, reaffi rms 
its resolve to extend and strengthen its economic, commercial and 
cooperation relations with those countries; 
 •  is determined to step up its activities to exploit all possible ways 
of achieving this goal, thus contributing, in particular, to the 
economic and social development of the Latin-American region, 
and to efforts aimed at the regional integration thereof; 
 •  will endeavour, more specifi cally, to give concrete form to ways of 
strengthening the present links, of developing, extending and 
diversifying trade as far as possible and of implementing coopera-
tion in the various fi elds of mutual interest on as wide a basis as 
possible, using the appropriate instruments and frameworks to 
increase the effi ciency of the various forms of cooperation; 
 •  is prepared in this context, in order to promote trade fl ows, to 
examine any problems which might arise in the fi eld of trade with 
a view to fi nding appropriate solutions, taking into account, in 
particular, the scope of the generalized system of tariff preferences 
and the application of the economic cooperation agreements 
concluded or to be concluded with certain Latin American coun-
tries or groups of countries. 
 Source :  EEC ( 1985 ). 
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 2006 : 87–88;  Royo  2006 : 45). In this declaration, the EU declared that it 
was keen to intensify its actions in order to help with the economic and 
social development of the Latin American region ( EEC  1985 ). From the 
moment of the Iberian accession to the EU, it was already possible to see 
that there were problems with the GSP and the cooperation agreements that 
were created or about to be created in reference to this region. The declara-
tion was strongly promoted by Spain ( El País  20/2/1985 ;  Dykmann  2006 ). 
The EP ’ s resolution of the following day recognizes the fact that Spain ’ s 
membership would help to consolidate relations with Latin America. 
Beyond this broad declaration, Spain also managed to keep 40,000 tons of 
cocoa and coffee under special treatment per year ( El País  31/12/1986 ). A 
Final Act Declaration by Spain on Latin America was made on 15 Novem-
ber 1985 (see Box  4.4 ). 
 The emphasis that Spain placed on Latin America had a price; during 
the reorganization of the Commission, a Spanish offi cial, Juan Prat, was 
given the job of coordinating relations with Latin America, Asia and 
the Mediterranean countries, but in the corridors of Berlaymount the 
president of the Commission Jacques Delors said, ‘Prat ’ s post is costly’. 
To gain this post, Spain lost other ‘good positions’ ( El País  7/3/1990 ). 
However, Spain ’ s interest in bringing Latin America closer to the European 
Community, according to the president of Spain at the time, was a product 
of national interests rather than moral reasons ( El País  22/11/1985 ). It is 
not clear if Spain ’ s position was taken because Spain wanted to become 
more important and more powerful within the EU by having strong connec-
tions with Latin America or whether Spain was trying to gain the benefi ts 
of having connections in Latin America by securing the support of the 
European Community. 
 Box 4.4  Final Act Declaration by the Kingdom of Spain on 
Latin America 
 In order to avoid sudden disturbances in its imports originating in 
Latin America, Spain has highlighted in the negotiations the problems 
which arise from the application of the ‘acquis communautaire’ to 
certain products. Partial and temporary solutions have been adopted 
for tobacco, cocoa and coffee. 
 Spain, in accordance with the principles and criteria set out in the 
joint declaration adopted by the Conference on Latin America, 
proposes fi nding permanent solutions in the context of the general-
ized system preferences, when next revised, or of other mechanisms 
existing within the Community. 
 Source :  EEC ( 1985 ). 
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 The declaration on EU relations with Latin America was a direct result 
of Spain and Portugal becoming members of the EU. Furthermore, this 
declaration provoked a series of chain reactions. On 2 December 1986, the 
commissioner in charge of Latin American affairs suggested to the Council 
of Ministers that they should improve Europe ’ s relationship with the region 
( Grabendorff  1987 ). In addition to this, a communication from the Com-
mission to the Council on 27 January 1987 relating to the improvement of 
relations between the EU and Latin America was offi cially made. This 
communication talked of improving relations in the areas of macroeconom-
ics, fi nancial dialogue, and that this should be done by establishing relations 
with the institutions in charge of them ( Blanco Garriga  1992 ). The fact that 
the intention was to begin by improving relations at an institutional level 
shows how little engagement there was in terms of developing long-term 
policies and strategies. The establishment of a dialogue at an economic level 
tends to be the fi rst dialogue between two regions. That it was absent shows 
that there was a lack of dialogue in relation to political matters. The 
Luxembourg European Council in June 1987 approved a document that 
contained new guidelines for EU–Latin American relations ( Blanco Garriga 
 1992 ;  Gomez Saraiva  2004 ). It also encouraged further integration between 
the regions ( Gomez Saraiva  2004 ). 
 The membership of Spain and Portugal is a crucial point, a critical 
juncture in the relations between the EU and Latin America. It could be 
argued that this historical moment created a sort of ‘bottom-up’ movement 
(see Figure  4.1 ). With the declaration, the EU proved that it intended to 
improve relations with Latin America. It is also clear that Spain expected 
to develop a greater degree of commitment, which in reality developed at 
such a slow speed that it often appears that the words were just pure rheto-
ric. This critical juncture also affected other EU external relations. Spain 
and Portugal, which were now members of the EU, could infl uence the 
future of the ACP by trying to favour Latin America over the latter, provok-
ing a diversifi cation of the EU resources. A path had been created and it 
would affect future negotiations of aid and GSP; Spain and Portugal would 
 Figure 4.1  Spain and Portugal ’ s EU membership: bottom-up outcome 
12 June 1985: Council
declaraon in favour of
improving its relaons
with Lan America




12 June 1985: Signature of the Treaty of Accession of Spain and Portugal
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ask the EU to be more generous in terms of resources given to Latin 
America. This was very prominent in the Spanish media. For example, a 
month before Spain joined the EU, the Spanish president commented that 
the possibility of increasing collaboration between Latin America and 
Europe was linked to the relationship between Spain and Latin America ( El 
País  22/11/1985 ). The media also pointed out views from Latin America 
in relation to the Iberian countries becoming members of the EU. For 
example, the president of the Chamber of Commerce of Bogota, Mario 
Suarez Melo, considered Spain and Portugal to be two advocates for Latin 
America at the EU, which would enable Latin America to gain better 
treatment from the EU ( El País  1/11/1985 ). Within the EU there were also 
statements recognizing this critical juncture. Cheysson, the commissioner 
at that time, recognized that the membership of Spain and Portugal would 
increase the possibilities of intensifying the relations between the EU and 
Latin America ( El País  23/6/1987 ). Furthermore, Helmut Kohl, the chancel-
lor of West Germany, days before the accession of Spain to the EU, men-
tioned that Spain could be ‘an intermediary of exceptional category between 
Europe and Latin America’ ( El País  28/12/1985 ). 
 There was, however, a major impediment to this bottom-up relationship 
– the lack of interest from the EU. The president of the Institute of Ibero-
American Cooperation, Luis Yanez, was worried about the lack of interest 
the EU showed towards Latin America and the possibility that the EU 
would not want to give all that attention to Spain ( El País  23/11/1985 ). 
 Kramer  ( 1980 ), for example, discusses the deep effects that Spain and 
Portugal had on other less developed countries that are not members of the 
EU and, in particular, the impact on EU development policy of the amount 
of money that would be transferred to the new members. However, Kramer ’ s 
work was published so early that it was more predictive than factual. The 
existing literature is also ambiguous in relation to the effect of the Iberian 
membership for Latin America. Previous studies do, however, recognize that 
the Iberian membership did open a path but, initially in terms of trade, it 
had a negative impact on Latin America. For example, Wiarda contends:
 There is still some possibility that the world ’ s most powerful economic bloc 
(the EEC) and the world ’ s most dynamic developing region (Latin America) 
will work out new arrangements or, alternatively, that Spain ’ s historic and 
recently expanding ties with Latin America will enable Spain to act as a bridge 
between the EEC and Latin America. But at this point it seems likely that the 
enlargement of the EEC will prove detrimental to Latin America.  ( Wiarda 
 1989 : 201) 
 The lack of interest in that region, and the EU ’ s interest in other regions, 
such as those who were part of the Lome Convention, brought about a 
‘top-down’ movement at the time of the Iberian membership. The lack of 
interest must be linked to the low EU ambition and commitment, which 
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shows a low EU engagement with Mercosur countries. In relation to ambi-
tion, the 12 June Council declaration in favour of improving its relations 
with Latin America shows a very low ambition, as it was vague and 
imprecise. In relation to commitment, these are no more than declarations 
of intent with the membership. 
 Figure  4.2 outlines this top-down movement in terms of trade. It shows 
that there are different elements to this top-down process. First is the EU 
External Common Tariff for the rest of the world, which means that trade 
with ACP countries (the former Lome group) is at a preferential rate and 
that Spain and Portugal would stop preferential trade with Latin America. 
The other effect would be related to the diversifi cation of Spanish and 
Portuguese trade towards the EU. 
 Trade with ACP countries meant the acceptance that the: ‘preferential 
EC tariffs granted to Third World countries and especially those granted to 
the African, Caribbean and Pacifi c countries under the Lome Convention 
and to the Mediterranean countries under cooperation agreements, were to 
apply from accession except for certain temporarily exempt products’ 
( Nicholson and East  1987 : 232). More specifi cally, ‘Typical tropical prod-
ucts (coffee, tea, cocoa, spices) will benefi t from enlargement in that the 
 Figure 4.2  Spain and Portugal ’ s EU membership: ‘top-down’ in relation to trade 
Spain and Portugal join the EU, 1 January 1986:






EU External Common Tariff for the















Spain and Portugal decrease their trade with Lan America in favour
of other EU countries or interests.
Spain and Portugal Europeanize their policies with third countries
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three applicant states still levy duties on them, and these will be abolished’ 
( Von der Groeben  1979 : 90). 
 Cocoa and coffee are very important products for Latin America in terms 
of trade. This change affected Latin America negatively due to the lack of 
protection these products were given compared with the ACP countries; 
this is one of the few third world areas that was not protected and one 
where Spanish products would partly substitute for Latin American prod-
ucts ( Wiarda  1989 : 201). Essentially, trade with the ACP countries had a 
negative impact on Latin American interests since they enjoyed a better 
trade agreement with the EU now that Spain and Portugal were members. 
The ACP countries are not the only countries that have some trade protec-
tion. It seems that Latin America is one of the few areas not protected. 
More specifi cally, Spanish imports of tropical products were bought from 
the ACP countries instead of Latin America because of the preferential 
agreements ( Baklanoff  2001 ). 
 The EU External Common Tariff meant that the import of industrial 
goods from third world countries would be reduced by Spain and Portugal 
over the course of a seven-year period ( Heywood  1995 : 270). The new 
members also had to accept new commercial policies which had a negative 
impact on exports to Spain from Latin America ( Baklanoff  2001 ). It also 
seems that the Iberian membership impacted on sensitive products for Latin 
America in that those products, which Latin America had exported to the 
EU, would now be provided to the EU by the new members. Von der 
Groeben writes, ‘The Community has reduced or frozen its offers with 
regard to sensitive products, and there are precisely products where capacity 
in the Community of Twelve would be appreciably increased as a result of 
accession. This would further reduce the chances of improving the system 
of preferences’ ( Von der Groeben  1979 : 90). The decision of the Council 
of Ministers that Spain had to remove all trade agreements with third world 
countries, including Latin America, was key ( Baklanoff  2001 ). 
 To some extent Spain and Portugal would end up buying from the EU 
agricultural products that Spain would otherwise have bought from Latin 
America. This was due to the CAP, which made goods such as cereals 
cheaper than those from South America ( Baklanoff  2001 ). Over time this 
change has been dramatic. Baklanoff argues that ‘Spain ’ s import share from 
the region collapsed; falling from over 11% in 1985, on the eve of its 
accession to the EU, to 4.4% in 1999’ ( Baklanoff  2001 : 114 ). However, it 
should not be forgotten in comparative terms that neither Spain, Portugal 
nor the EU had massive levels of trade with Latin America. In fact, in 1985, 
Spain ’ s trade turnover with Portugal was higher than its trade with Latin 
America ( Baklanoff  2001 ). Without denying the existence of this ‘top-
down’ movement in relation to trade, its impact should not be overestimated 
and an examination of other parts of the top-down process is required 
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before we can evaluate the full extent of the degree of the top-down 
movement. 
 Top-down in relation to aid 
 The existing literature discusses how much money would be added to the 
development budget following the Iberian membership. Kramer examines 
the opposite possibility but dismisses it:
 It is sometimes feared that the total fl ows of development aid given by the 
EEC Member States will stagnate or even decrease. This could happen if the 
nine old EC countries regarded the net fi nancial fl ows from the old Com-
munity towards the three new members as a form of development aid or at 
least as payments which could be counted in this category. Such view cannot 
be regarded as totally unfounded as at least Greece and Spain are still fre-
quently treated as developing countries and Portugal with regard to per capita 
income ranges behind several other countries which are without question 
among the LDCs.  ( Kramer  1980 : 96) 
 More importantly for this section, the existing literature also considers 
where this money is going to be spent. Kramer argues that:
 This concerns the fi nancial means of the European Development Fund (EDF). 
The sum to be distributed to the ACP states is laid down in the Agreement 
of Lome, and the share of the different Member States has been fi xed by an 
internal agreement. It seems politically impossible that the EDF could be 
reduced on account of an enlargement of the Community. Rather, the increase 
of the number of Member States will be accompanied by an increase of the 
EDF, although the contribution of the new Members States might not be very 
big.  ( Kramer  1980 : 96) 
 In fact, Kramer discusses how, although this aid might be small, the real 
effect is not going to be on the ACP countries which will continue to receive 
their share of the budget. Kramer contends that the real impact will be in 
other areas, for example where fi nancial aid goes to Latin America ( Kramer 
 1980 : 96). Crucially, Kramer points out the idea of Spain reducing its aid 
to Latin America as a consequence of its contribution to the EDF, only to 
reject it because:
 More likely is, however, that Spain (and for that matter Portugal) instead of 
reducing aid to Latin American countries will, on the contrary, try to increase 
it by way of reorientation of the Community, changing its interest from the 
heavy preoccupation with Africa a little towards more cooperation with South 
America.  ( Kramer  1980 : 100) 
 According to Kramer, this would follow from the history of development 
aid in the EU in a way that is similar to what has happened with France 
and the UK in terms of their former colonies. 
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 Top-down political relations 
 It appears that there have not been major top-down fl ows in political 
relations in terms of the development of policy towards Latin America. In 
fact, it can be said that the political part of the European foreign policy 
was not very advanced in the 1980s. Therefore the Spanish concessions 
were related to other areas and one-off events, such as the recognition of 
Israel ( Heywood  1995 : 270). It is diffi cult to say precisely how signifi cant 
top-down relations were in terms of the Iberian membership, to the point 
that it is diffi cult to confi rm whether the membership of Spain and Portugal 
was at this point good or bad for Latin America. This could be justifi ed in 
relation to the weak position of the Iberian countries in their negotiations, 
and their strong desire to become members of the EU at any price. However, 
once they were inside the EU, the pro-Latin American policy increased. This 
is why the declaration added to the Treaty of Membership is so signifi cant. 
The critical juncture was 12 June 1985 when it was signed, not so much 
for the instant changes that this would produce but what would happen in 
the long term, following the path that this created. It seems, as Wiarda 
explains, that Spain was not in an easy position when trying to explain its 
special relationship with Latin America:
 The EEC has said that Spain failed to specify how its special relationship with 
Latin America will affect its relations with the European Community. The 
EEC insists that Spain, as a condition of its membership, defi ne the nature of 
its relations with Latin America and also agree to accept the ‘commitments’ 
made by the EEC with the southern Mediterranean nations and with the ACP 
countries, that are signatories to the Lome treaty. The Europeans are con-
cerned that will all its special Latin American relationships Spain may try to 
bring in its EEC wake a string of ‘miniLomes’.  ( Wiarda  1989 : 200–201) 
 Therefore, it seems that the EU was constrained somehow by the fear of 
‘mini-Lomes’ and the Iberian membership could have been jeopardized 
(again) because of this, as well as not forgetting just how important agri-
cultural issues were during these negotiations. 
 This section has shown how there has been both a top-down and a 
bottom-up process with the Spanish membership, and a low ambition and 
commitment which implies a low engagement at that specifi c point. As has 
been mentioned, it does not mean events that happened in the past affect 
the future, and this is the perfect example of how an event did not lay the 
basis for big and immediate changes, but for later and more moderate ones. 
 EU engagement with Mercosur 
 In order to assess the level of ambition at the different stages, it is necessary 
to contrast the presence of: offers of negotiation mandates or agreements, 
EU offi cial policy pronouncements, promises to Mercosur, plans for a 
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potential relationship. In relation to ambition the different levels are shown 
in Figure  4.3 . 
 The level of ambition is low as a consequence of three decades of 
complete ignorance of the economics and politics of Mercosur countries by 
the EU. The EU could not develop an ambitious agenda until it had a 
minimum of knowledge about Mercosur countries, which developed over 
time, and specifi cally after the membership of Spain and Portugal. Figure 
 4.4 shows that the level of commitment at this stage was low as well since 
nothing was offi cially agreed between the EU and Mercosur countries. 
 The EU ’ s level of engagement with Mercosur countries was at its lowest 
point since all the talks were informal and under the umbrella of the EU–Rio 
Group annual meetings. The EU did not sign any agreement at this stage 
with Mercosur itself, or even with the Mercosur countries. As Table  4.2 
shows, after measuring the dependent variable, this stage of the policy 
should be placed at the low/low point of the spectrum. 
 Although it is clear that there is low ambition and commitment, this 
should not be confused with ‘none’, since that would mean there is no 
involvement. If there is no involvement, there is no policy. To say that there 
is low involvement does not mean that this is the least important stage of 
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the policy since, thanks to the membership of Spain and Portugal, it pro-
voked a historic moment in EU policy towards Mercosur. 
 As the introduction to this chapter outlined, the explanations provided 
in the existing literature for EU–Mercosur relations during this period are 
almost non-existent. By assessing if the expectations established in Chapter 
 2 for each argument became a reality or not at this stage, we can uncover 
the real explanatory potential of each explanation. 
 Counterbalancing the US 
 The fi rst explanation given in the literature relates to the US and the EU ’ s 
aim to counterbalance the power and infl uence of the US. Here it is expected 
that the EU would become increasingly involved in Latin America if the US 
was to increase its own involvement in the region. At this stage of the policy, 
the EU did, very slowly, increase its involvement in Latin America. The US 
also continued its involvement in Latin America in different areas, such as 
external debt. Moreover, in 1988, the fi rst talks regarding the creation of 
the FTAA also took place. However, to suggest that the EU was trying to 
counterbalance the US at this stage is an exaggeration. In fact, it seems that 
the US was infl uencing Europe at this point. For example, it has already 
been shown that the US was very keen on the Iberian membership, and this 
is supported by the fact that the US transferred funds to European parties 
( Wiarda  1989 : 194). Wiarda goes as far as suggesting that the Iberian 
membership was used to secure political changes such as democracy at the 
domestic level in the Iberian countries. This shows the infl uence of the US 
at that time in Europe, never mind in its own backyard. Therefore the 
expectation that the EU would look to counterbalance the US is not appli-
cable at this stage of EU–Mercosur relations. 
 Table 4.2  Measurement of the dependent variable, engagement: fi rst stage 
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 Global aspirations 
 The global aspirations of the EU as an explanation for the EU ’ s involvement 
in Latin America also fail to provide a satisfactory explanation of EU–
Mercosur relations at this stage. These arguments would expect there to be 
an increase in EU involvement in Latin America if there was an increase in 
the EU ’ s involvement in other regions. This, however, was not the case 
because the EU continued its high involvement in the ACP countries and, 
more importantly, from 1989, the priority for EU external relations for the 
next fi fteen years was its policy towards Central and Eastern European 
countries. 
 External federator 
 With regard to the role of the EU as a promoter of regional integration 
abroad, it can be acknowledged that at this stage the expectations proved 
to be true. It was expected that if Latin America became more integrated, 
the EU would increase its involvement in the area. Mercosur countries 
started an integration process in 1985 and from this moment the EU started 
to increase its involvement in this area. It could also be argued that the EU 
was impressed by the integration movement in this region, particularly the 
decision to develop a more open market economy. 
 Affi nity 
 It also seems that the proposal that an increase in shared values between 
the regions explains an increase in the EU ’ s involvement does not fi t at 
this stage. At this point, the EU shared more political, economic and 
cultural values with Latin America than with most of the regions in Asia 
and Africa. For example, the EU and Latin America share languages, 
religion and similar political systems. This is due to the large infl uence of 
Spain and Portugal over the course of three centuries, and even during the 
twentieth century. Franco in Spain and Salazar in Portugal were seen as 
examples of authoritarian regimes for Brazil, Chile, Argentina and Uruguay, 
which were, at the same time, capable of developing the economy in 
these countries without necessarily creating a degree of political openness 
( Wiarda  1989 ). Wiarda argues that ‘Those who lived and worked in Spain 
and Portugal during the early 1970s were witness to a virtually continuous 
parade of Latin American heads of state, military offi cers, and civilian 
technocrats all eager to learn the Spanish system’ ( Wiarda  1989 : 311). 
This is not to suggest that the whole of the EU shares dictatorships as 
a common value with Latin America, but that Latin American countries 
have continued to develop similar economic and political systems to those 
in Europe due to the infl uence of European countries in the Americas for 
centuries.  
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 Interdependence 
 The argument based on the complex interdependence of development 
between both regions is also not applicable in terms of explaining EU–Latin 
American relations at this stage. This argument would expect the EU to 
increase its involvement in Latin America if there was an increase in the 
EU ’ s investment in terms of trade between the EU and Latin America. As 
this chapter has already shown, the latter ’ s investment in trade did not 
increase signifi cantly at this time. For Latin America, trade with the EU is 
important, even if it is not important for the EU: EU trade with Latin 
America accounts for less than 2% of EU trade. 
 Iberian infl uence in the EU 
 Finally, the EU membership of Spain and Portugal has clearly been an 
important moment for the EU ’ s relations with Latin America. It would be 
expected that the EU would increase its involvement in Latin America if 
Spain and Portugal ’ s infl uence increased in the EU. In the discussion above, 
it has already been shown that this was very much the case. Therefore, this 
argument can indeed be applied in attempts to explain the development of 
the EU ’ s involvement in Latin America. 
 This chapter has analysed in detail the historical moment of the member-
ship of Spain and Portugal. It could be said that ‘history matters’ on this 
occasion and that the path created by Spain and Portugal, with their 
emphasis on Latin America, has been followed to some extent. The path 
dependence in relation to EU policies towards Latin America was also 
crucial over time, as will be seen in the future. The involvement of the EU 
in Mercosur will never be as low as it was before the Iberian membership, 
as will be shown in the following empirical chapters. The main characteristic 
of the institutionalization of EU policy towards Latin America is that it did 
not produce profound changes at once, but over time they became more 
obvious. However, due to the slow speed and power of the Europeanization 
process, this event alone was not suffi cient for the development of an EU 
policy towards Mercosur. As the central argument of this monograph 
claims, the proactive behaviour of Mercosur countries was crucial for the 
development of any policy towards Latin America. 
 In essence, it could be argued that there has been a degree of Europeani-
zation, with the EU slightly uploading Iberian policies to Latin America. As 
was explained in Chapter  2 , following  Reuben Wong ( 2008 ), there are 
several indicators that help to discuss the concept of Europeanization. In 
the case of the EU downloading policies, ‘Internationalization of EU 
members and its integration process’ ( Wong  2008 : 323) is the most relevant 
for this study. Spain and Portugal had to give up several agreements with 
Latin American countries that gave preferential treatment to Latin American 
products because of the common external tariff. Also, it seems that Spain 
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and Portugal had to accept the distribution of EU aid in a way that did not 
favour Latin American countries, which initially met resistance from Spain. 
In the case of the EU uploading policies, the ‘Externalization of national 
foreign policies positions onto the EU level’ is the crucial one. Spain and 
Portugal tried very hard to achieve foreign policy positions towards Latin 
America at the EU level, as the documents of 12 June 1985 show. They 
only had limited success. 
 As this chapter has shown, there is evidence that the changes in EU 
behaviour towards Mercosur were due to the Iberian countries’ accession 
to the EU. In fact, the central argument of this monograph maintains that 
the EU developed a policy towards Mercosur thanks to the Iberian interests 
in the region, although it was not suffi cient on its own – Mercosur ’ s pro-
active behaviour was crucial. The EU locked in the development of a policy 
towards Mercosur after the Iberian membership. The path-dependence 
created was followed until the end of the period of time studied here.
 The relation between the competing arguments for EU involvement in 
Mercosur can be seen in Table  4.3 by looking at the value of the independ-
ent variables and subsequently the expectation. The value assigned to each 
argument at this stage makes it easy to see if the argument was met/con-
fronted. It is clear that only in two cases do the competing arguments meet 
the measure assigned at this stage of the policy. 
 Conclusion 
 This chapter has explained the developments in relations between the EU 
and Mercosur at the fi rst stage of the policy. The central point is that the 
inclusion of the Iberian countries in the EU was extremely important for 
both this stage of the policy and the central argument of this monograph. 
 In addition, this chapter has explained that the fi rst stage of policy 
development between the EU and Mercosur was not institutionalized. It has 
explained that at this stage different steps were taken in order to develop 
higher levels of interaction between the two regions. The desire to do so 
came from both sides of the Atlantic. On one side, the EU, infl uenced by 
Spain and Portugal, which were now members of the EU, took the fi rst 
steps towards increasing its involvement in Latin America. On the other 
side, the creation of different groups in Latin America – for example, the 
Contadora Group, followed by the Rio Group – infl uenced the level of 
dialogue between the EU and Latin America. Mercosur countries were a 
key part of the Rio Group from its creation in 1986. Dialogue with the EU 
started the following year, becoming institutionalized in 1990, after Latin 
America demanded a greater degree of commitment from the EU. 
 This chapter has discussed broadly the level of Europeanization from 
two points of view, from an ‘adaptation and policy’ view and from a 
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‘national projection’ view. The historical event of the inclusion of the 
Iberian countries in the EU has been the starting point of the discussion 
since it started a path that has been followed by the subsequent development 
of EU policy towards Mercosur. This chapter has shown how, although 
Iberian countries were not in a strong position to defend their interest in 
Latin America – which meant the acceptance of the EU way of dealing with 
Latin America – they did manage to sow the seeds for a future blossoming 
of EU–Mercosur relations. Through the work of  Pierson  ( 2000 ) and  Sewell 
 ( 1996 ) this chapter has discussed the path created, and through the work 
of  Reuben Wong ( 2008 ) the discussion continued on Europeanization. This 
discussion has explained how Europeanization is directly linked to histori-
cal institutionalism since the EU institutions are the ones that matter in this 
case; therefore, the discussion of path dependence fi ts here. 
 After discussing to what extent the EU had uploaded and downloaded 
its policies, this chapter has explained the low engagement shown in the 
EU policy towards Mercosur due to the low levels of ambition and com-
mitment. In terms of ambition, there were some moves towards the develop-
ment of new guidelines. The joint declaration of the EU and the Iberian 
countries independent from the Treaty of Accession – as Spain and Portugal 
wanted – from a legal standpoint, shows a low level of ambition too. The 
meetings of the EU with the Rio Group after the San José process are evi-
dence of low but existent commitment, which should not be confused with 
an absence of commitment. The level of aid distributed is another example 
of the level of commitment. The fi nal assessment of engagement is ‘low’. 
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 The most productive years of 
EU–Mercosur relations 
 Introduction 
 This chapter covers a new stage in EU policy towards Mercosur and Latin 
America. It started with a new framework of policies within which agree-
ments between the EU and Latin American countries, including the Mercosur 
countries, were made. By explaining EU–Mercosur agreements within the 
general context of EU–Latin America relations, it is possible to shed light 
on the level of EU engagement with Mercosur in relative terms, to avoid 
either over- or underestimating the engagement. The discussion will show 
how EU–Mercosur relations were the most important ones within the 
EU–Latin America framework. As has already been established, the level of 
engagement will be explained by discussing two aspects of it: ambition and 
commitment. This chapter shows that at this stage there was a medium 
level of ambition and a high level of commitment, pointing to a medium 
level of engagement. 
 In relation to this stage, in the literature it has been accepted that, in 
1990, the EU ’ s means of dealing with Latin America changed ( Aldecoa 
Luzarraga  1995 ;  Bizzozero  1995 ;  Laporte Galli  1995 ;  Birochi  1999 ). Some 
indicate that these changes were due to wider changes in the international 
arena. With the end of the Cold War, the EU was given the chance to 
develop a global vision and a space in which to do it ( Aldecoa Luzarraga 
 1995 ;  Birochi  1999 ). The internal changes in the EU, especially its increased 
integration, have also been mentioned in this regard ( Aldecoa Luzarraga 
 1995 ). For  Laporte Galli  ( 1995 ), the reasons are various: fi rstly, the Com-
mission had an ambition to develop an external policy with one voice, 
independent from the individual interests of member states; secondly, the 
promotion of an ambitious external policy at global level necessarily 
involved Latin America due to its political and economic importance. There 
is a certain contradiction in Laporte Galli ’ s explanations: where, in the fi rst 
place, the importance of an EU independent of state interests is mentioned, 
later it is Spain ’ s special role in intensifying the relations between the EU 
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and Latin America that is emphasized. The identities of the people behind 
this notion of the projection of a global, external policy remain mysterious, 
so too does the identity of the institution(s) involved in this shift of policy. 
 For  Laporte Galli  ( 1995 ), evidence that the EU ’ s attitude to Latin America 
had changed can be seen in the intensifi cation of EU relations with Latin 
America. This reached its peak at the EU–Mercosur agreement of 1995. 
However, for  Aldecoa Luzarraga  ( 1995 ), the third-generation agreements 
and the institutionalization of the Rio Group are more compelling evidence. 
For  Bizzozero  ( 1995 ), the offi cial strategy of the cooperation policy, 
approved by the European Council in December 1990, is the key evidence. 
All these points will be discussed, since all explanations of the new stage 
are related, in some way, to EU–Mercosur relations. EU–Mercosur agree-
ments have to be placed within the framework of these sets of evidence. By 
looking at these events’ infl uence on the EU–Mercosur relations, the identity 
of the agent(s) of this policy will become apparent, as will the main driving 
force of the policy. Additionally, it will also be possible to discount the 
involvement of certain fi gures and/or institutions. 
 This period is relevant because it places the  EU–Mercosur relationship, 
including the cooperation agreement of 1992 and, to some extent, EMIFCA 
( 1995 ), in the context of the wave of EU agreements with Latin American 
countries and regions in the early 1990s. Several similarities between these 
agreements are obvious: they are all third-generation agreements; they took 
place in (roughly) the same time period; and they had the same form or 
structure and similar aims. However, Mercosur countries were not the only 
ones negotiating individual agreements and sub-regional agreements with 
the EU at this time. All these events help to link the EU policy towards 
Mercosur with the broader EU policy towards Latin America, which follows 
the pattern created in the previous phase of the policy. As will be seen, all 
these advances follow the same path. This path was created in the previous 
stage, with the membership of Spain and Portugal into the EU, and as 
explained in Chapter  4 . 
 The limitation of this policy can be seen both in the lack of substance 
and in the lack of a clear content in those agreements with Latin America 
– something not typical of other EU agreements with third countries or 
regions. This supports the idea that there was a fundamental lack of clarity 
in the EU policy towards the region, its sub-regions and countries, arguably 
originating from a lack of interest in the region, and/or a changing of aims 
towards Latin America over time. A contrast of what has been achieved 
and what could have been achieved (given the limitations) aids the discus-
sion of ambition and commitment in order to analyse EU engagement with 
Mercosur. 
 The outcome of this stage fi ts into the general argument: the develop-
ment of EU policy was possible thanks mainly to the infl uence of Spain 
and Portugal, and the advent of the Iberian membership of the EU that 
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institutionalized EU relations with Latin America; but again, Mercosur 
countries and other Latin American countries such as Mexico were keen to 
improve relations with the EU. In short, Latin American countries and 
Iberian countries collaborated in the development of these agreements. 
Additionally, the infl uence of a new political situation at the international 
level in the area of security should not be forgotten; that is to say, the end 
of the Cold War and important negotiations in international trade through 
the WTO. The EU ’ s ultra-protectionist agricultural policy and the end of 
the Uruguay Round trade negotiations (which created the WTO) were 
additional obstacles to the development of relations between Latin America 
and Europe, already characterized by a lack of interest on the EU ’ s part. 
The facilitation of better relations took place through the approaches to the 
Commission of European business associations who formed themselves into 
a lobby. 
 One might expect that this period would be described differently accord-
ing to the different arguments put forward in the literature. The argument 
that suggests that EU strategy was infl uenced above all by its direct competi-
tion for the Latin American market with the US would be supported if a 
clear link could be shown between relative EU and US involvement in Latin 
America. The EU role should have increased at the moment the US increased 
its involvement. Indeed, the US did increase its economic involvement in 
the region with the development of the FTAA in 1988. The argument 
suggesting that the EU ’ s involvement in Latin America increases as part of 
its global strategy has some merit. There was indeed an increase in the EU ’ s 
involvement at the global level in the post-Cold War era. The argument that 
defends the EU ’ s actions in Mercosur as part of its external federator role 
is also plausible since it was at this stage that the Mercosur institutions 
were created. The argument that it was long-standing political, economic 
and cultural ties that drove EU policy is diffi cult to sustain, however. There 
is no evidence of an increase of those ties in the period. Arguments for the 
interdependence created between the two regions are also not credible. 
According to this argument, a higher interdependence between both areas 
would mean a higher interaction between the regions. The data related to 
trade between the regions disprove this theory. Another argument incom-
patible to this stage is that the development of the relationship was due to 
the Spanish and Portuguese infl uence, since both countries lacked power 
within the EU, and this even decreased during the time period in question 
because of the new membership of wealthier countries. 
 This chapter is divided into fi ve sections. All the sections help to explain 
how EU–Mercosur relations were affected by different events which provide 
evidence for the discussion of the level of engagement. The fact that there 
were different instances that do not come necessarily from EU actions 
undermines the notion that there was a strategy behind EU actions towards 
Mercosur. The fi rst section is focused on the development of the new 
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cooperation guidelines and their infl uence on EU–Mercosur relations. The 
second looks at the development of EU agreements with the different 
countries in Latin America and regional groups such as Mercosur, highlight-
ing the legal commitments that were made by the EU, and those that were 
not. The third section examines the EU–Rio Group relationship, since 
Mercosur, from the very beginning, had used it to develop its contacts with 
the EU. The fourth section discusses the advance of, and the obstacles to, 
EU–Mercosur relations. Finally, the last section will discuss the various 
explanations given in the existing literature, and to what extent they provide 
a satisfactory explanation of EU–Mercosur relations between 1991 and 
1995. 
 New broader cooperation guidelines for Latin America lead to new 
cooperation guidelines for Mercosur 
 This section discusses the development of a new framework of EU–Latin 
America relations through the new EU cooperation guidelines for Latin 
America. The relations between the EU and Mercosur at this stage were 
affected by different aspects of the wider, EU–Latin America relationship, 
of which EU–Mercosur was just one facet. The other aspects – the EU–Rio 
Group dialogue and the wave of agreements between the EU and individual 
Latin American states – will be explained in later sections of the chapter. 
 The document that set up the new guidelines was produced by the 
Commission ( European Commission  1990 ) at the end of 1990: ‘Guidelines 
for cooperation with the developing countries of Latin America and Asia’. 
These guidelines proposed to restructure the policy around two areas, 
‘development aid for the poorest countries and population groups, and 
economic cooperation with countries or regions which have high growth 
potential, to the mutual benefi t of those countries and of the Community’ 
( European Commission  1990 ). These new guidelines were an upgrading of 
the ones set in 1982. The impetus for the new guidelines came from the 
European Commission and the president, Felipe Gonzalez of Spain, at the 
Council summit in The Hague in 1986 (see Chapter  4 ). By 1995 a new 
upgrade had been prepared. The time period studied here starts with the 
fi rst EU–Mercosur meeting and ends with the signature of EMIFCA. This 
is not accidental; the EU–Latin America and EU–Mercosur relations were 
clearly interdependent. Though this was the case during the whole time-
frame of the policy, the level of interdependence was more marked at this 
stage. 
 By the end of this stage (October 1995), EU relations with Latin America 
were disconnected from the ones with Asia, as shown in the Commission ’ s 
fi nal communication: ‘The European Union and Latin America: the present 
situation and prospects for closer partnership’ ( European Commission 
 1995a ). In that document, the EU fi nally considered variations  within Latin 
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America and, as a consequence, a specifi c document was prepared for 
Mercosur. Thus, a distinct Mercosur–EU relationship relatively independent 
from the offi cial framework of EU–Latin America relations was founded 
by the end of this stage. 
 Changes in the guidelines: the Commission or the Council? 
 The 1990 guidelines ( European Commission  1990 ) were approved by the 
Council in the Council conclusions of November of the same year. However, 
the Council asked COREPER to ‘continue its discussions in the light of the 
positions expressed during the meeting in order to be able to adopt a set 
of guidelines as soon as possible’ ( European Commission  1995a ). By 
December 1990, the Commission was asking the Council for a decision on 
fi nancial and technical cooperation for the 1991–1995 period. In April 
1991, the Commission presented to the Council a draft for the Council 
regulation. Having been redrafted after the EP ’ s demands for more detailed 
information, it was fi nally adopted by the Council in February, 1992 ( EEC 
 1992a ). 
 In the guidelines for cooperation, the Commission asked for ‘multi-
annual fi nancial objectives’ ( European Commission  1990 ) for those fi ve 
years; additionally, it wanted to restructure the guidelines according to two 
main points, ‘development aid for the poorest countries and population 
groups’ and ‘economic cooperation with countries or regions which have 
high growth potential, to the mutual benefi t of those countries and of the 
Community’ ( European Commission  1990 ). An increase in the amount of 
aid was requested; as far as economic cooperation was concerned, it was 
suggested that efforts be directed in particular to the relatively more 
advanced countries, with a focus on three main areas: (1) the transfer of 
economic, scientifi c and technical knowledge; (2) the economic environ-
ment; and (3) schemes to help fi rms ( European Commission  1990 : 654). 
Environmental considerations were to be taken into consideration as well. 
The aid and economic cooperation budget for the 1991–1995 period was 
2.570 million ecu, with 65% intended for Asia and 35% for Latin America 
( Ayuso  1996 ). 
 It was the Commission that sent a communication to the Council. The 
Commission very often addressed proposals promoted by others with the 
intention of upgrading relations with Latin America. The person behind 
this proposal was the commissioner responsible for the Latin American 
region. According to his testimony, the aim was ‘to defi ne the philosophy 
and the general framework of future relations’, at a point when the possibil-
ity of separate budgets for Asia and Latin America was a real question for 
the Commission ( Agence Europe  7/7/1995 ). It seems that the Commission 
was asked by Latin America to do so: ‘Latin America is both uniform and 
diverse; it calls for the Union to vary its approaches tailoring them to 
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national and regional circumstances’ ( European Commission  1995a ). 
Therefore, it was the Commission that was asking for changes and offering 
options but, at the same time, Latin America was doing the same. This will 
be explained in more detail in the following sections. It can be noted here, 
however, that this was a constant characteristic of Latin American relations 
with the EU, suggesting upgrading which according to the Commission was 
a natural development in EU–Mercosur relations. The guidelines will be 
explored in more detail in the following chapter. 
 Effects on EU–Mercosur relations 
 The main result of the new guidelines on EU–Mercosur was a more defi nite 
and active EU policy towards Latin America and, therefore, the Mercosur 
countries. A major consequence was the upgrading of investment facilities 
between the two regions, from which Mercosur countries benefi ted. This 
was the ‘European Community–International Investment Partners Financial 
Facility for Countries of Asia, Latin America and the Mediterranean Region’ 
programme. It was more than a ‘policy’: it could be understood as a tool 
for economic purposes, for the mutual benefi t of both partners with a focus 
on developing countries. The budget for this policy, however, was actually 
smaller than for the previous one. So it is more a complementary tool for 
the general development of EU policy towards Latin America. It is obvious 
that Mercosur countries, being the most developed in Latin America, would 
be among the main benefi ciaries of this facility. 
 The main objective of this programme was the promotion of investment 
in the form of joint ventures. The investment partners would be private 
economic actors from the EU and from a particular developing country 
( European Commission  1991a ). This plan was set in motion after a com-
munication from the Commission in 1986; a year later, ‘the Council called 
on the Commission to devise new instruments for cooperation with certain 
developing countries in Latin America, Asia and the Mediterranean’ ( Euro-
pean Commission  1991a ). As a consequence, the fi rst ‘European Commu-
nity–International Investment Partners’ facility started in 1988 for a 
three-year trial period with a budget of 30 million ecu. In March 1991, in 
its proposal for council regulation, the Commission asked for a further fi ve 
years’ trial from January 1992 ( European Commission  1991a ), but received 
only three years ( EEC  1992b ). This council regulation was intended to 
provide regulation in those areas not already covered by the treaties, neces-
sary for this new three-year trial ( EEC  1992b ). The new regulation had in 
mind the 1990 guidelines mentioned previously and had a larger budget 
than the previous trial: 31.4 million ecu for 1992 and 39 million ecu for 
1993 and 1994 ( European Council  1998 ). 
 This stage of EU–Latin America relations was affected by issues other 
than the guidelines. However, these issues were also in some part a product 
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of the guidelines. The reorganization of EU–Latin American relations is 
linked to the reformulation of the structure of the GSP ( Cepal  1999 ). The 
revision was planned for 1991 but was postponed until 1995 due to the 
delay in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) ( Sanahuja 
 1999 ). Arguably this had an effect on the new GSP as the new GSP set tariff 
rates depending on how suitable the products were for EU producers, as 
well as how developed the country was ( Sanahuja  1999 ). Because the tariffs 
were lower for developing countries, Mercosur countries would lose their 
access to the GSP, since they were among the most developed in Latin 
America. This might leave Mercosur countries more willing to develop a 
trade agreement with the EU, but this does not mean that it was a conscious 
policy of the EU to place Mercosur countries in that position. After the end 
of the Uruguay Round, due to the concessions made and considering the 
competitiveness of some countries such as Brazil in the agricultural sector, 
it seems more likely that such actions were taken by the EU in order to 
protect its own agricultural sector. 
 These guidelines can help us measure the level of ambition and commit-
ment. The plans set up in these guidelines, together with the fact that 
guidelines exist at all, point to a medium level of ambition. 
 In the case of commitment, there is mixed evidence. The amount of aid 
assigned to Latin America in the guidelines – especially if there is an increase 
– and the upgrading of investment facilities are evidence in favour of a high 
level of commitment. On the other hand, the repercussions of the reorgani-
zation of the GSP has a negative impact on commitment. 
 A wave of EU agreements with Latin American countries and regions 
including Mercosur 
 The EU became the most important aid donor to Latin America. The use 
of the GSP was considered a way of stabilizing democracy in Central 
America and a way of helping the Andean Community ( Caetano et al. 
 2010 ). The agreements that were created in the 1990s (the third-generation 
agreements) included the democratic clause – the signatories had to respect 
democratic values and be democracies. 
 The guidelines of 1990 were the basis for the inauguration of third-
generation agreements with Latin American countries ( Laporte Galli  1995 ; 
 Ribeiro Hoffmann  2004 ). By 1993 all South American countries had made 
such agreements ( Laporte Galli  1995 ): Argentina and Bolivia in 1990, 
Venezuela and Uruguay in 1991, Chile in 1990, 1996 and 2002, Mexico 
in 1991 and 1997, and Paraguay and Brazil in 1992. Agreements were 
also made with sub-regions: the Andean Community (Bolivia, Colom-
bia, Ecuador and Peru, and formerly Venezuela, and sometime member 
Chile) and CACM in 1993; Mercosur in 1995 ( Ribeiro Hoffmann  2004 ). 
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These agreements had common characteristics as well as country- and 
circumstance-specifi c stipulations. The most innovative aspect was in 
respect of human rights and the evolutive opt-out, which made it possible 
to increase new cooperation in new sectors ( Aldecoa Luzarraga,  1995 ; 
 Laporte Galli  1995 ;  Ribeiro Hoffmann  2004 ). 
 The EU had cooperation agreements with most developed Latin Ameri-
can countries from the 1970s (Uruguay, Brazil, Argentina and Mexico), 
excluding Chile , which at that time was under the dictatorship of Pinochet. 
At the beginning of the 1990s a new wave of cooperation agreements was 
developed with the same countries, a ‘network of new framework coopera-
tion agreements with Latin America countries’ ( Agence Europe  22/3/1991 ). 
These agreements are called ‘third generation’. In relation to Latin American 
countries, this ‘impl[ied] an enlargement and development of cooperation 
and a revision clause and explicit reference to the respect of human 
rights and democratic principles’ ( Agence Europe  23/4/1991 ). Mercosur 
countries and Chile and Mexico were prioritized over other Latin America 
countries, being offered privileged association agreements. This might have 
been due to their economic importance in relative terms to the rest of Latin 
America or because of their relative political stability in the 1990s. However, 
given the fact that, until the mid-1980s, the ‘prioritized’ countries (exclud-
ing Mexico) were under dictatorships, it seems more likely that in this case 
economic development was more infl uential. 
 The interest of Spain in the progress of a policy towards Latin America 
was represented by the Spanish commissioner in charge of this area, Abel 
Matutes, but it should be noted that, towards the end of this stage, Jacques 
Delors, the president of the Commission, had started to pay more attention 
to the issue. It could be argued that thanks to the engagement with Latin 
America, countries and regions with different economic situations were 
increasingly ‘visible’ to the EU. In fact, Delors visited Chile, Mexico and 
Argentina (although not any other Latin American countries) in his week-
long visit to Latin America, since it was ‘considered in Brussels [that this 
region was] likely to play an increasingly important role on the international 
scene now that they [were] coming out of a period of serious economic 
diffi culties and political instability’ ( Agence Europe  10/3/1993 ). 
 The Commission was going a step further towards Latin America after 
continued pressure by Spain and Portugal. Delors was progressively devel-
oping an interest in Latin America through the work of Matutes. This does 
not mean that the Commission had gained this new interest just because of 
the Iberian interest in the region. The reasons behind Delors’ sudden interest 
in those countries are also related to interdependence. Delors, on his visit 
to those countries, stressed ‘the need “better to control world inter-
dependency together” … the planet today having become a village’ ( Agence 
Europe  20/3/1993 ). Coming back to the discussion of engagement, these 
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visits by Delors should be seen as evidence of a high level of commitment, 
since they symbolize the brand-new interest that was growing within the 
Commission or at least the attention Mercosur was gaining. 
 In addition, the EP had economic reasons to give its support: ‘The EP 
invites the Commission to negotiate free trade agreements in the near 
future with the main supplier of customers from Latin American countries’ 
( Agence Europe  25/4/1994 ). A few months later, another MEP was asking 
for the involvement of the economic ministers in EU–Latin America rela-
tions ( Agence Europe  24/10/1994 ). Delors considered Mercosur ‘an impor-
tant step towards a Latin American Common Market’ ( Agence Europe 
 20/3/1993 ). It is no surprise, then, that a third-generation agreement had 
the aim of opening markets fi rst at the sub-regional level (such as Merco-
sur), as a fi rst step towards the opening of the whole Latin American 
market. 
 This support by the EP again adds to the evidence of a medium level of 
ambition; since the EP has always shows support towards Latin America it 
cannot be considered a totally new ambition on its side. 
 Prioritization of Mercosur 
 The relationship between the EU and Mercosur has been characterized fi rst 
by great speed and close cooperation, and second by the ambitiousness of 
the fi nal aims, the development of an FTA that would include both regions. 
These two characteristics make the EU ’ s policy towards Mercosur distinc-
tive since there are no other cases with this combination of features. When 
(or if) it is realized, the FTA with Mercosur will create the largest free trade 
area in the world with a market of over 200 million people. The chances 
of an inter-regional FTA between the EU and Mercosur being created were 
higher than between the EU and other Latin American regions (or even with 
other regional groups in general). Why should EU–Mercosur relations have 
been so unique? 
 The countries in the Andean Community benefi ted from the GSP. Because 
of the economic situation of the Andean countries, lower tariff levels would 
be imposed in their trade with the EU. This regional group had been created 
in the 1960s and, due to historical, political and economic reasons alongside 
the economic agreements already achieved, would naturally be in a better 
position to develop an inter-regional relationship with the EU. Mercosur, 
which was a creation of two countries (Argentina and Brazil) started its 
integration as late as the mid-1980s; it had no offi cial links to the EU until 
its creation. Yet it had come the closest to achieving an inter-regional 
position with the EU. Even the Central American countries, where the links 
with the EU had for political reasons already been created in the 1980s, 
had a more distant relationship with the EU. What were the reasons for 
this prioritization of Mercosur? 
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 As early as 1987, Grabendorff was clear about the implications of South 
American integration for the EU: ‘In the Southern Cone, the Community 
faces its most intractable sub-regional situation, due not only to the specifi c 
tensions which exist between itself and Argentina, but also to the traditional 
competition which has existed between Argentina and Brazil for regional 
leadership in the area of foreign commerce’ ( Grabendorff  1987 : 77). He 
goes on to explain, however, that the success of the integration process 
between these two countries (beginning in 1986) might bring Uruguay, 
Paraguay and Chile into the process later. In that case, due to its degree of 
development and economic potential, it would become the most interesting 
partner for the EU. 
 In the literature, there is not much discussion of Mercosur ’ s priority 
position, or the process by which this priority was established, and little 
empirical data is presented to support what little discussion there is of these 
issues. It  is stated in the literature that Mercosur became a priority ( Cien-
fuegos  2003 ), but the reasons for it are not clearly explained. For some 
( Aldecoa Luzarraga  1995 ;  Gillespie et al.  1995 ;  Laporte Galli  1995 ;  Sanchez 
Bajo  1999 ;  Cienfuegos  2003 ), Mercosur is a priority because common 
historical, cultural and social patrimony made important contacts possible. 
The common interests of the EU and Mercosur are also given as a reason 
( Cienfuegos  2003 ). The importance of Mercosur in relative terms compared 
with other countries in the region is mentioned; the integration of Brazil 
and Argentina – the most important economies in the region – makes 
Mercosur especially important for the EU ( Smith  1998 ); Mercosur includes 
two of the three largest markets in Latin America ( Arenas  2002 : 2). More 
explicitly
 Mercosur is a promising partner for the EU, because it represents its main 
market quota at the commercial and investment level. At the same time 
Mercosur constitutes an exceptional opportunity for European companies to 
penetrate the Latin American continent … the Southern Cone meets one of 
the EU ’ s sensitive requirements for negotiating international agreements, such 
as having a democratic system and respecting human rights. In more that one 
sense the relationship between both blocs constitutes a natural strategic 
association.  ( Cienfuegos  2006 : 257) 
 It also appears to some that Mercosur and the EU are ‘natural partners’ 
( Kanner  2002 ), sharing similar values and ideas ( Arenas  2002 ) 
 The EU–Mercosur agreement will be discussed in detail in the next 
section. But fi rst it will be useful to look at other agreements between the 
EU and other countries/regions. This will give an understanding of the 
peculiarities of agreements with Latin American countries and regions such 
as Mercosur as well as providing the context in which to analyse the EU ’ s 
level of commitment to Mercosur. 
c05.indd   117 12/15/2016   12:44:06 PM
118 The EU’s policy towards Mercosur
 The EU–Mercosur agreement in comparison to other agreements between 
the EU and third countries 
 The legal base of the agreements sets the rules for policy- and decision-
making (see Chapter  2 ). Room for manoeuvre is left for those actors who 
offer agreements, however, for instance, in terms of what is offered by each 
side at the outset, and what might be offered after the agreement has been 
made. The relative level of precision in agreements can therefore be ana-
lysed, and reasons given for the differences between agreements in this 
regard. According to Smith:
 The extent of the network of partners illustrates the infl uence of law on the 
EU ’ s external relations: a great deal of what the EU does in international 
relations is to develop relations that are based on law, that is, on legal 
agreements. But power is not absent, and the Community can wield its 
instruments for political purposes. The decision to conclude an agreement 
with a third country or regional grouping is, in the fi rst place, political.  ( Smith 
 2003 : 55) 
 All third-generation agreements with Latin America have in common the 
‘political conditionality regarding democracy, the environment, and human 
rights, by means of the so-called democracy clause, and they could be 
renegotiated with total fl exibility, as set out in the so-called ‘evolutive 
clauses’ ( Ribeiro Hoffmann  2004 : 5). Space is left within that framework 
for issues to be developed further by the evolutive clause. 
 Ribeiro Hoffmann ( 2004 ) makes clear distinctions between formal 
(empty) and substantial legal commitments. Agreements with the ACP 
group, the Central and Eastern European countries and former Soviet and 
Mediterranean countries contained from the beginning ‘specifi c legal com-
mitments concerning topics such as trade, competition, etc’ ( Ribeiro 
Hoffmann  2004 : 8). That is not the case in agreements with Latin America. 
Some of these were substantiated later, as is the case of Mercosur, Chile, 
and Mexico; others, such as the agreement with the Andean Community, 
remained formal and without substantial commitments ( Ribeiro Hoffmann , 
 2004 ). These agreements were ‘fi lled’ later, either by the conclusion of a 
new agreement, as in the one with Chile of 2002 and the Mercosur one, or 
directly in the same agreement, as in the case of Mexico, with the incorpora-
tion of Decision 2/2000, which promoted the liberalization of trade in 
goods, and Decision 2/20001, about the liberalization of trade in services 
and FDI ( Ribeiro Hoffmann  2004 ). Table  5.1 shows the differences between 
EU agreements with different Latin America countries/regions quite clearly. 
 It must be noted that the intention of the EU towards Latin America 
changed from the early 1990s. By the mid-1990s, the EU was offering more 
concrete agreements to some of the Latin American countries. Still, none 
of them managed to garner the level of commitment that the EU had made 
with countries in other regions. There appears to be a clear list of priorities 
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for the EU when it comes to agreements with third countries/regions. As 
 Smith  ( 2003 ) claimed, agreements are political decisions. Ribeiro Hoffmann, 
identifying the relative emptiness of some agreements, reaffi rms the political 
side of them. For her:
 The logic behind the execution of empty agreements is their political meaning. 
One political reason pointed out as a factor for the execution of such agree-
ments is that they were seen as a strategy by the EU to reinforce its presence 
worldwide and consolidate the international legal personality of the Com-
munity as distinct from its Member States vis-à-vis third parties. Another is 
that such agreements met the Commission ’ s interests in expanding its compe-
tence and the Council ’ s interest in justifying its work since most agreements 
–whether full or empty- create bilateral institutional arrangements such as 
joint Committees, Commissions, and Sub-Commissions that meet periodically 
to manage relations.  ( Ribeiro Hoffmann  2004 : 8–9) 
 It seems, then, that the wave of agreements with Latin America was not 
as ambitious as it was presented to be. This could correspond to the priority 
that the EU placed on becoming a global presence. At the end of this stage, 
other interests were created that led to some of the regions/countries in 
Latin America – such as Mercosur – becoming more of a priority for the 
EU. This could have given the misleading impression that Mercosur was a 
priority in itself. Mercosur was a priority within Latin America but it was 
not the EU ’ s only priority in the region because Chile and Mexico also 
secured association agreements with the EU. Furthermore, it should also be 
noted that EU–Mercosur relations were defi nitely not much of a priority 
within the broader context of EU external relations. In addition to this, the 
fact that the EU institutionalized relations with Latin America might also 
have been because the EU was in a position where it ‘had’ to do something 
with the region, but had no real interest, or strategy, which explains why 
the agreements are empty from a legal point of view. 
 What should be very clear at this point in the discussion is that Latin 
America was not a top EU priority. According to  Smith  ( 2003 ), the pyramid 
of privileges ran as follows (from top to bottom): the Central and Eastern 
European countries, Cyprus, Malta and Turkey; South-East European 
countries, the Cotonou Convention partners; the Euro-Mediterranean 
partners; other countries (the former Soviet republics, Latin American 
countries, ASEAN countries) ( Smith  2003 ). The only signifi cant change 
from earlier periods was that the ACP group used to be at the top and now 
were overtaken by the EU ’ s closest neighbours ( Smith  2003 ;  Marsh and 
Mackenstein  2005 ). 
 This discussion of the legal content as a way of looking at the EU ’ s 
behaviour is extremely interesting for the analysis of the level of EU engage-
ment. The lack of concrete content in the agreements shows a very vague 
ambition towards the region. However, the fact that these agreements seem 
to be the exception rather than the rule shows not just a vague ambition 
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but a distinct lack of it, and low commitment as well. It is not the intention 
here to discuss the entire complex of EU external relations, but rather to 
contextualize where Mercosur stands within the global spectrum of EU 
relations with other regions; and that is clearly at the bottom. However, 
when Mercosur is studied within the context of just EU–Latin American 
relations, it is clear that Mercosur is the priority or at a minimum is the 
most successful region in getting the attention of the EU, which illustrates 
that it is not pure indifference that the EU feels about Mercosur. As a 
consequence of the evidence proffered in this section, the EU engagement 
appears lower than might be expected after the discussion in the previous 
section. 
 This section has demonstrated how, at this stage, the EU developed a 
series of agreements with Latin American countries which did not, in and 
of themselves, reveal the EU ’ s real expectations for EU–Latin America 
relations. The lack of legal commitment compared to other EU agreements 
is evidence that relations with Latin American countries were not included 
within, or covered by, a clear strategy. Moreover, this shows the EU ’ s 
ambiguous stance as regards Latin America. It meant that the desires or 
demands stated by Latin American countries in these cases were relatively 
more important than in other EU external relations. In order to develop a 
semblance of EU–Latin America policy Mercosur is prioritized within the 
Latin American groups, as are Mexico and Chile, since all have achieved 
association agreements, but they are not priorities in comparison to other 
EU external relations 
 The EU–Rio Group relations: a forum for everything and anything, 
including EU–Mercosur relations 
 The Rio Group was introduced in the previous chapter. It is important to 
note that by 1990 there were eleven members of the Rio Group, including 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, 
Uruguay and Venezuela. It was the most important forum for the discussion 
of political and economic issues in Latin America. The EU started as an 
observer of the meetings, and then informal meetings naturally developed 
between both groups. 
 It is important to highlight how the institutionalization of the annual 
meetings was driven from the Latin American side. The Rio Group asked 
the EU for the institutionalization of the meetings and the EU agreed. In 
December 1990, the Declaration of Rome institutionalized the relations 
between the EU and Rio Group. The annual meetings between the groups 
signifi ed the construction of a forum in which the two sides could develop 
their relations further. In the Declaration of Rome, the following were 
included as areas for discussion: commerce, general economic cooperation, 
science and technology, investment, debt, aid for development, regional 
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cooperation and integration, environment, drugs, terrorism, consultation 
on global issues, and cooperation projects. 
 The Declaration of Rome was not a surprise; the conference in Rome 
had been called in order to institutionalize this forum ( Ayuso  1996 ). It could 
be argued little improvement in the relations resulted, apart from discus-
sions and promises to cooperate, which tended to remain unrealized. The 
role of the EU–Rio Group relations is better understood from the point of 
view of the EU ’ s interests in the region. Given the low level of EU interest 
in Latin America, the mere possibility of having regular contacts was at 
that point important as a means to closer, future cooperation ( Ayuso  1996 ). 
 This forum gave some access in particular to the EU perspective on areas 
of mutual interest, as well as to perspectives of all other participating actors 
more generally. The Spanish foreign minister, Fernandez Ordonez, agreed 
to the idea of including the topic of fi nancing from the EIB in Latin America 
during the Luxembourg declaration. This issue was pursued again in the 
following meeting in 1992. The issue was closely linked to that of opening 
the economies of Latin America, a notion accepted by Latin American 
countries themselves. At the same time, however, Latin America was asking 
for the opening of the EU market – that is, a liberalization of trade in the 
region. This took on special importance with the launching of the European 
Common Market and concomitant developments in Central and Eastern 
Europe. These latter moves apparently spooked the Latin American coun-
tries since they threatened the expected increases in trade between the 
regions. 
 The ministerial meetings of the EU–Rio Group proved to be multi-purpose 
and multi-functional affairs, where Latin American countries demanded, 
above all, more accessible trade with the EU. In October 1992, a meeting 
took place between representatives of the Rio Group and the Commission. 
A variety of issues related to trade were discussed, including the Uruguay 
Round, the European Single Market and the impact of the reform of the 
CAP and the future of the GSP ( Agence Europe  30/10/1992 ). 
 The main actor within the EU was the commissioner in charge of this 
area. Until 1992, the offi ce was held by the Spanish commissioner Abel 
Matutes; the following year, another Spaniard, Manuel Marin, took over 
the role. Following the Latin American countries, Matutes used the forum 
to announce changes in the EU towards Latin America. Matutes highlighted 
the importance of these meetings and confi rmed the intention of the EU to 
help Bolivia and Peru – the poorest countries in Latin America – through 
the provision of aid ( Agence Europe  23/4/1991 ). In these meetings, Matutes 
stated the intention of the Commission to open a delegation in Lima that 
would deal with both Peru and Bolivia, and another one in Buenos Aires 
( Agence Europe  26/4/1991 ). In the main, however, it was the Latin Ameri-
can countries that requested changes from the EU (as in the case of the EIB 
or the GSP). The EU had to react to these petitions, which it did in a more 
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or less positive way. Marin (as will be seen in the next section) also used 
this forum to communicate with Mercosur countries, but only to some 
extent, since EU–Mercosur relations were then relatively independent of 
wider EU–Latin American or EU–Rio Group discussions. 
 In terms of EU engagement, this section presents evidence which ques-
tions the level of EU ambition because the Latin American side was the one 
asking for the institutionalization of the annual meetings. The changes 
requested on the Latin American side related to the GSP and the EIB and 
do not support the claim of a good level of ambition, especially since both 
the GSP and EIB are EU instruments whose use is decided unilaterally by 
the EU. Therefore, in a way, the EU was being told what to do, which does 
not suggest a high level of ambition. On the other side, the fact that the EU 
agreed to some of the suggestions is evidence of a sort of commitment 
on the EU side, although it was directed by Latin America. These requests 
from the Latin American side do not demonstrate very strategic behaviour 
by the EU. 
 The fact that again the main EU actors were Spaniards – the Spanish 
foreign minister, Fernandez Ordonez, and the Spanish commissioners, 
Matute and Marin – show the continuity of the path started in the previous 
stage with the Iberian membership. 
 Effect on EU–Mercosur 
 These annual meetings helped in the development of the EU ’ s relations with 
Mercosur in its initial stages, giving each of the parties the opportunity to 
contact the other, and even to negotiate informal agreements. It was a good 
base from which the EU could develop its relations with Latin America, 
and vice versa ( Hoste  1999 ). Latin America took the opportunity in these 
meetings to demand concessions since, until 1999 when the fi rst summit of 
heads of state of Latin America and the EU was celebrated, these were the 
only offi cial meetings between the parties. EU–Mercosur relations developed 
unoffi cially within the EU-Rio Group forum before becoming autonomous 
( Hoste  1999 ). 
 An important ministerial meeting with the Rio Group, bringing the 
Mercosur countries to Europe, took place in Luxembourg on 26–27 April 
1991. Two days later they visited the European Commission in Brussels, 
meeting President Delors, Vice-Presidents Bangerman and Pandolfi  and 
Commissioner Matutes. ‘The aim of the visit was mainly to present to the 
Commission the objectives and cooperation of the Mercosur common 
market. It is signifi cant that the fi rst ‘international action’ by Mercosur 
countries was to present their achievement to the EU, especially since the 
treaty that created Mercosur was signed only a month before their trip to 
Europe. It indicates Mercosur ’ s ‘willingness to develop relations with the 
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Community in particular’ ( Agence Europe  23/4/1991 ). The importance for 
Latin America of these meetings – as a forum in which to discuss important 
issues with the EU as well as detailing for the EU their own position – is 
obvious. It helped Mercosur to understand the EU position on many issues 
as well as to develop, informally, meetings in relation to their own interests 
and projects. Mercosur introduced itself to the world in this fi rst visit to 
Europe. This meeting produced a desirable outcome for Mercosur only a 
year later: in a subsequent EU–Rio Group ministerial meeting, the EU and 
Mercosur signed an administrative cooperation agreement ( Agence Europe 
 29/5/1992 ). 
 Moreover, as the ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council 
and the European Parliament, the European Community and Mercosur: an 
enhanced policy’ of 1994 explains clearly:
 a Union strategy aimed at strengthening relations with Mercosur, Mexico and 
other Latin American regions cannot be seen as an alternative to the dialogue 
with the Rio Group. It should instead be considered a means of deepening 
and extending that dialogue, within which the Community ’ s interests demand 
that it recognize and take account of regional specifi cities. This means that 
the Community ’ s proposed new strategy towards Mercosur must not be 
developed in isolation, but as part of a broader Community strategy towards 
all the Latin American countries, and in particular the Rio Group.  ( European 
Commission  1994a : 3) 
 It can be said then, that Mercosur was one part of the general EU strategy 
towards Latin America. The Rio Group and Mercosur were not in competi-
tion, but were meant to complement one another. This supports the notion 
that EU relations towards Mercosur were an inseparable part of EU policy 
towards Latin America. 
 In relation to the analysis of EU engagement, once again the EU seems 
to be the one taking on initiatives from the outside more than developing 
its own. The fact that Mercosur was the one coming to Brussels, seeking 
to start some sort of relations with the EU, does not evidence much ambi-
tion on the part of the EU. Since the EU and Mercosur signed their fi rst 
agreement a year after their fi rst offi cial meeting, this does show a good 
level of EU commitment. The fact that the EU is the one receiving offers 
from Mercosur and developing the relationship based on these offers does 
not help the image of the EU as a strategic actor. 
 EU–Mercosur relations 
 This section discusses EU–Mercosur relations at this stage, focusing on 
agreements that were made and any evident problems associated with them. 
It explains the causes of the agreements, showing the extent to which they 
were part of an EU strategy and/or responses to Mercosur ’ s demands. 
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 EU–Mercosur agreements: the productive side of the relations 
 The development of agreements between the EU and Mercosur was the 
most productive part of the policy at this stage. This could also be con-
sidered the most productive stage of the policy studied here. The agreement 
made in 1992 was minor, without far-reaching intent or consequences; 
in 1995, another agreement upgrading EU–Mercosur relations with 
the aim of creating an association agreement was signed, but the negotia-
tions have not fi nished yet, as will be explained in detail in the following 
chapter. 
 The EU ’ s fi rst contact with Mercosur was in April 1991, a month after 
it had signed the treaty that created the Common Market of the South. The 
foreign ministers of the four member states of Mercosur – Guido di Tella 
(Argentina, acting secretary), José Francisco Rezek (Brazil), Alexis Frutos 
(Paraguay) and Hector Gros (Uruguay) – visited the Commission on 29 
April for talks with commissioners Delors, Matutes and MacSharry. 
 This visit had several aims. The fi rst aim was to introduce the new 
regional group to the EU. It was welcomed by Delors and his colleagues 
and the importance of integration for political stability and the economic 
development of the countries involved was highlighted. Secondly, the pos-
sibility of cooperation between the EU and Mercosur was discussed. There 
also were talks regarding a cooperation agreement ( Cienfuegos  2006 ), to 
be made on the basis of Article 228 of the Treaty of Rome, once Mercosur 
institutions were developed. Similar discussions were entered in the areas 
of trade. The foreign ministers of the Mercosur countries held a meeting 
with representatives of the Commission in Brussels on 21 April 1991 in 
order to present the new regional group and to request a cooperation 
agreement: ‘On the question of the terms of trade between the Community 
and the Mercosur countries, the Commission representatives said that the 
Commission could, at the opportune moment, propose measures to take 
account, in the application of its own commercial policy instruments, of 
the progress made by Mercosur in establishing its customs union and 
common external trade policy’ ( European Commission  1991b ). Soon after 
this meeting, Matutes had a working meeting with the Council and it was 
decided that, once the Treaty of Asunción was ratifi ed, an inter-institutional 
agreement between the Commission and Mercosur would be signed ( Agence 
Europe  5/5/1992 ). 
 The presidency of the EU was held by Portugal at this time. On 2 May 
1992, an informal meeting took place in Guimaraes (Portugal) between the 
European Union foreign ministers and their Mercosur counterparts, where 
a potential agreement was discussed. After this meeting, the ministers asked 
the Commission to work on a paper in which different ways of improving 
relations with Mercosur would be discussed ( Agence Europe  5/5/1992 ). At 
the Guimaraes meeting, it seems that the ministers of Mercosur countries 
criticized the EU ’ s agricultural protectionism ( Agence Europe  5/5/1992 ). It 
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is not clear what the EU wanted to do with Mercosur, but it was clear that 
the agriculture sector would be a point of contention in EU–Mercosur 
relations. In Chile, on 29 May 1992, the fi rst Inter-institutional Cooperation 
Agreement between the Commission of the European Communities and the 
Mercosur Council was signed. 
 The EU ’ s level of engagement seems to start to confront the most impor-
tant obstacle, the agricultural sector. This issue, as will be shown in the next 
chapter, will become the centre of the discussion due to its negative effect 
on EU engagement towards Mercosur. Again, the work of Matutes as 
commissioner and the Portuguese presidency worked to the benefi t of 
EU–Mercosur relations, once more demonstrating the path dependence 
created by the Iberian membership. In terms of strategic behaviour, again 
the EU does not seem to have a clear plan since Mercosur is the one asking 
for changes, and updates. 
 The Spanish commissioner Manuel Marin took over Matutes’ portfolio 
in 1993. He visited Uruguay in early 1993; in March of the same year 
Delors paid visits to Chile, Argentina and Mexico in order to ‘take the 
pulse’ of the continent and of those countries specifi cally, since they were 
considered by Brussels potentially important players on the international 
scene ( Agence Europe  10/3/1993 ). At this point, the Commission seemed 
to be considering different approaches to Mercosur. In April 1993, an 
informal meeting took place in Copenhagen within the EU–Rio Group 
framework ( Bizzozero  1995 ). The contacts between the groups were con-
stant; the idea of upgrading the relationship seemed to be in the air at this 
point. From that moment, the speed of events was frenetic. The annual 
EU–Rio Group meeting of April 1994, which discussed the options for an 
upgrading of EU–Mercosur relations in earnest, was crucial. After April 
1994 a series of diplomatic gestures were made on both side of the Atlantic. 
First, in June 1994, the General Affairs Council meeting in Luxembourg 
discussed the evaluation of the Commission with regard to relations with 
Mercosur. After Commissioner Van den Broek ’ s (external relations commis-
sioner at that time) thoughts on the EU ’ s relations with Mercosur were 
heard, the Council affi rmed its desire to ‘strengthen relations between the 
European Union and that important Latin American regional grouping’; the 
Council also took note of the communication by the Commission to 
be submitted in the near future, linked to these relations ( European Com-
mission  1994b ). The presidency ’ s conclusions at Corfu a few days later 
re affi rmed the intention of the EU to strengthen its relations with Mercosur. 
Mercosur countries responded to these gestures positively, welcoming them 
and, crucially, reaffi rming on their part a wish to intensify the economic 
and trade issues and ‘to contribute to the liberalisation of world trade’ 
( Agence Europe  16/8/1994 ). Finally, on 19 October 1994, the Commission 
proposed an ‘enhanced policy’ towards Mercosur ( European Commission 
 1994a ). This was presented to the press by Manuel Marin on 19 October. 
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In this policy, the Commission was offering two potential scenarios for the 
years up to 2000:
 •  Scenario 1: No change in current trends. 
 •  Scenario 2: Liberalization of trade between the EU and Mercosur. This 
scenario assumed the establishment of a free trade area with Mercosur 
( European Commission  1994a ). 
 The EU ’ s institutional machinery put in motion traditional procedures; it 
was decided a few days later in the General Affairs Council meeting to send 
the communication to COREPER for its perusal, with a request that the 
subsequent report to the Council be delivered within one month. This 
would give time for the preparation of the Essen European Council ( Euro-
pean Commission  1994c ). As Box  5.1 shows, the Commission had suggested 
different options for the development of EU–Mercosur relations. 
 The Commission favoured the third option, thereby demonstrating a 
certain interest in developing an agreement with Mercosur. However, before 
the Essen Council was able to convene, the four Mercosur ministers of 
foreign affairs met Delors, Marin and Van den Broek in Brussels ( European 
Commission  1994d ). This was not a coincidence: Mercosur wanted a 
chance to discuss the Commission communication before the Essen Coun-
cil ’ s decision on the Commission ’ s proposal of an inter-regional EU–Mer-
cosur association was made ( European Commission  1994d ). Mercosur had 
already been incredibly active and present in the upgrading of its policy, 
putting continuous pressure on the Commission. 
 The conclusions of the Essen Council presidency gave yet another push 
to the relations: ‘It urges the Council and the Commission, working on the 
basis of the Council report, to create as quickly as possible the conditions 
for an early opening of negotiations with the Mercosur countries on an 
inter-regional framework agreement, including a Memorandum of Under-
standing’ ( European Council  1994 ). On 22 December 1994, the Solemn 
Joint Declaration between the Council of the EU/European Commission 
and the Member States of the Mercosur was signed ( European Commission 
 1994e ). 
 The objectives of the inter-regional association in the offi cial documents 
were a mix of economic and value-based interests, coming from the EU 
side:
 •  To foster inter-regional fl ows to the advantage of both partners and 
within the bounds of the Uruguay Round Final Act. 
 •  To promote strategic investment by fi rms. 
 •  To strengthen political cooperation at international level, in particular by 
seeking to reach joint positions in international forums on issues of 
mutual interest, including world peace and security. 
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 Box 5.1  Options for EU–Mercosur relations 
 Option 1: A trade cooperation agreement 
 This option would give priority to the trade cooperation aspect. 
While continuing the work begun under the existing inter-institutional 
cooperation agreement, priority would be given to measures that 
would help strengthen Mercosur ’ s structural capacity to manage 
effectively the trade-related aspects of its integration and the trade 
element of its cooperation with the EU in preparation for the liber-
alization of trade. This option refl ects the need to deepen trade links, 
with the political and structural side of relations taking second place. 
 Option 2: An inter-regional framework agreement on trade and 
economic cooperation 
 Compared with the previous option, this one offered the advantage 
of being a more active response to Mercosur, demonstrating the EU ’ s 
express desire to contribute to Mercosur ’ s consolidation process. This 
approach is genuinely political, and not simply economic. 
 Option 3: An inter-regional association agreement 
 Set against the other options, this one pre-empts Mercosur ’ s consoli-
dation by proposing the immediate negotiation of an inter-regional 
association between the EU and Mercosur. This agreement would 
include the provisions needed to bring about, according to a fi xed 
timetable, a free trade area of the type outlined above. 
 Cooperation under such an agreement would cover the same areas 
as the preceding option, but would be reinforced by the introduction 
of joint fi nancial instruments through the raising of substantial funds 
by both parties. Compared with the other options, this would be a 
proactive approach on the part of the EU aimed at accelerating the 
regional integration process by acting upstream even of initiatives by 
Mercosur and its members. 
 Source :  European Commission  ( 1994a ). 
 •  To improve the effi ciency of the EU ’ s external activities by establishing a 
new framework for relations with partners of a similar nature. ( European 
Commission  1994a ) 
 The Commission was already considering the presentation of draft negotiat-
ing directives to the Council in early 1995 ( European Commission  1994d ). 
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In April 1995, in the General Affairs Council meeting, communication from 
the Commission to the Council regarding the negotiating mandate for the 
inter-regional framework with Mercosur was welcomed. As usual it was 
passed to COREPER for analysis ( European Commission  1995b ). Later in 
June, the General Affairs Council adopted the directives of negotiations 
( European Commission  1995c ). On the other side of the Atlantic, Mercosur 
countries were preparing for their meeting with the EU in Brussels on 14 
September 1995. 
 In Montevideo the Commission and Mercosur negotiators initialled the 
agreement ( European Commission  1995b ), and on 15 December 1995 in 
Madrid, the EMIFCA was signed. 
 The level of engagement shown by this agreement seems higher than 
previously thought because the agreement proposed (and the association 
agreement) involves more than the general cooperation or only trade agree-
ments. Association agreements are offered to countries or regions to upgrade 
the relationship; this shows an increase in the levels of both ambition and 
commitment, which as a consequence involves an increase in the level of 
engagement. 
 Who supported this policy and who did not? 
 There were some obstacles to the agreement within the EU because of the 
agricultural question. ‘The majority of the ministers of industry, economic 
and foreign affairs from the EU member states appeared to support the 
negotiations with Mercosur. But the French, Irish and Dutch ministers of 
agriculture and fi sheries, under pressure from their domestic lobbies, were 
opposed to this mandate’ ( IRELA  1999 , quoted in  Santander  2005 : 296). 
The UK did not want to start negotiations until the end of the WTO Round. 
Even within the Commission there was disagreement: the commissioner of 
agriculture, Franz Fischler, his colleagues from France, commissioners de 
Silguy and Cresson, and from Ireland, Flynn, also opposed the project 
( Santander  2005 ). In the end it was voted on by the Commission and a 
decision was taken to go ahead with the association agreement with Mer-
cosur (Interviewee 9). 
 At the same time there were other obstacles within the EU against devel-
oping an economic agreement. These obstacles were based on the argument 
in Article 24 of the GATT ( El País  6/4/1995 ). On the other side, Manuel 
Marin argued that Article 24 of the GATT would allow ‘the progressive 
liberalization of all sectors establishing exceptions and transitory periods for 
the most sensitive products if it does not pass the 20% of the total. The other 
obstacle is the norm of the WTO that expects the creation of the free trade 
area in 10 years maximum’ ( El País  6/4/1995 ). Apparently, Marin was able 
to convince them, since the negotiation mandate was eventually conceded. 
When asked, he argued that the exchange of agricultural products was only 
14% of the trade between the regions. However, Mercosur was an exporter 
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of cereals, meat and dairy products, all of them super-sensitive products 
for the EU ( El País  16/12/1995 ). In the case of free trade between the two 
regions, it would be interesting to know to what extent the EU would 
increase its imports from Mercosur without the constraints of the CAP. 
 The EU–Mercosur agreements: the most productive side of 
the relationship 
 The EU was involved in controversy over its CAP before it signed any 
agreements with Mercosur. This began as early as 1986, when the agricul-
tural issue was included in the Uruguay Round after pressure from the US 
and the Cairns Group ( Meunier  2000 ). The Cairns Group is a coalition of 
developing countries that export agricultural products and was formed in 
1986 to give its members an international voice. Crucially, the four members 
of Mercosur were members of the Cairns Group. The agricultural impor-
tance of Argentina and Brazil at the international level was clear. The 
agriculture issue was a problem for the EU at all levels and with many 
regions. In relation to Mercosur, many problems could be foreseen at the 
outset as the parties’ positions varied on the matter. However, there was 
scope for optimism after the so-called Blair House Agreement was reached, 
leading to the EU ’ s 1992 CAP reforms. 
 There had been talks beforehand about not including agricultural sector 
trade in the EU–Mercosur agreement of 1995 ( Agence Europe  12/10/1994 ). 
Of all the commissioners, René Steichen, the commissioner of agriculture, 
was the most recalcitrant in his rejection of the agreement. In Brasilia, just 
days before the commission led by Marin presented a report on a possible 
EU–Mercosur agreement, Steichen stated his opinions on the matter quite 
openly: both sides would be in direct competition on several products and 
procedures but the EU would protect the most sensitive sectors ( Agence 
Europe  12/10/1994 ). A day later, during the same visit, the president of 
Argentina, Carlos Menem, and the ministers of agriculture, foreign affairs 
and trade were treated to similar outbursts from Steichen. He indicated that 
Argentina was one of the principal benefi ciaries of the Uruguay Round and 
also profi ted from the impact on world trade of the reform of the CAP 
( Agence Europe  12/10/1994 ). He claimed that the reforms of the latter and 
the Uruguay Round meant that the EU would be producing less, exporting 
less, and importing more, leaving little to offer Argentina in this area so far 
as the liberalization of the EU market for Argentinean products was con-
cerned ( Agence Europe  12/10/1994 ). ‘Mr Steichen used the same argument 
with Brazil and the WTO: Brazil was one of the countries that would benefi t 
from the Uruguay Round and the Blair House agreement, therefore Brazil-
ian taxation on European whiskeys differently from Brazilian whiskeys 
should be modifi ed’ ( Agence Europe  13/10/1994 ). As mentioned above, 
these talks took place days before the Commission proposed a ‘pioneering 
agreement’ with Mercosur ( Agence Europe  19/10/1994 ). Marin, as the 
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‘father’ of this proposal and of most of the EU ’ s advances towards Latin 
America, was very optimistic. He emphasized the singular characteristics of 
the ‘fi rst inter-regional agreement’ ( Agence Europe  19/10/1994 ). 
 However, this announcement did not smooth over the issue of agriculture. 
Days later an exchange of views on it took place. This agreement would 
not cover agriculture automatically; Argentina and Brazil responded clearly: 
the Argentinean minister for the economy, Domingo Cavallo, declared that 
‘negotiations in which the fi rst item was not agricultural trade would have 
no signifi cance’ and that ‘negotiations limited to industry and services 
would be worthless’ ( Agence Europe  9/11/1994 ). The Brazilian president 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso said it would be ‘very diffi cult’ to conclude an 
agreement with the EU because ‘an agreement that did not include a chapter 
on agriculture would not make sense’ ( Agence Europe  9/11/1994 ). 
 EU engagement in Mercosur 
 In order to assess the level of ambition at the different stages, it is necessary 
to contrast with the status quo the presence of offers of negotiation man-
dates or agreements, EU offi cial policy pronouncements, promises to 
Mercosur and plans for a potential relationship. The different levels of 
ambition are shown in Figure  5.1 . 
 This chapter has explained that in the area of ambition the new guidelines 
indicate that there was a good level, as well as the support of the EP towards 
a development on the EU side. Also evidence of ambitions is the fact that 
the EU agreed to an association agreement with Mercosur, considered a 
preferential type of agreement. 
 However, the fact that the EIB requests came from the Latin American 
side, as did the requests for the institutionalization of the Rio Group 
and the requests for the development of agreements, balances the level of 
 Figure 5.1  Level of ambition: second stage 
Scenario 3: MediumPromises to Mercosur
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ambition. Also on the negative side is that the EU agreements had no legal 
content and the initial negative reaction in some parts of the EU to the 
inclusion of the agricultural sector in any of those agreements. Therefore 
the fi nal level of ambition is medium, higher than in the previous stage. 
 The link between commitment and engagement is that you need the fi rst 
one to have the second one. This is the case especially in an area such as 
South America which has been ignored for decades. The more concise and 
less abstract the commitments are, the more verifi able this criterion is. If 
there is no commitment, involvement will come as a reaction to the other 
players, or as an unintentional action. It is important to note whether 
strategy existed or not. 
 In order to assess the level of commitment it is necessary to pay attention 
to certain indicators: prioritization of negotiations over other agreements/
negotiations, substantial content of agreements and of offers during the 
negotiations, aid, funding or technical help provided by the EU, meetings 
either offi cial or unoffi cial at any level. Figure  5.2 shows the assessed level 
of commitment. 
 The amount of aid assigned in the guidelines can be seen as evidence 
confi rming commitment, as can the upgrading of investment facilities. Also 
boosting the level of commitment are the visits by Delors to the region, and 
the acceptance of requests for the inclusion of Latin America in EIB loans, 
and the institutionalization of the annual meetings. Finally in favour of 
commitment is the fact that the EU signed two different agreements in a 
very short period of time. 
 However, the reorganization of the GSP is a negative indicator of the EU 
commitment towards Mercosur countries as well as the legal emptiness of 
the EU agreements with Mercosur. Also pushing down the level of commit-
ment is the indecision about the inclusion of the agricultural sector in the 









Substanal content of agreements and of
offers during the negoaons
Scenario 3: MediumAid, funding, or technical help provided by the EU
Meengs either official or unofficial at any level: civil servant level,
ministerial level and/or head of state level
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agreements. All of the evidence together points to a high level of commit-
ment, the highest of the three stages. 
 The level of engagement is somewhere between high and medium, as 
shown in Table  5.2 . This is a large change from the previous stage, where 
EU involvement was qualifi ed as low. The component of engagement which 
improved the most was commitment, since during this stage of the policy 
two offi cial agreements were signed between the EU and Mercosur in a 
short period of time. Also in general terms, as this chapter has shown, these 
years were the most productive of EU–Mercosur relations. Ambition has 
been assessed as medium, since although Mercosur is the EU ’ s priority 
within Latin America, it does not mean that the EU has enormous ambition 
in this region compared with other EU foreign policies such as the policies 
towards Eastern European countries. EU ambition towards Mercosur is 
high within Latin America, but low within EU global ambitions, therefore 
it is fair to be placed at medium level. 
 Once the dependent variable has been assessed, the focus is on the 
competing arguments. On this occasion, three of the six explanations meet 
the outcome of the analysis of this stage, as Table  5.3 shows and as evalu-
ated further below. 
 Counterbalancing the US 
 The explanation for EU actions as a counterbalancing strategy against the 
US at this stage has been discussed in Chapter  2 . This argument would 
expect the EU to increase its involvement in Latin America if the US 
increases its involvement. In relation to the US ’ s involvement, the idea 
behind this explanation is the possibility of the FTAA. This plan was 
 Table 5.2  Measurement of the dependent variable, engagement: second stage 
 Ambition
Top High Medium Low None
Top
High Second stage: 
med/high
Medium
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launched during the Summit of the Americas in Miami in December 1994 
which brought together the heads of state of thirty-four American states. 
The process had been started in 1993 by the US Clinton administration, 
headed by Vice-President Al Gore. At the Miami Summit, the heads of state 
signed a declaration with the aim of creating an FTA in America by 2005 
( Devlin et al.  2003 ). In December 1994, the European Council asked the 
Commission to work on the agreement with Mercosur and Chile and 
Mexico; this is compelling evidence in support of the ‘US infl uence’ argu-
ment at this stage in EU–Mercosur relations. 
 Although there is certainly some kind of competition between the EU 
and the US for infl uence/control of the Latin American market, this should 
be considered to be a natural element of the international economic system 
where the globalization of markets means that economic competition now 
takes places at a global level rather than just an inter-regional level. However, 
as discussed in the previous section, the amount of trade between the EU 
and Mercosur countries highlights just how little economically Mercosur 
means to the EU. It has been noted that the EU could not compete with the 
US in Latin America due to the advantage that the latter already had there 
( El País  17/6/1994 ; Interviewee 7). Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that 
the Commission was already planning an upgrading of the EU–Mercosur 
relations in 1993 after Mercosur demands. 
 Global aspirations 
 The basis of this argument – that the EU was expected to increase its 
involvement in Latin America as a consequence of the EU ’ s increased 
involvement in the world – seems to have been realized, since these relations 
did indeed intensify with the end of Cold War. The new globalized world 
brought new opportunities for the EU. The agreement with Mercosur could 
be seen as one way of developing the EU ’ s economic infl uence in the dif-
ferent regions rather than being a result of the end of the Cold War. 
According to the Argentinean government, in a globalized world Europe 
clearly had an interest in achieving infl uence in the new economic regions 
( El País  9/12/1995 ). When the EU upgraded its policies towards Latin 
America with the new strategy for 1996 to 2000, Manuel Marin explained 
the upgrading in these terms: ‘The EU must be equally present in the 
emerging zones at world level such as Latin America’ ( El País  27/10/1995 ). 
 This argument has been mentioned several times in this chapter. The 
question remains, however; whether the EU actually had the political will 
to achieve the requisite degree of involvement with Latin America to fulfi l 
its global strategy. The EU ’ s agreements appear more as compensatory 
attempts to fi ll the gaps in the common foreign and security policy ( Petite-
ville  2004 , cited in  Santander  2005 : 303). If that is indeed the case, then 
the political emphasis of those agreements is clear. 
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 For some, it has been important to stress that the EU ’ s role in Latin 
America – even if it is part of the broader strategy to increase the EU ’ s 
political and economical role at global level – is still less prominent even 
than the EU ’ s role in Asia ( Dinan  1999 ). For  Freres  ( 2000 ) this is not 
explained by a lack of power, but rather by a lack of common will. It has 
been explained in this chapter that, relative to other external agreements, 
those with Latin American countries (including Mercosur) were treated 
differently by the EU, initially in terms of the legal commitments offered 
when signing the agreements. It has also been mentioned that the EU ’ s 
pyramid of preference has never given Latin America priority; it has, in fact, 
always been (and now remains) at the bottom of the heap, as it were. 
 Promotion of regional integration 
 The promotion of regional integration has been one of the arguments given 
in the literature. For this stage, emphasis on the promotion of regionalism 
has special signifi cance, probably because of the speed of the development 
of Mercosur institutions and the involvement of the EU in the process. The 
expectations related to this argument would be realized if the EU increased 
its involvement in Latin America in response to an intensifi cation in Mer-
cosur ’ s integration. This seems to have been the case. The agreement of 
1992 allowed the transfer of knowledge (know-how) and funding from the 
EU to Mercosur. On 26 and 27 July 1992, the Lisbon European Council 
‘emphasized the importance of supporting moves towards regional integra-
tion in Latin America such as that represented by Mercosur’ ( European 
Council  1992 ). The fi rst meeting of the Joint Advisory Committee was in 
July 1992, and it was asked to focus initially on the topics of customs, 
technical standards and agriculture ( EC–Mercosur  1993 ). 
 Mercosur secured a considerable amount of funding from the EU for the 
development of the institutions in a relatively short period of time, as 
presented in Table  5.4 . Moreover, in 1993, the Training Centre for Regional 
Integration was created in Uruguay by the EU in order to provide know-
how in the area of regional integration. The European Institute of Public 
Administration in Maastricht administered the development of the pro-
gramme ( Bizzozero  1995 ). 
 The involvement of the EU in the development of Mercosur institutions 
was intense and it is clear that the Mercosur institutions are modelled on 
the EU institutions outlined in Chapter  1 . Much literature in this area has 
been dedicated to comparing the similarities and difference between the 
institutions in the two regional groups. According to Marin, this type of 
agreement was pioneering and became a possibility for other parts of the 
world where there was both integration and emergent economies ( IRELA 
 1994 ). In other words, the EU model could be considered to be an example 
for other regions to follow. 
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 Table 5.4  EU cooperation with Mercosur, 1992–2000 
Area Projects under the 1992 
inter-institutional cooperation 
agreement and the EMIFCA








Technical standards Standards 3,950.000
Mercosur ’ s bodies Administrative Secretariat of 
Mercosur (I)
900,000
Administrative Secretariat of 
Mercosur (I)
900,000
Joint parliamentary commission 917,175






Support to the single market 4,600,000
 Civil society 
Social dimension of 
Mercosur
Labour and social dimension 950,000
 Others 
Mercosur Agriculture 11,200,000
 Source :  European Commission  ( 2002c ). 
 The ‘external federator’ tag for the EU ’ s behaviour towards Latin America 
in general and Mercosur in particular is justifi ed by this evidence. Even an 
offi cial from the European Commission, working at the Mercosur desk, 
confi rmed that the promotion of regional integration was the clearest way 
of explaining EU–Mercosur relations: ‘if one adopts a perspective of sup-
porting and furthering regional integration, then the European Union–
Mercosur relationship and its future possibilities … suddenly becomes much 
clearer’ ( Klom  2000 ).  Jean Grugel ( 2004 ) believes an adequate explanation 
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of EU policy towards Mercosur might potentially draw on many factors, 
including perhaps trade and investment, but considers Mercosur ’ s replica-
tion of the EU example a very important reason. Grugel develops her 
argument further based on the idea of the ‘partnership’ that was offered to 
Mercosur (and other regions) by the EU. She argues that the EU is ‘using 
new regionalism as a way to lay down an identity marker of what it per-
ceives as a more humane governance model for Latin America than that of 
the USA’ ( Grugel  2004 : 1). The problem is that she believes that, since the 
intention is to compete with the US, the EU is treating Mercosur and 
the other regions in Latin America similarly. This is clearly not the case. 
Like many authors, Grugel considers many explanatory models, but vacil-
lates rather than chooses one particular explanation. 
 It was Latin America and Mercosur that took the initiative in dealings 
with the EU, particularly in respect of the possible upgrade of agreements 
and the institutionalization of relations or meetings. Therefore, the idea of 
the EU using these agreements as an incentive to achieve regional integra-
tion is not a sustainable argument. Nevertheless, this does not mean that 
the EU does not want regional integration. Two offi cials from the European 
Commission admitted that the EU is in favour of regional integration, but 
that it could not force Mercosur to integrate (Interviewees 7 and 8). Cer-
tainly, the EU cannot force Mercosur, but it  can do more than make sug-
gestions. The EU is still not using all its tools to achieve regional integration 
in Mercosur, and at the same time it is offering individual agreements to 
Mercosur countries. The term ‘external federator’ seems too big for the EU 
in this case. Looking at the evidence, we can discount the argument of 
promotion of regionalism. 
 Affi nity 
 This argument explains that the involvement of the EU in Latin America is 
due to an increase in the sharing of values between the regions. Therefore, 
if Latin America and the EU shared a higher degree of common values at 
this stage, the EU would increase its involvement in the region. This was 
not the case, however: political, economic and cultural values did not 
change in any of the regions at this stage. 
 Interdependence 
 The interdependence argument makes reference to the level of trade and 
FDI between the two regions in its explanation of EU–Mercosur relations. 
The argument expects an increase in the EU ’ s involvement in Latin America 
if there is an increase in the level of trade and FDI between the regions. 
Table  5.5 presents the levels of trade between the EU and Mercosur in this 
period in both relative and absolute terms, showing that there was a low 
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 Table 5.5  EU exports and imports with Mercosur countries, 1991–1995 (values in 
US$ million) 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1 
EU imp from 
Mercosur
14,500 15,500 14,000 17,500  18,000 
EU imp from world 1,578,945 1,654,045 1,487,610 1,690,635  2,050,935 
 EU imp from 
Mercosur as % 
of total 
 0.91%  0.93%  0.94%  1.03%  0.87% 
EU exp to Mercosur 7,000 9,000 12,000 17,000  21,500 
EU exp to world 1,492,780 1,584,275 1,488,885 1,702,895  2,083,745 
 EU exp to Mercosur 
as % of total 
 0.46%  0.56%  0.80%  0.99%  1.03% 
 Sources :  The author ’ s own elaboration with the data from  IRELA ( 1995 ,  1999 ), WTO Sta-
tistics Database and Eurostat Database. 
 Note :  1 Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the EU. 
level of trade as a percentage of the total EU trade. The highest level is 
barely 1% of the total imports and exports, evidence enough of its relative 
insignifi cance. This table also shows that there had been a considerable 
increase in the area of EU exports, so much so that EU exports increased 
threefold. However, this is still only 1% of the total. It is diffi cult to sustain 
the argument that Mercosur was of particular economic importance for the 
EU at this stage. 
 The idea of interdependence is diffi cult to defend at this stage. Also, Latin 
America has never been the EU ’ s priority from an economic point of view. 
The agreements with Mercosur were driven by political factors, not eco-
nomic ones (Interviewee 7). 
 Spanish and Portuguese infl uence in the EU 
 Spain and Portugal have been key actors in the development of EU–Mer-
cosur relations, but they are not the only reason for the development of 
EU ’ s policy towards Mercosur. The argument for the Iberian infl uence in 
the EU expected that the EU ’ s involvement in Latin America would increase 
if Spanish and Portuguese infl uence increased in the EU. At the end of this 
stage, the EU increased its membership from twelve to fi fteen states, 
decreasing the power of Iberian countries within the EU. Therefore, the 
argument ’ s expectations are not met at this stage. This does not mean that 
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Spain and Portugal did not have infl uence in the EU: their infl uence was 
necessary, but not suffi cient to produce the actual outcomes found at this 
stage. 
 Spain did play a crucial role. The commissioners involved and directors 
of portfolio in the Commission were Spanish. Marin himself admits that he 
did everything possible for the development of EU–Latin America relations 
( Marin  1995 ). There has also been major progress in EU relations with 
Latin America during the Spanish presidencies; the Spanish presidency of 
1995 secured signatures on the EMIFCA. However, Spain was not as 
entirely pro-regional integration in relation to economic interest as Marin 
was. Spain opposed Latin American products such as bananas being 
imported into the EU. Marin went further and warned of the possibility of 
treating regions of the Mercosur as individual states. The EU agreement 
with Mercosur was also welcomed by a Brazilian ambassador who thanked 
Spain and Portugal for the ‘obvious and proven’ role that they played, 
particularly because their membership of the EU sensitized the EU towards 
issues relating to Latin America, whereas before the Iberian membership 
there was not much in the way of contact between the two regions ( El País 
 20/11/1994 ). 
 Compared with other EU members, Germany, Spain, France, Italy and 
the UK are the EU countries that invested the most in Latin America ( IRELA 
 1995 ). In the case of Brazil, Germany and Italy were the biggest investors. 
Spain also had a strategy of increasing its investments in the area if there 
was a process of privatization in Brazil similar to the ones that took place 
in Argentina and Chile ( El País  16/9/1995 ). In general, in 1992 most of the 
investments in Latin America were destined for the privatization of former 
public companies in Mercosur countries. In the case of Argentina, 80% of 
the $10,000 million came from Europe ( IRELA  1995 ). These fi gures can 
be problematic and looking at the amount of money invested in general 
terms by each country does not give a true picture; rather one should look 
at the proportion of its GDP because Spain was at that time one of the 
poorest nations in the EU, whilst Germany could afford to invest more in 
absolute terms. 
 In the area of aid, again Spain and Germany were the main actors:
 Over the period 1991–1997, only two countries, Germany and Spain, can be 
considered major region wide donors. Both provided a cumulative total of 
more than two billion dollars. Germany was the top European donor through-
out the 1990s; in 1996 its aid for Latin America was twice that of the United 
States. In that year, Spain ’ s ODA [offi cial development aid] for the region was 
only slightly lower than that of the United States.  ( Freres  2000 : 42) 
 Again in relative terms, Spain prioritized the region, giving more than half 
of its aid to Latin America. If Spain had not increased the amount of aid 
that it gave to Latin America in the early 1990s, Latin America would 
c05.indd   141 12/15/2016   12:44:06 PM
142 The EU’s policy towards Mercosur
have received less funding from the EU than in previous periods ( Freres 
 2000 ). This confi rms the lack of, or at least decline in, interest shown by 
the EU in Latin America. It also demonstrates just how important Spain 
was to the region. Spain ’ s prioritization of Latin America is cited by many 
member states as an obstacle to the coordination of aid plans at the 
national level ( Youngs  2000 ). The EU ’ s priority tended to be the poorest 
countries in the world and Latin America in general and Mercosur in 
particular were not in this category. At the supranational level, due to 
Spanish pressure, the Commission did increase the level of funding to 
Latin America and, more specifi cally, the Spanish government acquiesced 
on the enlargement of the EU in terms of the Eastern European countries 
after securing an increase of funding for Latin America ( Youngs  2000 ). 
However, it seems that this Spanish pressure backfi red. One of the reasons 
that the EU member states did not give more aid to Latin America was 
that they assumed that Spain would take care of Europe ’ s responsibilities 
in this area ( Youngs  2000 ). 
 This chapter has also shown that the Commission, the EU institution in 
charge of the development of the policy towards Latin America, and Com-
missioner Matutes fi rst and later more specifi cally Commissioner Marin 
were key to the development of EU relations towards Mercosur. They 
confronted the commissioners of agriculture, and the French and Irish 
commissioners, and managed to develop some kind of agreement with the 
region. Iberian countries persistently tried to increase their infl uence in the 
EU and certainly without their effort it would not have not been possible 
to develop the policy towards Mercosur. However, it must be noted that 
this would also not have been possible without the assistance of other 
countries, such as Germany, who also contributed. The initiative and 
demands of Mercosur were also a necessary feature that made the develop-
ment of the EU policy possible. 
 The path dependence created by the membership of Spain and Portugal 
is as applicable as in the previous stage. Moreover, this stage helps to show 
the consequences of the path dependence created in the fi rst stage, which 
have effects in the third stage because the consequences do not tend to be 
immediate. The path dependency created in 1986 keeps being followed with 
the evolution of the cooperation policies towards Latin America in general 
and Mercosur countries in this case. Moreover, the EU fi nally managed to 
develop independent guidelines towards Latin America, separate from the 
ones for Asia. At the end of this stage the development of some knowledge 
on Latin America was shown with the division of policies towards the 
different regions in Latin America instead of being directed at the whole 
region. 
 With regard to the process of Europeanization, there had been more 
changes in the way the EU dealt with Latin America, and Iberian countries 
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had not changed the way they dealt with their former colonies. However, 
it should be stated and highlighted how Spain in particular had been trying 
to behave as a bridge between the EU and Mercosur, placing Spain in a 
powerful position as an intermediary. Also, like any other EU country, Spain 
and Portugal tried to have some infl uence in the EU when holding the 
presidencies. Iberian countries tried to pursue their interest in Mercosur at 
the EU level, but again it cannot be described as Europeanization since there 
was not a massive change in the EU towards Mercosur. In other words, 
Spain and Portugal did try to provoke a sort of Europeanization process 
which would initiate the uploading of their national foreign policies 
by the EU. 
 As explained before, the central argument in this monograph is related 
to the degree of Europeanization which comes from the infl uence of Spain 
and Portugal within the EU when dealing with Mercosur. This was not 
suffi cient, however, and the proactive role of Mercosur countries was neces-
sary. It seems that the path dependence created was not strong enough on 
its own to create a policy towards Mercosur that could overcome the 
obstacles. 
 Conclusion 
 This chapter has shown how this period was the most productive period of 
EU–Mercosur relations. The fi rst agreement between Mercosur and the EU 
took just a year to be reached. It was given the green light at the fi rst meeting 
between the two regions. Almost immediately, Mercosur took the initiative 
and made efforts to have the policy upgraded (which the EU could not 
concede until Mercosur became a customs union because the policy involved 
inter-regional trade). The development of EU–Mercosur relations had also 
been infl uenced by the productive EU–Latin America relations at this stage, 
which led to the creation of new cooperation guidelines between the regions, 
new agreements with the individual countries and the consolidation of the 
institutionalization of the EU–Rio Group meetings. Once again it should 
be noted that this political forum was institutionalized at the request of the 
Rio Group. 
 In terms of the analysis of the EU ’ s engagement with the region, this 
chapter ’ s evidence has helped the assessment of the EU ’ s ambition and 
commitment, with an outcome of ‘medium’ and ‘high’ respectively; as a 
consequence, the level of EU engagement has an outcome of ‘high’. In 
relation to ambition, the new guidelines and the support of the EP together 
with the EU compromise helped to develop an association agreement. 
However, the fact that it was the Latin American side that requested the 
EIB, the institutionalization of the annual meetings and different agreements 
does not lend support to a high level of ambition. In fact, the lack of legal 
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content in the EU agreements offered to Mercosur and Latin American 
countries suggests an undefi ned, unclear and uncertain level of ambition on 
the EU side. That there were already voices against the inclusion of the 
agricultural sector does not help the level of ambition. 
 In relation to commitment, the outcome is more positive, with a fi nal 
assessment of ‘high’. There are several pieces of evidence in support of that, 
such as the increase in aid assigned in the new guidelines, and the upgrading 
of the investment facilities, together with the visits of the president of the 
Commission, Delors, to the region and the inclusion of the countries of 
Latin America as candidates for EIB loans. Moreover, the institutionaliza-
tion of the annual meetings with the Rio Group and the fact that two 
agreements between the EU and Mercosur were signed in a period of fi ve 
years do help this assessment. Against the measure of commitment are the 
fact that the reorganization of the GSP left Mercosur countries out of the 
scheme, and the lack of legal content in the EU agreements offered to Latin 
American countries and regions. 
 This chapter has also looked at the different arguments that can be 
found in the existing literature which try to explain these events. In par-
ticular, the discussion above has examined to what extent these explana-
tions can or cannot explain the development of EU policy towards 
Mercosur. Here it was argued that the contradiction in the EU ’ s actions 
leaves gaps in most of the explanations. The EU claims to promote regional 
integration but at the same time has offered agreements to individual 
countries. The EU also claims to have economic interest in the region, but 
trade fi gures and the lack of priority shown towards the region when 
compared to other regions contradicts that. The ‘counterbalancing the US’ 
argument is not credible since the EU and Mercosur had been discussing 
the upgrading of relations years before the US started to become more 
involved in the region. Spain and Portugal clearly supported further 
development of EU–Mercosur relations. However, the evidence presented 
above suggests that the Iberian countries were not powerful enough to 
bring this region to the same status as the former colonies of other EU 
member states. 
 This chapter has also demonstrated that there was a link between Mer-
cosur petitions and Spanish – and, to a lesser extent, Portuguese – support 
for those petitions. This comes from the path dependence created with the 
Iberian membership which had an effect at this stage and also in the fol-
lowing stage. Consequently, there had been an upgrading of the cooperation 
policies achieved at this stage; there were now guidelines towards Latin 
America that were independent from the ones on Asia. Moreover, the new 
guidelines towards Latin America fi nally acknowledged an obvious fact: 
Latin America is so diverse that it could not be treated as one entity, 
therefore different policies were planned for the different regions and 
countries. 
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 Finally, Spanish and Portuguese support was essential for the develop-
ment of EU–Mercosur relations but not suffi cient to develop these relations 
more signifi cantly. Therefore, continuing with the central argument of this 
monograph, the EU has been  responsive  to Mercosur petitions and EU–
Mercosur relations were developed as a result of Spanish and Portuguese 
interest in the region. Mercosur is not a priority for the EU compared to 
other regions such as the ACP, although EU–Mercosur relations were more 
of a priority for the EU compared to other Latin American groups and 
countries. 
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 The fi rst attempt to negotiate the 
association agreement 
 Introduction 
 This chapter aims to explain the phase in EU–Mercosur relations which 
saw the negotiation of the association agreement without reaching a suc-
cessful ending. Both parties developed those negotiations under the EMIFCA. 
It was agreed that this agreement would be carried out in two phases. The 
fi rst phase related to the preparation of the ground for future negotiations 
by comparing standards, statistical systems and trade procedures, whilst the 
second phase centred on trade liberalization. The second phase of this 
agreement was also focused on the actual negotiations. In the end, the 
parties were unable to reach an agreement and the negotiations were halted 
in October 2004. 
 By looking at how these two parts of the policy were developed, and 
how far both sides went in both their statements and actions, it will be 
possible to discuss the level of engagement on the EU side towards Mercosur. 
It seems that within the EU there were actors willing to increase and 
decrease the level of ambition and commitment. Mercosur countries helped 
to overcome some of the obstacles and this should be considered in order 
not to attribute the whole outcome solely to EU behaviour. The EU devel-
oped the association agreement towards Mercosur at this stage because of 
the efforts of the commissioner in charge of the policy until 1999. This was 
also the result of the clear pressure and demands made by Mercosur coun-
tries and Spanish ministers in the European Council and Spanish MEPs. 
The business associations, where again there was a strong Spanish presence, 
were also in favour of this agreement. However, despite having various 
sources of support, these forces were not powerful enough within the EU. 
The mandate given to the Commission was linked to the WTO negotiations. 
This proved to be an obstacle which led to the cessation of the negotiations 
without a successful conclusion until the WTO fi nished its negotiations. In 
addition to the pressure exerted by the agricultural lobby groups at the 
European level, French commissioners and Council members were opposed 
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to the agreement. Argentina also decided to stop the negotiations until the 
results of the Doha Round of the WTO was over. Five years later, the 
negotiations were restarted. These initial renegotiations were ambitious in 
that they were designed to be concluded during the Spanish presidency of 
the EU in 2010. This did not happen, but the work of the Spaniards before 
their occupation of the presidency was key to relaunching the negotiations. 
As in the previous stages, the effect of the path dependence created with 
the Iberian membership is clear. 
 The period between 1995 and 2004 is important because it is the point 
where the actors that were against the agreement clearly voiced their dissent. 
During the period leading up to the end of the policy, new actors either 
started to participate or became more prominent in EU–Mercosur relations. 
This period highlights the differences of opinions and views among com-
missioners and among EU member states. It will be demonstrated that this 
lack of agreement could not sustain EU–Mercosur relations nor could it 
lead to the development of a clear and coherent EU strategy, and this affected 
the overall level of engagement. Exploring these issues between 1995 and 
2004 is fundamental to examine the validity of the six different arguments 
which have been developed to explain EU–Mercosur relations. In fact, as 
has been discussed already in previous chapters, the interest of Spain and 
Portugal, combined with a strong desire on the part of Mercosur actors, 
made possible the development of relations between the two regions to some 
extent, although those relations did end somewhat unsuccessfully. 
 This stage is also the period when there were more contacts and more 
discussions between the two regions. The discussion below will also dem-
onstrate that the EU continued to adopt the role of a reactive actor, respond-
ing to the demands and initiatives emanating from Latin America. However, 
it must be acknowledged that the EU was not simply the voice of Latin 
America in Europe. Below it will be demonstrated that even though it was 
always Mercosur that tried to further develop relations and policies between 
the regions, and EU the one reacting to its demands; the EU did not agree 
to all Mercosur ’ s demands. In other words, Mercosur was always the one 
fi ghting (being proactive) to develop relations further and the EU, to a 
certain extent, repeatedly played the role of the responsive/reactive actor, 
with Manuel Marin once again being the channel and defender of Mercosur 
requests within the EU. 
 At the end of the fi rst part of the policy the negotiation mandate was 
accepted ‘in extremis’ due to the pressure of Spain, Marin and Mercosur 
on the French embassies in their countries. This was also the result of the 
pressure mounted with the fi rst summit of the heads of state of the EU and 
Latin America. Prior to this, the EU had been attempting to delay any policy 
decision for several years. When the negotiations started with Romano 
Prodi in charge of the Commission, Mercosur was once again very keen 
but the EU proved to be less interested in the region than ever. 
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 Again we examine the six explanations for EU–Mercosur that can be 
found in the existing literature. In relation to the argument which suggests 
that the EU would seek to counterbalance the infl uence of the US, the EU 
should have been at its most aggressive at this point. In other words, the 
EU should have been very generous towards Mercosur because the FTAA 
was being negotiated at the same time as the association agreement with 
the EU. As far as the global aspirations expectation is concerned, again the 
EU should have been more active in order to achieve the fi rst inter-regional 
agreement in history and not leave Latin America lagging behind on the 
EU ’ s overall external relations agenda. The idea that the EU would act as 
an external federator suggests that the EU ’ s priority would be to promote 
regional integration in other parts of the world, and the next argument – 
which points towards the long-standing political, economic and cultural ties 
between the Iberian countries and Latin America – would also suggest that 
these ties should have made the agreement possible. The interdependence 
argument also predicts that business issues should have been prioritized too, 
particularly in the agricultural sector, during the attempts to seek an agree-
ment which would bring more interdependence between the regions by 
increasing FDI. Finally it is suggested in the existing literature that Iberian 
infl uence in the EU should have been able to demand a more generous offer 
for Mercosur countries which would have made negotiation of the agree-
ment less complicated. 
 This chapter is divided into three main sections. The fi rst section will 
examine the fi rst part of EMIFCA at the level of the EU directives. The 
focus will then move to the EU–Mercosur negotiations. This is followed by 
an analysis of both the role and interests of the various key actors involved 
in this process. 
 EMIFCA ’ s negotiations at the internal level: EU directives 
 EU policy-making towards Mercosur took on a new dimension after the 
signature of the EMIFCA in Madrid on 15 December 1995. It is important 
to acknowledge that this agreement was signed whilst Spain was holding 
the presidency of the EU; which shows again the interest of Iberian coun-
tries channelled through the path dependence. At the time of the signature 
in 1995, it was agreed that this agreement would be developed in two 
phases. The fi rst phase was designed to prepare the ground for future 
negotiations by comparing standards, statistical systems and trade proce-
dure. The second phase was designed to focus on trade liberalization 
( Agence Europe  9/4/1997 ). As already explained in the introduction, the 
EU promised to start the process of trade liberalization at the beginning of 
the twenty-fi rst century. In order to start the liberalization, which would 
require further negotiations between the two sides, the Council had to pass 
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directives to the Commission. The second phase is the heart of the discus-
sion in the next section. 
 This section examines the internal negotiations and debates within the 
EU in relation to the granting or not of the directives to start the negotia-
tions of EMIFCA. This discussion will highlight the degree of interest shown 
towards these directives by the Council, since the different positions of the 
members of the Council are the basis of the outcome. The Council is the 
main actor to consider in this part of the policy and indeed in this chapter. 
This section will analyse to what extent there was any ambition and com-
mitment within the EU, revealed through the negotiations of the directives 
that would give the Commission power to start negotiations for an associa-
tion agreement with Mercosur. 
 During the fi rst phase of the agreement, actors involved in the policy 
showed either their support or opposition very clearly through the debate 
related to the directives that the Council had to give to the Commission. 
These directives were necessary if negotiations of an association agreement 
with Mercosur were to begin. In fact, it was during this period that it 
became much clearer who exactly was in favour and who was opposed to 
the creation of an association agreement. It could be argued that this was 
a result of there being a substantial leap from the previous stage where 
discussions had been held in relation to small issues such as technical 
cooperation. During this stage, the EU was about to develop an inter-
regional agreement with a region that was not geographically close to it, a 
region which until then had never truly been of any great interest to the EU 
because there was not any signifi cant security risk to the EU, nor did Latin 
America provide any real economic competition to the EU in sectors such 
as agriculture. It seems that this was the fi rst time that both supporters and 
the opposition believed there was a chance of opening up trade relations 
with Mercosur. During this time the EU was deciding whether or not to 
approve the directives. Furthermore, a series of meetings were held between 
the EU and Mercosur in order to resolve a number of technical issues. Some 
of these meetings happened within the framework of the EU–Rio Group 
annual meetings. At one of these annual meetings it was decided that a 
summit for the heads of state of the EU and Latin America would be held 
in 1999. This decision would prove to be an important moment in the 
development of EU–Mercosur relations. 
 This section will now explain, fi rstly, what happened during the negotia-
tions of the directives, before going on to discuss the actors who were either 
in favour or opposed to the association agreement. This will shed some 
light in relation to the following questions: Why did it take so many years 
to approve the directives? Who was involved? Was it diffi cult to reach a 
consensus within Mercosur? During this period of the policy, how involved 
was Spain and Spanish offi cials in Brussels, especially Manuel Marin before 
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he left the Commission? To what extent did the EU perception of Mercosur 
change during this period? And fi nally, was this agreement really Mercosur ’ s 
top priority, and if so, why? 
 How to delay a decision until the last minute 
 As mentioned above, the creation of the directives took several years to be 
approved. Meanwhile, representatives of both the EU and Mercosur held 
meetings, during which time they resolved many of the technical issues 
related to future negotiations. In addition to this, these meetings helped to 
maintain the momentum that had been created and avoided a watering-
down of the promises behind the EMIFCA. The derailing of the whole 
process was a possibility, given how comments coming from both sides 
relating to the agricultural sector had created tensions in EU–Mercosur 
relations at certain moments. 
 As a consequence of the signing of EMIFCA in 1995, a Joint Committee 
with representatives from both the EU and Mercosur was created. The Joint 
Committee held its fi rst meeting in mid-June 1996. Its task was ‘preparing 
the ground for future trade liberalisation, approve the protocol for customs 
cooperation currently on the table, examine the rules for the functioning of 
consultation intended to settle trade problems, and examine the main 
avenues of trade cooperation’ ( Agence Europe  17/4/1996 ). The fi rst sign of 
just how problematic the agriculture issue had become was clear after the 
inaugural meeting of the EU–Mercosur, when farmers’ representatives met 
in Brussels in mid-June 1996. On the one side, Mercosur ’ s position ‘allowed 
for agricultural trade issues to be tackled in a realistic fashion and less ideo-
logically’ ( Agence Europe  18/6/1996 ). On the other side, the European 
farmers, grouped under the Committee of European Agricultural Organiza-
tion (COPA), were more reserved, stating, ‘We are in favour of more liberal-
ized trade but under harmonized social and environmental conditions’ 
( Agence Europe  18/6/1996 ). With this, COPA tried to put in place some 
obstacles to developing inter-regional trade by highlighting EU regulations 
that did not exist in Mercosur countries in relation to social and environ-
mental issues. 
 Mercosur went further and asked to hold meetings twice a year, a pro-
posal that was rejected by the Europeans, who claimed that these discussions 
should take place within the International Federation of Agricultural Pro-
ducers, as well as claiming that Mercosur farmers were too divided to be 
able to develop a common position ( Agence Europe  18/6/1996 ). In any case, 
in December 1996 the EU and Mercosur signed a cooperation agreement 
( Agence Europe  16/4/1998 ), a sign of the enduring desire and persistent 
efforts aimed at further developing EU–Mercosur relations. The creation of 
the Joint Committee was a good indicator of the level of ambition shown 
by the EU. The content of the meetings held by that committee and the 
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actions developed in the framework will show the level of commitment on 
the EU ’ s side. It is clear that COPA opposed from the very beginning any 
agreement with Mercosur that included the agricultural sector. However, 
when discussing EU engagement, we are looking at the EU and its members, 
not to third parties that tried to infl uence the EU (sometimes successfully) 
and therefore the EU engagement. 
 The commissioner in charge of Latin America, Manuel Marin, was 
working on the evolution of EMIFCA and announced that by the end of 
1997 both sides would assess the fi rst phase of the agreement. Marin also 
requested that ‘political arbitration’ be given to the Council in 1998 in order 
to provide a brief for moving into the negotiation on trade liberalization 
( Agence Europe  9/4/1997 ). The calendar prepared by Marin was welcomed 
by Mercosur countries apart from Uruguay. Whilst three Mercosur countries 
had already ratifi ed the agreement, only three EU member states had done 
so ( Agence Europe  9/4/1997 ). As a result, an entire section of the agreement 
which is under shared responsibility had not been enforced and the Joint 
Committee had not been able to meet formally to discuss the liberalization 
of services and intellectual property since it was fully under the states’ 
competence ( Agence Europe  9/4/1997 ). As has been explained, if there is 
no ratifi cation of an agreement, the negotiations cannot start. The lack of 
progress in the ratifi cation of the agreement had a clear impact on the 
activities of the Joint Committee, Therefore, it could be said that the 
commitment shown by the EU did not match the expectations of either 
the Joint Committee or Mercosur since both were interested in starting the 
negotiations. 
 By November 1997, the Trade Subcommittee of the Joint Committee met 
in Uruguay to analyse trade fl ows since 1990 in the ‘area of goods and 
services, and practices related to trade standards and disciplines’ ( Agence 
Europe  19/12/1997 ). This analysis would be used by the Commission for 
its proposal for a negotiating brief. ‘In accordance with the agreed calendar, 
the technical working groups fi nalised their work in April 1998. The assess-
ment served as a background document for the negotiation of the interre-
gional association agreement between the European Community and 
Mercosur’ ( Adiwasito et al.  2006 : 8). By early 1998, it was becoming more 
diffi cult for the EU representatives to justify to Mercosur countries the lack 
of agreement. The EU created things such as a ‘photograph’ or snapshot of 
trade relations. The snapshot was simply a mechanism to save face (Inter-
viewee 1). Once the snapshot was completed, it was expected that a political 
decision would be taken ( Agence Europe  14/5/1998 ). In a way, the EU was 
trying to create some extra time to reach a decision, whilst Mercosur was 
putting more and more pressure on the EU to reach a decision more quickly. 
Again the Joint Committee tried its best to keep alive the ‘intention’ set up 
with the 1995 signature of EMIFCA but so far the commitment shown did 
not match the expectations. 
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 On top of the problems relating to ratifi cation by the member states, 
some commissioners to the Council voiced their opposition to the proposal 
in relation to the negotiation mandate led by Mr Marin. The resistance 
came from the two French commissioners, Edith Cresson and Yves-Thibault 
de Silguy, and the German commissioner of agricultural, Franz Fischler. 
Their opposition stemmed from the sensitive nature of agricultural issues 
for their particular countries ( El País  9/7/1998 ). In fact, Fischler asked for 
an extension of a week to analyse the impact of the liberalization of the EU 
agricultural market ( El País  9/7/1998 ). 
 The situation became even more diffi cult when France and Germany 
took the issue to the Council of Ministers. According to a spokesperson for 
the French government, it was argued that the liberalization of trade 
between the regions posed a ‘great real and potential risk for the Union 
agriculture model’ ( El País  21/7/1998 ). On a more positive note, the UK, 
Denmark and Sweden supported Mr Marin ’ s project ( El País  21/7/1998 ). 
Another problem for Brussels was that the rules established at international 
level would also infl uence the nature of their trade agreements. The WTO 
explicitly said in its Article XXIV that FTAs between its members must 
substantially cover all trade. It has been accepted in the literature that this 
means that the FTA must cover around 90% ( Griffi th  2006 ) or between 
80% and 90% (Hilpold  2003 ) of the total trade, and that no individual 
sectors should be left out of the agreement, and that agreements should be 
implemented ‘within a reasonable length of time’ (agreed interpretation is 
ten years except in exceptional circumstances) ( Griffi th  2006 ). It appeared 
that Brussels wanted to exclude 13.9% of the trade negotiations, but due 
to the WTO rules it had to cover 90% of trade negotiations ( El País 
 21/7/1998 ). Leaving aside the matter of percentage of trade to be covered, 
it was by now clear that the EU wanted to omit agriculture from the 
negotiations, whilst Mercosur, especially Brazil, was particularly insistent 
that agricultural issues were included. 
 On 22 July 1998 a decision was fi nally taken. The Commission passed 
a recommendation to the Council asking for a negotiating brief for Merco-
sur even though four commissioners, Fischler, de Silguy, Cresson and Flynn, 
voted against it ( El País  23/7/1998 ,  Agence Europe  24/7/1998 ; Interviewees 
10 and 15). After this the Council was the one that had to decide this issue. 
Yves Doutriaux, spokesman for the French foreign minister, could not have 
been clearer when he stated:
 France will, at Council level, point out its stance on the inappropriateness of 
this Commission proposal as conceived. While fundamentally in favour of 
deepening relations between Europe, Mercosur and Chile, in the framework 
of the agreements signed in 95 and 96, France considers that the Commission ’ s 
proposal does not take account of the major hurdles facing the Union, 
especially Agenda 2000 and the preparation of negotiations within the World 
Trade Organizations. The establishment of a free trade area proposed by the 
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Commission, moreover, poses a problem of compatibility with the Union ’ s 
common policies, and foremost the common agricultural policy and the 
European model of agriculture, reaffi rmed by last December ’ s European 
Council. It could considerably further burden the Union ’ s budget, in the order 
of several tens of billions of francs a year. The Council of Agriculture Ministers 
already expressed its concerns on this issue on 20 July.  ( Agence Europe 
 24/7/1998 ) 
 This statement explains why the French were looking to develop a different 
kind of relationship with Mercosur. It also shows that the French would 
object to the proposal as it stood at that particular time. French complaints 
were repeated but this time by the president of France, Jacques Chirac. At 
the same time, in 1997 it was agreed to arrange a summit of the heads of 
state of the EU and Latin America. This suggestion, put forward by Spain 
and France after the annual meeting with the Rio Group, was accepted and 
was to be held before 1999. Being the fi rst summit of that kind, it put extra 
pressure on the EU. During the fi rst six months of 1999, the presidency of 
the EU was held by Germany. Up until this point, Germany had tried to 
get the directives approved in the General Affairs Council on 31 May 1999 
in order to avoid going to the Rio Summit with nothing to offer to Mercosur 
( Agence Europe  27/5/1999 ). The summit was to be held in Rio de Janeiro 
on 28–29 June 1999. Two weeks before the General Affairs Council, France 
and the UK were attempting to halt any progress in relation to the directive 
( El País  12/5/1999 ). 
 Wording issues also became important. France, Ireland and the UK 
refused the term ‘free trade area’ and suggested the ‘possibility of a free 
trade area’ ( Agence Europe  27/5/1999 ). In contrast, Spain and Portugal 
explicitly wanted the words ‘free trade area’ in order to maintain the politi-
cal impact of the agreement, whilst the German presidency proposed the 
phrase ‘tend towards free trade’ which was also supported by the Benelux 
and Scandinavian countries ( Agence Europe  27/5/1999 ). The French expla-
nation for this language issue, according to Yves Doutriau was:
 We have framework agreements with Mercosur and Chile that need to be 
followed up with more specifi c agreements. In these framework-agreements, 
it was agreed that there would be a gradual and reciprocal liberalisation of 
trade. These framework agreements did not provide for the establishment of 
a free-trade agreement. There is now a Commission proposal that does not 
comply with what was agreed, what was the subject of an agreement between 
the European Union and the countries of Mercosur. Reciprocal and gradual 
liberalisation does not mean a free-trade area. We have never said anything 
else.  ( Agence Europe  24/7/1998 ) 
 On 31 May, as a result of France ’ s position on this matter, the General 
Affairs Council failed to reach an agreement ( Agence Europe  31/5/1999 ). 
The next attempt to approve the text before the summit in Rio took place 
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at the Cologne Summit on 3–4 June. At this point it was clear that France, 
Ireland and the UK were against the agreement. These three countries felt 
that the negotiations should not start before they knew the results of the 
agriculture negotiations at the WTO ( Agence Europe  1/6/1999 ). Apart from 
the ‘free trade’ words, another issue was impeding the approval: the crea-
tion of a timetable to start the negotiations. The German presidency pro-
posed to start negotiations on non-tariff issues in the second half of 1999 
and negotiations on tariff reductions and services before 1 December 2000 
( Agence Europe  1/6/1999 ). A group of countries supported the German 
proposal on timetables, but Spain, Portugal and Sweden wanted to start 
negotiations on tariff issues as soon as possible, in addition to accepting 
the German proposal as long as the objective of a free trade area was clearly 
indicated in the directive ( Agence Europe  1/6/1999 ). Italy also supported 
the proposal, which confi rmed that there was a balance between the differ-
ent member states in relation to the extreme positions in favour of or against 
the agreement. However, France rejected the idea of starting negotiations 
on tariff issues by 1 December 2000, proposing instead that negotiations 
be started on 1 July 2003, the date by which they predicted the WTO 
negotiations would have concluded ( Agence Europe  1/6/1999 ). The UK also 
wanted to wait until the end of the WTO negotiations, whilst Paris insisted 
that negotiations on the FTA objective be eliminated from the negotiating 
brief ( Agence Europe  1/6/1999 ). 
 The Cologne Summit did not resolve these issues and Chirac vetoed the 
German proposal of splitting the dates for starting negotiations ( El País 
 6/6/1999 ). Chirac explained that until the end of the WTO negotiations, 
which he expected to be concluded by 2003, he did not want to discuss 
anything because doing so would jeopardize a million tonnes of French 
sugar ( El País  6/6/1999 ). Nevertheless, it was verbally agreed that this issue 
would be discussed again during the Council meeting on 21 June 1999 ( El 
País  6/6/1999 ), although hopes were not high that these issues would be 
resolved at this meeting, which would take place just four days before the 
summit with the heads of state of Latin America in Rio. In addition to this 
situation in Europe, in Latin America there was pressure for an agreement. 
In fact, at this point, Jorio Dauster, a former Brazilian ambassador to 
Brussels, stated very clearly, ‘Mercosur must make no concessions to the 
EU as long as this economic bloc maintains its protectionist position in 
relation to Latin American exports’ ( Agence Europe  10/6/1999 ). In relation 
to France, Dauster claimed that ‘Its attitude is surprising after all this 
diplomatic work … Globalization discourse is increasingly false and hypo-
critical. The rich countries are not globalizing because they are not opening 
their markets, especially agriculture’ ( Agence Europe  10/6/1999 ). 
 Finally, when it seemed that all hope was lost, the unexpected happened. 
On 21 June 1999 an agreement was reached. In the preceding days, Spain 
had further pressed France for a possible agreement ( Agence Europe 
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2 1/6/1999 ). It seems that the pressure put on the French embassies in Latin 
America had some infl uence in addition to the pressure being mounted by 
the Commission and Spain ( El País  22/6/1999 ). In the end, it was agreed 
that the negotiation on tariff reductions and services would begin on 1 July 
2001 ( Agence Europe 2 1/6/1999 ). The pressure exerted on France appears 
to have had an impact because France eventually accepted an offer that was 
worse than the one offered to them during the Cologne Summit, when the 
Germans had proposed negotiations started on 1 July 2002, after the French 
elections ( El País  22/6/1999 ). However, France was able to secure one of 
its objectives – that the negotiations could not be concluded before the 
WTO round ( Agence Europe  24/6/1999 ). At the diplomatic level, France 
continued to pursue this issue. Firstly, during the Rio Summit, Chirac 
argued that: ‘Against what I have read lately, I reiterate that France supports 
without reservation the beginning of these negotiations, because they cor-
respond to our strategic view in the long term’ ( El País  29/6/1999 ). 
 However, during the Rio Summit the EU asked that the Council of 
Ministers’ mandate that was passed to the EU Commission be included 
word for word in the joint communication of EU–Mercosur. This request 
was refused by Mercosur because it was considered an internal EU docu-
ment ( Agence Europe  29/6/1999 ) and therefore had nothing to do with 
Mercosur. The directives were approved offi cially by the General Affairs 
Council in September 1999 ( Agence Europe  15/9/1999 ). 
 This section has shown how, in terms of ambition, the EU was divided, 
with Spain and Portugal and the Spanish commissioner having great ambi-
tion, Germany, the Benelux and Scandinavian countries having medium 
ambition and Ireland, France and their commissioners having very low 
ambition. As a consequence, the EU had a medium level of ambition overall, 
since most of the countries were somewhere in between the two positions. 
In relation to commitment, there is a similar picture, giving a medium level 
of commitment. 
 Again, success in this part of the policy was due to the pressure that 
Mercosur countries exerted on the French embassies in their countries, 
together with the pressure created with the fi rst summit of the heads of state 
between Latin America and the EU. The suggestion for another summit 
came from Latin America, and Mercosur was very keen on promoting this 
summit, as they showed in the Joint Committees. This undermines the level 
of ambition attributed to the EU in its policy towards Mercosur. 
 The path dependence is once again clear if we look at the behaviour of 
Marin – the Spanish commissioner called the ‘father’ of the agreement – and 
the drive of Spain and Portugal towards a positive agreement with Mercosur. 
The impact of the Iberian membership of the EU at this stage is underesti-
mated in the literature. As this monograph has explained, the impact was 
more long-lasting than any other study has yet considered – it infl uenced 
both the second and third stage of the policy. 
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 EMIFCA ’ s external negotiations: the negotiations with Mercosur for the 
association agreement 
 The negotiations between Mercosur and the EU towards an association 
agreement were the most problematic of the whole EU policy covered in 
this monograph. This was mainly due to the lack of interest the EU showed 
in Mercosur ’ s agricultural sector. The fact that the teams of negotiators did 
not have complementary goals and were trying to get the best deal without 
sacrifi cing their own market competitiveness only complicated matters. In 
fact, playing around with their options led to the negotiations being char-
acterized as a ‘poker game’ (see  Russau  2005 ). At this stage, the EU was 
trying to protect its agricultural sector from the extreme competitiveness of 
Brazilian and Argentinean agricultural products. Similarly, Mercosur coun-
tries were trying to protect other sectors of their own national and regional 
economies. Furthermore, EU–Mercosur negotiations were not helped by the 
Doha Round of the WTO negotiations. This part of the policy lowers 
tremendously the level of EU commitment because the EU was not willing 
to overcome the obstacle of agricultural negotiations. Also, the EU ’ s level 
of ambition was not very high since it linked the EU–Mercosur negotiations 
to the WTO negotiations in a way that set the limits of the outcome of the 
EU–Mercosur agreement before the negotiations started. The level of 
engagement in this part of the policy lowers the previous levels. 
 EU–Mercosur negotiation meetings 
 As has already been discussed, Mercosur refused to include the Council ’ s 
negotiating mandate on a word-for-word basis. During the ministerial 
meeting of February 2000, before the fi rst EU–Mercosur Biregional Nego-
tiations Committee meeting, Mercosur countries insisted that they were not 
bound by that mandate and that they wanted the negotiations to address 
all issues ( Agence Europe  24/2/2000 ). In the area of political dialogue, it 
was argued that:
 Political co-operation between the Parties should cover the aspects of mutual 
interest and any other international issue the Parties should consider appropri-
ate to discuss in their Political Dialogue: Particularly, on the grounds of peace 
and stability, prevention of confl icts, confi dence and security building meas-
ures, promotion and protection of Human Rights, democracy and the Rule 
of law, sustainable development taking into account economic, social and 
environmental dimensions, common action against drug traffi cking and 
related felonies, arms traffi cking, organized crime and international terrorism. 
 ( EU–Mercosur  2000a ) 
 This statement makes it clear that Mercosur felt that the negotiations 
‘should consider [it] appropriate to discuss’ a full range of topics, but the 
objectives in this area are not clear. In the area of cooperation, there was 
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more organization and a number of groups were created in order to ensure 
the ‘smooth functioning of negotiations’ ( EU–Mercosur  2000a ). Further-
more, in the area of cooperation the structure of the discussion is clearer 
than in the area of political dialogue, implying that in this area both sides 
had a clear set of aims. The following subgroups were created at this 
meeting:
 1  In relation to the Subgroup on Economic Co-operation: industrial co-
operation, co-operation on technical regulations and conformity assess-
ment, co-operation in the fi eld of services, investment promotion, 
macro-economic dialogue, scientifi c and technological co-operation, 
energy co-operation, transports, telecommunications, information tech-
nology and information society, co-operation on agricultural and rural 
sector fi sheries, customs co-operation, statistic co-operation, environ-
mental co-operation, consumer protection and data protection; 
 2  In relation to the Subgroup on Social and Cultural Co-operation: social 
co-operation, education and training, social dialogue, drugs and related 
organised crime, cultural co-operation; 
 3  In relation to the Subgroup on Financial and Technical Co-operation: 
public administration modernisation, inter-institutional co-operation, 
co-operation on regional integration. ( EU–Mercosur  2000a ) 
 Finally, in the area of trade, the most important area in this agreement, it 
was considered essential that this agreement had proper organization and 
that these negotiations were planned in greater depth than the negotiations 
relating to cooperation. In order to achieve this, the following technical 
groups were created:
 1  Technical Group 1: trade in goods, covering both tariffs and non-tariff 
measures, including inter alia sanitary and phytosanitary measures, 
standards, technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures; 
antidumping and counter-vailing duties and safeguards, rules of origin, 
and customs procedures and mutual assistance in customs matters; 
 2  Technical Group 2: trade in services, intellectual property rights and 
measures to encourage an open and non-discriminatory investment 
climate; 
 3  Technical Group 3: government procurement, competition and dispute 
settlement. ( EU–Mercosur  2000a ) 
 It is clear that these trade discussions were far more wide-reaching and 
based on objectives that were both clear and straightforward. For example, 
these trade discussions aimed to develop the: ‘Exchange of information in 
all areas of negotiations; Discussion on specifi c objectives and modalities 
on non-tariff measures; Ways of addressing non-tariff obstacles to trade; 
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and exchange of working texts’ ( EU–Mercosur  2000a ). Furthermore, the 
unoffi cial discussion of non-tariff trade in the fi rst meeting, although it 
could not start offi cially until July 2001, proves the interest in developing 
trade. Table  6.1 gives a timeline of the meetings and discussions, in parallel 
with the development of the WTO 
 The Mercosur–EU Business Forum (MEBF) mentioned in the seventh 
meeting was established in 1999 to provide an informal forum for business 
people to identify what they regarded as the key issues in the trade and 
industrial relationship between the two regions. This forum was also created 
to develop recommendations to the public authorities of both regions, on 
steps that could be taken to improve market access, facilitate business 
dealings and encourage investment ( European Commission  1999 ). The 
twelfth meeting, which took place prior to the third summit of heads of 
state from the EU and Latin America in Guadalajara, was working towards 
the deadline of October 2004. The Guadalajara Summit included a discus-
sion on the offers exchanged prior to the summit. On 21 May 2004, the 
EU had prepared an improved offer on agriculture which would allow 
 Table 6.1  Timeline of EU–Mercosur meetings and the evolution of the WTO 
EU–Mercosur 
meeting











Political dialogue: agreement reached for an 
exchange of texts in relation to the third 
meeting.
 Cooperation: meetings of the different groups 
and discussions but nothing specifi c was 
agreed.
 Trade: exchange of information and the setting 
of some deadlines:
 •  By 30 June: both sides to exchange a list of 
names of experts in order to facilitate 
information exchange; 
 •  By 31 July: information requests identifi ed at 
the second round to be submitted; 
 •  By 31 July: analysis of information submitted 
so far and submission of follow-up questions; 
 •  By 30 September: both sides to submit new 
information requested in the follow-up 
questions, and the EU to submit a proposal 
regarding specifi c objectives. 
c06.indd   158 12/15/2016   6:45:02 PM
First attempt to negotiate the association agreement 159
EU–Mercosur 
meeting




Political dialogue: exchange of negotiating texts 
which was the basis for a draft of a joint text.
 Cooperation: less positive than in the political 
dialogue.
 Trade: more progress with the three technical 
groups working on specifi c issues and 
agreeing to send draft documents a month 







Political dialogue: discussion on the draft 
Mercosur had presented at the previous 
meeting and the draft that the EU sent in 
advance of the meeting.
 Cooperation: some joint texts were produced in 
the fi eld of social and cultural cooperation to 
be discussed in the following meeting.
 Trade: this group worked intensively and 
focused on the proposals put forward by 
both delegations. Also they agreed that 
experts from both sides would work together 
continuously and send proposals a month in 




Political dialogue: discussed draft joint texts.
 Cooperation: the subgroup on economic 
cooperation agreed on joint drafts in the area of 
customs cooperation, competition cooperation, 
statistics cooperation and scientifi c and 
technological cooperation. The subgroup on 
social and cultural cooperation also agreed on 
texts in the fi eld of cooperation in combating 
drugs and related organized crime.
 Trade: The EU presented its offer on tariffs and 
negotiating texts for good, services and 
procurement, including a progressive and 
reciprocal liberalization without excluding 




Political dialogue: more talks were held.
 Economic cooperation: more joint texts on the 
economic cooperation group were produced 
but nothing specifi c was agreed.
 Trade: An offer from Mercosur was presented 
in response to the offer presented by the EU 
during the previous meeting.
Table 6.1 Timeline of EU–Mercosur meetings and the evolution of the 
WTO—cont’d
Continued
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EU–Mercosur 
meeting




Political dialogue: agreed to improve the political 
and cooperation area of the negotiations as 
well as measures for business facilitation.
 Cooperation: the analysis was focused on the 
draft on the principles, objectives, nature and 
scope of the association, political dialogue and 
institutional framework. Parties examined the 
incorporation of the principle of ‘good 
governance’ and the regularity and content of 
meetings of heads of state and government.
 Trade: progress in the area of business facilitation 
where they analysed ‘trade facilitation 
measures with a view to their adoption in 
Madrid, taking into consideration the 
recommendations of the Mercosur–EU 
Business Forum. These included customs, 
standards, regulations and conformity 
assessment, sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures, and electronic commerce’ 





Tariffs: there was discussion relating to the 
methodology for market access and the EU 
made some offers, reminding Mercosur of 
the target date of 28 February 2003 agreed 
by both sides;
 Customs procedures: there was discussion of 
the EU proposal as well as a discussion on 
the negotiations of the regulation of the rules 
of origin.
 Services: there was a broad discussion on the 
objectives in this area and in relation to 
intellectual property rights. Both sides 
presented their proposals, which were 
circulated before the meeting, fi rst by Mercosur 
in March and then by the EU in October.
 Competition: the discussion was focused on a 
proposal made by the EU, leading to a 
consolidation paper being produced.
 Dispute settlement: both parties followed 
Mercosur ’ s text prepared on 9 October, but 
this time the EU offered to prepare a proposal 
for the next meeting instead of agreeing 
completely on the one produced by Mercosur.
 Business facilitation: indepth discussion of the 
proposal presented by Mercosur on the 
implementation of the measures agreed 
in Madrid.
Table 6.1 Timeline of EU–Mercosur meetings and the evolution of the 
WTO—cont’d
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EU–Mercosur 
meeting




Tariff offers: completed. There was a discussion 
relating to the Action Plan on Business 
Facilitation, cooperation for development, 









Tariff offers: some requests to improve the tariff 
offers on government procurement. The EU 
could not discuss anything without a Mercosur 
offer, but Mercosur was ready to discuss the 





















Hervé Juoanjean, the deputy director general of 
the Commission, highlighted the extreme 
importance for Brussels of this meeting to 
exchange improved offers on services, 




 Sources :  EU–Mercosur  ( 2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 2001a, 2001b, 2001c, 2002a, 2002b, 2003a, 
2003b, 2004a, 2004b ). 
Table 6.1 Timeline of EU–Mercosur meetings and the evolution of the 
WTO—cont’d
duty-free and preferential treatment that would cover more than 99% of 
current imports of agricultural products to the EU from Mercosur ( Euro-
pean Commission  2004 ). It was possible to complete the agreement in 
October 2004 because of the extra effort expended in the fi nal few months 
by both the EU and Mercosur. 
 The foundations for negotiations were ‘on the table’, according to Com-
missioner Franz Fischler before the Guadalajara Summit ( Agence Europe 
 27/5/2004 ). In June, Commissioner Pascal Lamy did not rule out the idea 
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of asking the Council to eliminate the link between the EU–Mercosur 
discussion and the WTO negotiations if there was enough progress since 
its discussions with Chile were already completed in that vein ( Agence 
Europe  28/5/2004 ). At this point, France was once again showing its 
opposition to the agreement by claiming that the situation was far from 
being concluded, at what was a very sensitive moment in the negotiations 
and just days before a deadlock was created ( Agence Europe  1/6/2004 ). 
Other actors present at the Biregional Negotiations Committee meetings 
were expecting there to be a successful ending to these discussions. 
However, the deadlock was created at the next meeting, in June 2004. This 
did not seem to worry Karl Falkenberg (the director general of trade) too 
much because he confi rmed that there was no reason to think that there 
would not be a successful conclusion by October 2004 ( Agence Europe 
 29/6/2004 ). The deadlock remained following the meeting held in July. In 
August, both sides started to blame each other for the continuing stale-
mate. Mercosur complained that the EU was not offering enough in terms 
of agricultural negotiations, whilst the Commission claimed that Merco-
sur ’ s offer on public tendering and services did not match EU expectations 
( Agence Europe  10/8/2004 ). At the end of September 2004, Mercosur put 
forward a new offer which was studied carefully by the Commission and 
individual EU member states in the Article 133 Committee ( Agence Europe 
 28/9/2004 ). A few days later, the EU improved its offer at the last minute, 
leaving almost no time for further negotiation, which suggests that the EU 
probably expected its offer to be accepted by Mercosur. It might be argued 
that the EU could have been more fl exible during the negotiations. The 
fact that there was a possibility of breaking the link between these negotia-
tions and the WTO negotiations but it was not pursued, shows a low level 
of commitment. 
 When October arrived, Portugal was the holder of the EU presidency. 
Despite this, there was no last-minute agreement this time, as had hap-
pened 1999 with the negotiation mandate. On this occasion, the blame 
was directed at Argentina because it decided, at the last minute, to wait 
to see what would happen in the WTO, much to the dismay of Pascal 
Lamy, who wanted to reach an agreement before his departure from the 
EU Commission (Interviewees 7 and 8). Therefore, it seems that both 
Falkenberg and Lamy had high expectations that there would be a suc-
cessful ending to the negotiations. It could also be argued that both 
Falkenberg and Lamy offered as much as they thought it would take to 
get Mercosur to accept the offer, even though neither made any further 
last-minute offers in order to secure an agreement. This might be seen as 
a typical behaviour when negotiating trade agreements, but it reduces the 
level of ambition to reach an agreement since it seems that they could 
have done much more. 
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 The negotiations and the WTO 
 In the discussion above it was suggested that the negotiations were inten-
tionally linked to the outcome of the WTO negotiations in terms of the 
mandate that the EU Council gave to the Commission. However, the Com-
mission did consider asking the Council to take that link out of the directives 
during the negotiations. There were many offers, and there is not room here 
to discuss the technicalities of the negotiations, but Table  6.2 provides an 
outline of the offer made by the EU in September 2004. This was the most 
signifi cant offer because it is the last offer to be made by the EU and is 
clearly linked to the WTO negotiations. 
 Table 6.2  EU tariff-rate quotas offer, September 2004 







Bovine meat 10% 60,000 40,000
Pork meat  € 125/tonne net (5%–10% AVE) 6,000 5,000
Poultry meat  € 49.7/tonne net (1%–5% AVE) 45,000 30,000
Milk and 
cream powder
 € 640/tonne net (30%–66% AVE) 6,500 6,500
Butter  € 434/tonne net (19%–21% AVE) 2,000 2,000
Cheese  € 401.4/ tonne net (7%–17% AVE) 10,000 10,000
Garlic 4.8% 6,000 4,000
Bananas  € 37.5/tonne net (12% AVE) 30,000 0
Low quality 
wheat
 € 6/tonne (5% AVE) 120,000 80,000
Maize  € 24.5/tonne (4%–8% AVE) 400,000 300,000
Rice  € 29/tonne (7%–17% AVE) 26,000 14,000
Ethanol $5.1–9.7/hl (9%–23% AVE) 600,000 400,000
 Source :  Kutas  ( 2006 ). 
 Note :  AVE: ad valorem equivalent (a tariff that is not a percentage (e.g.  € /tonne) can be 
estimated as a percentage of the price using the ad valorem equivalent. 
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 During the fi rst step (see Table  6.2 ),
 [The tariff-rate quotas] will be carried out through equal instalments over a 
period of 10 years, starting from the entry into force of the agreement … As 
regards the second quantity, the volume granted to Mercosur is linked to the 
WTO negotiations in the Doha Round because the EU does not want to ‘pay 
twice’. As a consequence, the second quantity that Mercosur will effectively 
obtain will be inversely linked to the increase in the current volume of the 
EU WTO TRQs [tariff-rate quotas] that will be negotiated at the WTO. For 
every percentage point of increase in the EU bound WTO TRQs, the second 
quantity devoted to Mercosur shall be reduced by a corresponding fi ve per-
centage points. Therefore, if no increase of EU bound TRQs is negotiated at 
the Doha Round, Mercosur shall be granted the full second quantity men-
tioned … Conversely, if the Doha Round results in an increase equal or 
superior to 20%, no second quantity shall be given to Mercosur. Finally, if 
an increase of 10% of the bound TRQs is negotiated at the WTO, Mercosur 
shall be granted half of the second quantity.  ( Kutas  2006 : 37) 
 As pointed out by  Kutas  ( 2006 ), an increase in imports in the WTO 
negotiations does not necessarily mean that Mercosur would be the one 
obtaining the increase since it will compete with the other WTO members. 
In other words, an agreement within the WTO includes other actors, 
therefore, the amount of imports that the EU will allow to enter the 
European market in certain conditions is offered to all the WTO members. 
However, the EU–Mercosur negotiations only allow Mercosur countries to 
have access to the European market under the conditions agreed. 
 Lack of interest: lack of commitment and ambition? 
 In terms of interest shown by the EU towards Mercosur, EU Commissioner 
Chris Patten explained what could be considered to be the offi cial line since 
the same speech was given by a member of the Council Secretariat (Inter-
viewee 4) and a permanent representative of a country (Interviewee 9). 
Patten claimed that
 Mercosur is today an area of peace, progress and growing prosperity. It may 
still have many challenges to overcome (economic development, social justice, 
and environmental degradation). But its efforts during the past decade to 
restore democracy, and the respect of human rights, and to restructure and 
open up its economies are to be applauded. Some say that the European Union 
does not suffi ciently recognise this reality. They say we do not assign suffi cient 
priority to its relationship with the Mercosur countries delegating them to a 
second division when it comes to the attention we pay them. I would like to 
answer those critics honestly. I say to you: there is inevitably some truth in 
that Mercosur takes up less of the European Union ’ s time than other parts of 
the world. And we – and the countries of Mercosur – should be grateful for 
that. Because Mercosur does not need to be a priority like the gruesome war 
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in Kosovo. Or the bloody slaughter in Chechnya. Or the killing fi elds 
in Rwanda. Or the human misery following Hurricane Mitch.  (EU–Mercosur 
 2000c ) 
 Despite acknowledging that the EU had not given Mercosur the same 
attention as other regions, the speech outlined an argument for why the EU 
had not done so. Patten failed to mention why other countries that were 
former colonies of the UK and France, such as ACP countries or the Medi-
terranean countries, or even ASEAN countries, had a larger share of the 
EU ’ s attention than other regions such as Mercosur. 
 Within the EP, the view was different from the one put forward by Patten. 
For example, José Ignacio Salafranca, a Spanish MEP, argued that ‘discrimi-
nation towards this [Latin America] continent in EU external relations is 
not justifi ed’ ( Agence Europe  1/3/2001 ). In relation to discrimination, a 
Brazilian ambassador pointed out that ‘it is a well-known fact that the 
Member States are less enthusiastic about these negotiations than the Com-
mission’ ( Agence Europe  7/11/2002 ). During the negotiations, Spanish 
MEPs Marset Campos and Salafranca also directed their comments directly 
at Commissioner Patten. The MEPs provided a report with suggestions for 
changing the negotiating mandate. This report requested a specifi cation of 
the legal basis of the agreement and the elimination of the link to the WTO 
( Agence Europe  8/2/2001 ). As has already been noted, the negotiation 
mandate did not change, and in 2001 Patten was not ready even to con-
template the type of change that Lamy considered in 2004. In addition to 
this, the link between the agreement negotiations and the WTO negotiations 
still remained intact. In relation to the legal basis, Patten explained that it 
was not going to be just a mere trade agreement, but an association agree-
ment ( European Commission  2001a ;  Agence Europe  1/3/2001 ). Further-
more, he also stated that the exact articles for the legal basis could only be 
determined at the end of the negotiations, as had been done during similar 
negotiations ( European Commission  2001a ;  Agence Europe  1/3/2001 ). The 
EP also asked for the discussions to be based on Article 310 (ex Article 
238) ( Agence Europe  1/3/2001 ). 
 In the previous chapter there was an analysis of the legal base for the 
agreements compared to other EU agreements. It was clear from Patten ’ s 
comments (on the negotiations with the WTO) that it would continue to 
be ambiguous and imprecise. When an agreement is so ambiguous and open 
to interpretation as this one was, the personal commitment and diplomatic 
skills of the individuals involved can carry enormous weight. But having in 
mind the lack of interest in Mercosur, in this case it has to be assumed that 
there was a lack of ambition, characterized by the ambiguous nature of the 
agreement. 
 This shows that the EU may not have had a clear strategy because once 
again it appears that if Mercosur wanted to develop a broader relationship 
with the EU then Mercosur would have to be the one demanding such a 
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relationship and would also have to be the fl exible side during the negotia-
tions. It could also be argued that this was yet another occasion where the 
EU assumed the role of the reactive actor that simply responded to the 
demands of Mercosur in a way that appeared to depend upon who was in 
charge of the EU ’ s negotiation team. Furthermore, it seems that the success 
of these negotiations may have depended upon the EU negotiator rather 
than the EU having a clear and coherent policy agenda. This argument 
is supported by the fact there was so much disagreement between EU 
member states. This lack of strategy does not help to support a good level 
of ambition. 
 This section has shown again the importance given by the Spanish and 
Portuguese in the Commission or the EP to these negotiations. It is clear 
that the efforts of the Iberian countries in the different EU institutions 
helped to advance EU–Mercosur negotiations. Again this refl ects the path 
dependence created with the Iberian membership of the EU. 
 After the failure to reach an agreement in October 2004, the next 
important stage in EU–Latin American relations and policy development 
was the political partnership that the EU offered to Brazil in 2008. This 
was part of the EU ’ s strategy which aimed to establish new political partner-
ships with the leaders in other regions such as Brazil, Russia, India and 
China. Although this was the offi cial line, one interviewee (Interviewee 9) 
claimed that this was a direct decision taken by the president of the Com-
mission, José Manuel Barroso. It seems that Argentina asked for a similar 
agreement but it was not accepted. 
 The role of other actors 
 This section will examine the role played by the other actors during this 
stage of EU–Mercosur relations and policy development. It begins by 
considering the role of the EU Commission and various commissioners and 
moves on to discuss the role played by civil society. 
 The Commission and commissioners 
 The reasons for each commissioner ’ s support or opposition for the agree-
ment had different roots. The Spanish commissioner, Marin, was the most 
involved in the agreement and his support was not matched by the others. 
Marin left his post in 1999 when the whole Commission resigned under 
allegations of corruption; it has been proved since then that he was not 
involved in the corruption case at all. The negotiations restarted, but there 
was more trouble ahead for EU–Mercosur relations. Arguably, with Marin 
still in charge of the portfolio, the agreement could have been reached. 
Marin played an important role until two of the most diffi cult aspects of 
the agreements were successfully resolved. He proved to be very persistent 
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during the negotiations leading to the signature of EMIFCA, as well as being 
very determined at the beginning of the negotiations in 1999. The predis-
position of the Spanish commissioner during the negotiations was very 
different to that of other commissioners, particularly in relation to trade 
issues (Interviewee 2). Spanish commissioners were said to be more willing 
to give better offers, as well as being prepared to tell Mercosur actors that 
other commissioners would not be willing to do the same (Interviewees 1 
and 2). Furthermore, the attitude and skills of individual negotiators is a 
variable that tends to be underestimated when analysing the success or 
failure of these cases (Interviewee 2). 
 Chris Patten argued that ‘What is at stake in the negotiations between 
the EU and Mercosur is the possibility for a strategic, political and economic 
alliance between the only two real common markets in the world’ ( EU–
Mercosur  2000c ). Using phrases and terms such as ‘alliance’ and ‘the only 
two real markets in the world’, Patten ’ s statement appears to suggest that 
the actions of the EU were very much part of a clear strategy. It sounds as 
if EU relations with Mercosur were based on the EU ’ s interests and the EU ’ s 
position in the world. However, Patten later went on to adopt a more 
normative position when claiming that
 The prospective association agreement will not only provide for short-term 
fi nancial gains and closer political ties. It will create a free trade area covering 
nearly 600 million people. By doing this, it will generate democratic develop-
ment, growing prosperity and respect of human rights. Where prosperity 
reigns, democracy and human rights can take fi rm root.  ( EU–Mercosur  2000c ) 
 These claims appear to focus more on the idea of promoting human rights, 
democracy based on the economic development of a region, which is 
normal. Patten then went on to claim: ‘A fair distribution of wealth and 
the elimination of extreme poverty make sense not only politically, but also 
economically: with increases in consumption capacity comes new invest-
ment possibilities’ ( EU–Mercosur  2000c ). 
 Nowhere in this speech does Patten appear to provide a clear reason for 
an association agreement in terms of political or trade interests. It could be 
argued that this ambiguity was due to the lack of a real EU strategy prior 
to this agreement and the fact that the EU had adopted the role of being 
reactive to Mercosur requests. The requests that the Mercosur put forward 
to the EU were channelled through Marin, who was extremely committed 
to improving EU–Mercosur relations. In fact, in Latin America some dip-
lomats complained that Patten was less sensitive to the problems of the 
region than Manuel Marin ( El País  17/11/2002 ). When Marin had to leave 
after the problematic Santer Commission, cooperation and aid to the region 
decreased tremendously ( El País  15/7/2000 ). Under Prodi, the number of 
staff in the Latin America section of the Commission was less than half of 
previous levels ( El País  15/7/2000 ). 
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 In contrast to Patten, Pascal Lamy, the trade commissioner, considered 
EU–Mercosur policy to be of great strategic importance to the EU. In 2000, 
Argentina complained about the absence of high-level European representa-
tives during the EU–Mercosur meetings held on the fringes of the UN 
Assembly. When the MEBF scheduled for September 2000 was cancelled, 
Lamy responded by saying that ‘increasing the pressure is part of the tactics’ 
of negotiation – as if the cancellation was nothing more than a game. He 
continued, ‘The negotiations will take time. The Mercosur is very compli-
cated: compared to it, the European Union seems to be a monster of simplic-
ity. We have a mandate from the Council that we are following’ ( Agence 
Europe  20/9/2000 ). 
 It would also seem that Lamy ’ s trip to Brazil was of strategic importance. 
For example, he claimed that, ‘As a central pillar of both Mercosur and the 
WTO, Brazil is a unique and essential partner for the EU. During my visit 
I look forward to further cementing our trading relationship in both the 
regional and multilateral contexts’ ( European Commission  2001b ). 
 Therefore, it could be argued that the EU ’ s interest in establishing strong 
links with Brazil was evident as early as 2000. Furthermore, Lamy also 
explained:
 It follows that this negotiation must not detract our attention from the pursuit 
of the Doha Development Agenda. I am glad that this is a view fi rmly shared 
by Mercosur countries. Why does the EU care about Mercosur? Because 
above and beyond providing a market to our exports and stability to the 
region, Mercosur reinforces the multi-polar nature of the international system. 
 ( European Commission  2002a ) 
 This would suggest that, for Lamy at least, developing EU–Mercosur rela-
tions, particularly in the area of trade relations, was, to a certain extent, 
part of the EU ’ s wider inter-regional agenda. 
 Civil society 
 The EU ’ s Economic and Social Committee has always supported relations 
with Mercosur. However, it does not seem to have been particularly infl u-
ential. As early as 1997, the Economic and Social Committee (ESC) from 
the EU met with Mercosur ’ s Foro Consultativo Economico y Social (FCES). 
To mark the fi rst offi cial meeting in Montevideo on 16 December 1997, 
both parties signed a ‘Memorandum of understanding for institutional 
cooperation between the Economic and Social Consultative Forum of 
Mercosur (FCES) and the Economic and Social Committee of the European 
Communities (ESC-EC)’ ( European Commission  1998a ). This memoran-
dum of understanding provided for: ‘a regular exchange of information and 
experience, possible joint projects and studies, technical assistance and 
familiarization visits. It was agreed that a working meeting should be held 
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once a year when the joint work programme would be drawn up’ ( European 
Commission  1998b ). It was also agreed that this alliance would: ‘Pursue 
the establishment of an ESC–FCES Joint Consultative Committee within 
the framework of the inter-regional political and economic association 
agreement, in order to institutionalize their discussions’ ( European Com-
mission  1998b ). 
 The business sector was arguably the most active body to lobby the EU 
in terms of developing EU–Mercosur trade initiatives, prioritizing an agree-
ment between the EU and Mercosur as soon as possible. As explained earlier 
in this chapter, the MEBF was created to provide an:
 informal forum for business people to identify what they regard as the key 
issues in the trade and industrial relationship between the two regions and to 
come up with recommendations to the public authorities of both sides on 
steps that could be taken to improve market access, facilitate doing business 
and encourage investment.  ( European Commission  1999 ) 
 The MEBF was also very much are aware of its own infl uence. For example, 
it was claimed that:
 Many of our recommendations, including the ones made during the last 
MEBF Plenary Conference held in Brasilia in October 2003, have been 
adopted by offi cials of the European Commission and the Mercosur Govern-
ments and are now at the core of their current negotiation agenda, while some 
others are subject to deep discussion.  ( MEBF  2004 : 3) 
 Pascal Lamy also supported this initiative because he supported the idea 
of liberalizing inter-regional trade ( European Commission  2001b ). In fact, 
the meetings that were held during the negotiations helped both sides in 
the area of business facilitation to the point that it created an EU–Mer-
cosur Action Plan on Business Facilitation agreement; Commissioner 
Liikanen from enterprise and society and Lamy and Patten thanked the 
forum for its proposals ( European Commission  2002a ). In fact, Liikanen 
said, ‘I am very pleased with the positive results of this week ’ s meeting. 
Our dialogue with the Mercosur–EU Businesses Forum is part of the 
strengthening of our dialogue with civil society in both regions’ ( European 
Commission  2002b ). 
 However, despite praising the efforts of the MEBF, Liikanen did not 
discuss the role played by other parts of civil society that were not repre-
sented in these negotiations, such as the efforts by the Economic and Social 
Forum. Therefore, it could be argued that those groups in civil society, such 
as the MEBF and the agriculture groups, were the groups that the EU either 
listened to or were infl uenced by. However, agriculture groups, particularly 
European ones, had a different view of the EU–Mercosur agreement. For 
example, the largest associations, COPA and the General Committee for 
Agricultural Cooperation in the European Union, complained about the 
agreement from the very beginning. Nevertheless, it seems that these groups 
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infl uenced EU policy towards Mercosur because agricultural issues were an 
important factor for why such an agreement was not reached. And fi nally, 
the evidence presented in this section also suggests that the EU did not have 
a coherent policy agenda towards Mercosur beyond the development of 
trade relations. 
 EU engagement in Mercosur 
 There are several pieces of evidence that suggest a top level of ambition. 
Priority was given to the development of an association agreement, the fi rst 
trade agreement between two regions in history. The Joint Committee that 
was created supports a good level of ambition. The level of ambition within 
the EU has varied, and that has had an impact on the overall ambition. 
Spain and Portugal have been the most pro-Mercosur, and on the opposite 
side, Ireland and France were critical of Mercosur due to the importance 
of the agricultural sector in their countries. It should be noted that agricul-
ture is still very much an important sector in Spain and Portugal but their 
links to Latin America were more important, generally speaking. As in the 
previous chapters, the level of ambition should not be overestimated since 
the ambition on the part of Mercosur helped increase ambition on the EU 
side. Once the negotiations had been started, the level of ambition increased 
again, as they were working towards the achievement of an association 
agreement, which was considered a privileged agreement. 
 On the negative side, the ambition shown so far defl ated due to the fact 
that the EU did not do everything it could have done to achieve an agree-
ment with Mercosur, as shown by the linking of the negotiations with the 
WTO, and the fact that the EU did not try to improve its offer in order to 
secure the agreement (Figure  6.1 ). 
 The change of actors within the Commission played a big part in the 
lack of full ambition. Once Marin left, commissioners Lamy and Patten did 
not ever intend to pursue the same level of ambition. 
 In order to assess the level of commitment it is necessary to pay attention 
to different indicators. Here the picture is less positive, since the EU ’ s 
actions did not match its level of ambition. For example, in relation to the 
Joint Committee, the lack of progress for several years was due to the lack 
of commitment shown by some actors in the EU, including the French and 
Irish commissioners and the commissioner of agriculture. The lack of fi nal 
agreement is the best example of how the EU did not do its best to achieve 
a successful outcome; it has been shown that there were other unpursued 
options that could have improved the negotiations. The insistence on the 
linking of the negotiations to the WTO and the lack of agreement in the 
agricultural sector do not show a high level of commitment (Figure  6.2 ). 
 If there is more ambition than commitment, the EU ’ s behaviour could 
be described as having more strategy than interest, or pretending to be more 
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 Figure 6.1  Level of ambition: third stage 
Scenario 2: High
EU official policy pronouncements
Promises to Mercosur






 Figure 6.2  Level of commitment: third stage 
Scenario 2: High
Substanal content of agreements and of
offers during the negoaons
Aid, funding, or technical help provided by the EU
Meengs either official or unofficial at any level: civil servant level,








interested than it really is. In the case that there is more commitment than 
ambition, there would be more interest than strategy. In that case it would 
seem that the EU was not very organized. Altogether, ambition and com-
mitment show the real engagement of the EU. 
 As a consequence of all of this, the assessment of the level of engagement 
is high, is the highest level of the whole policy. Table  6.3 shows the assess-
ment of the dependent variable in the three stages. Once the dependent 
variable has been assessed and compared with the values given at this stage 
of the policy to the independent variables of the six competing arguments, 
the conclusion is that none of the six independent variables reached the 
level of of the dependent variable (see Table  6.4 ). 
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 As with the previous chapters, the fi nal section here will consider the six 
different expectations that were laid out at the beginning of this monograph, 
to assess whether the evidence presented above supports any of these 
arguments. 
 Counterbalancing the US 
 The argument based on the notion that, if the EU was trying to counterbal-
ance the infl uence of the US, it would lead to an increase in the EU ’ s 
involvement in Latin America does not seem applicable during the period 
1996–2004. Not only did the commissioners have different views, many of 
the EU member states were opposed to the agreement. It should also be 
clear by now that there was not a clear strategy towards the region. On top 
of that, the aforementioned FTAA that had threatened the EU–Mercosur 
agreement was dead before the EU–Mercosur deadlock of October 2004 
( El País  9/7/2004 ), yet the negotiations between the EU and Mercosur 
continued. It is also quite clear that the EU did not want and was not 
capable of competing with the US (Interviewee 4). Pascal Lamy, who was 
in charge of trade, was extremely clear about how much the actions of the 
US were an infl uence upon him: ‘I am not going to lose any sleep about 
Bob Zoellick pursuing an FTA with Morocco … any more than he is 
worried about me doing one with Mexico’ ( Agence Europe  5/11/2003 ). The 
EU would not have been able to compete with the US in Latin America, 
even if it had wanted to. Certainly, there were declarations made by some 
EU members about the intention to compete with the US, such as those 
made by Chirac ( El País  11/3/1997 ), but once again it is clear that France 
 Table 6.3  Measurement of the dependent variable, engagement: third stage 
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was never entirely serious about doing so because it was opposed to the 
agreement all the way through. Furthermore, Patten himself commented on 
how:
 Some wish that the EU compete in LA with the US. It is not our intention, 
the US has a geopolitical and strategic relation that no other region can have. 
There is a geographic continuity, a great economic interdependence and 
common problems of security and an exchange of population that cannot be 
compared with the one existing in Latin America and the EU.  ( El País 
 17/11/2002 ) 
 Global aspirations 
 The global aspirations argument expects that an increase in the EU ’ s 
involvement in Latin America would be an important part of the developing 
agenda of the EU in which the EU would play a greater role in the inter-
national arena. It is diffi cult to support this argument at this point because 
there were some questions about the usefulness of FTAs and of the ill-
thought-out promises the EU made towards third world countries. Further-
more, the Commission was seen as incompetent when developing a global 
agenda: ‘The criticisms are addressed fi rst and foremost to the European 
Commission, which does not seem to have developed a comprehensive 
debate on this problem and appears to have launched its free trade plans 
without due consideration’ ( Agence Europe  14/2/1996 ). To be more 
accurate:
 If Vice-President Marin was given the responsibility of relations with the 
Mediterranean and South African countries, what could be more normal than 
for him to take initiatives to build closer relations? … It is the other Com-
missioner who must point out the repercussions of free trade areas on the 
sectors under their responsibility. The President must impose comprehensive 
refl ection on the effects of free trade areas.  ( Agence Europe  14/2/1996 ) 
 It seems clear that there has been a lack of coordination within the 
Commission, let alone the Council, when developing FTAs. It also seems 
apparent that the main actors developing the agreements are the commis-
sioners in charge of geographical portfolios. For example, a few months later 
it was also clear that the Agriculture Council shared the Italian president of 
the EU ’ s position in relation to the increase in the number of proposed areas 
of free trade conceived in Brussels and that an increase in goods imported 
from Latin America would have a detrimental effect on the agricultural sector 
in the EU ( Agence Europe  7/5/1996 ). Again there is a mix of interests in the 
EU related to FTAs with third world countries that makes it diffi cult to 
support the argument that the EU ’ s relationship with Latin America was a 
constituent feature of a strategy designed to strengthen the EU ’ s presence in 
the global arena, because no such strategy actually existed. 
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 With the Prodi Commission, Patten relaunched the debate on EU policy 
towards third countries with a paper in which he questioned the whole 
organization. Among other things, Patten claimed: ‘certain Member States’ 
invitations to the Commission are more like Mafi a offers that cannot be 
refused’ ( Agence Europe  8/6/2000 ); instead, regarding external relations, he 
supported ‘the necessity of establishing a rigorous hierarchy of priorities, 
and the requirement of making available fi nancial means corresponding to 
objectives’ ( Agence Europe  8/6/2000 ). 
 If the commissioner in charge of EU external relations questions the 
organization of the Commission, it seems that the EU had failed to develop 
a clear strategy towards Mercosur. Therefore, it is hardly possible to talk 
about EU global strategy. Instead, it seems that the EU Commission was a 
place where different national interests were pursued rather than the EU 
Commission pursuing a unifi ed strategy agenda. On top of this, Pascal 
Lamy, the commissioner in charge of trade, questioned the usefulness of 
FTAs with third countries, claiming that
 I personally believe this kind of traditional free trade area of the 20th century, 
based on total market liberalisation, to be a formula that is today a little 
outdated despite its political symbolism. If we want the trade and investment 
relationships to reach their full potential, then we should tackle the regulatory 
obstacles, and, for the time being, put our ‘ambitions’ aside with regards to 
market access, leaving that to the multilateral arena where it belongs. Frankly 
speaking, the diffi culty that Europe experiences with the idea of a free trade 
area is that it is not absolutely clear that this is what our trade relations really 
need.  ( Agence Europe  14/1/2003 ) 
 Here, the person in charge of the portfolio of trade is against the very idea 
of creating FTAs between countries. In fact, Lamy ’ s comments suggest that 
there was an obvious lack of agreement, plan or strategy towards third 
countries within the EU. If this was the case at this stage in policy develop-
ment towards Mercosur (1996–2004), then it is diffi cult to accept the 
existence of a global strategy in the previous stages of the EU–Mercosur 
policy. 
 External federator 
 In the area of regional promotion, the EU continued to provide funding 
and the transfer of know-how. This is something the EU had done from 
the very fi rst moment and reinforced it with the agreement based on 
region-to-region negotiations. This means that the EU was demanding 
that Mercosur comply with a common external and internal tariff in order 
to be able to negotiate trade issues between the regions. Therefore, when 
the Commission voiced its frustration at the lack of integration as one 
of the reasons for the lack of an agreement, it seems possible that the 
main force for the EU policy towards Mercosur was the development of 
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a regional group that was modelled on the institutional framework of the 
EU. To copy the EU ’ s structural framework would be extremely fl attering 
as well as giving the EU further infl uence in Latin America. However, 
the Commission was not going to force regional integration on Latin 
America. In fact, interviewees suggested that there was only so much that 
the Commission could do if the countries in Latin America did not want to 
integrate (Interviewees 7 and 8). The problem was that, when the EU was 
promoting regional integration on the one hand and on the other hand was 
offering a political partnership to Brazil in 2008, it was sending a message 
which undermined any suggestion that the EU was committed to regional 
integration and establishing inter-regional relations with Latin America as 
a whole. In other words, by showing preferential treatment to a particular 
member of Mercosur, the EU was not demonstrating a solid commitment to 
regional integration in Latin America in terms of a coherent policy agenda 
(Interviewee 9). 
 Affi nity 
 The argument that the EU ’ s involvement in Latin America would increase 
because of the historical ties and shared values between the regions is dif-
fi cult to sustain during the third stage of EU–Mercosur relations. This is 
evident in the fact that most EU member states showed a serious lack of 
interest in the region. The discussion throughout this chapter has shown 
that individual commissioners have also shown either opposition or a dis-
tinct lack of interest in developing relations with Latin America. More 
specifi cally, the discussion above has shown that the EU did not express a 
desire to develop EU–Mercosur policy as a consequence of long-standing 
political, economic or cultural ties and values. 
 Interdependence 
 The argument which suggested that an increase in the EU’ s involvement 
in Latin America would develop as a consequence of increasing trade and 
FDI in Mercosur cannot be supported at this stage. The infl uence of business 
associations such as MEBF was higher in Latin America than in the EU 
because the Mercosur was producing more information on business-related 
issues. In terms of trade, it has been shown that Latin America was of 
minimal importance to the EU, hence there had been a lack of agreements 
between the two regions. Furthermore, if the EU did have any real interest 
in Latin America, then the development of any relations/policies would have 
been restricted to agricultural issues rather than more substantial levels of 
inter-regional interdepence. 
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 Spanish and Portuguese infl uence in the EU 
 The argument which suggested that there would be an increase in the EU ’ s 
interest in Latin America as a result of the infl uence of Iberian countries in 
the EU is also not sustainable when looking at EU–Mercosur relations 
between 1996 and 2004 because the preparations for the 2004 enlargement 
had an impact on the infl uence of Spain and Portugal, which after 2004 
was completely diluted when ten new countries joined the EU. Nevertheless, 
the Iberian countries continued to support Mercosur and did try to infl uence 
the policy towards Mercosur. Despite this, the Iberian countries were unable 
to develop any substantial policy developments. To some extent, Spain and 
Portugal had undoubtedly been the biggest supporters of EU–Mercosur 
policy within the EU. During this stage of EU–Mercosur relations, Spanish 
offi cials in the Commission (Marin), in the EP (Spanish MEPs such as 
Salafranca) and in the Council (Aznar or Zapatero) persistently showed 
their commitment to developing EU–Mercosur relations. However, it seems 
that they were not able to achieve the type of progress and policies that 
they would have wanted and, in the end, the lack of an agreement proves 
just how little power they had within the EU. This is most evident in relation 
to the Prodi Commission, when Marin was no longer a commissioner. More 
specifi cally, during this time the Latin American section in the Commission 
was downgraded, levels of interest decreased, as did the levels of coopera-
tion and aid given to Latin America, which show just how little the Iberian 
countries were able to achieve. Finally, this stage of the policy demonstrates 
how Spain and Portugal were not strong enough to further develop a degree 
of Europeanization that would have made possible the agreement between 
the two regions. 
 Conclusion 
 This chapter has discussed the third phase of the EU policy towards Mer-
cosur. The fi rst section outlined the diffi culties encountered until the 
negotiating directive was approved in 1999. Here it was argued that the 
diffi culties were mainly due to the opposition shown by France. It was also 
explained that it was the infl uence of Spain and the Latin American coun-
tries that fi nally led to the fi rst summit of the heads of state of Latin America 
and the EU. In the second part of the chapter, the discussion focused on the 
negotiations and how EU interest in Latin America declined during this 
period. The discussions were intimately connected to the importance of the 
WTO negotiations. It was suggested that agricultural issues were the main 
obstacle to an agreement being reached and as a result policy negotiations 
were unsuccessfully concluded in October 2004, just before the change of 
Commission. It was also suggested that the EU showed a change in direction 
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in terms of its approach to relation with Mercosur. More specifi cally, the 
EU regional policy towards Latin America was undermined by the decision 
to offer a political partnership to Brazil, the largest and least integrated 
member of Mercosur. The fi nal section of this chapter focused on the main 
actors involved in shaping EU policy towards Mercosur by paying attention 
to the individuals’ position during this phase of EU–Mercosur relations. 
Looking at the arguments laid out in the introduction to this book, none 
of the expectations has any real purchase in terms of explaining policy 
development between the two regions. In fact, it could be argued that this 
is the case because of the EU ’ s general lack of interest in the region. 
 Considering the evidence offered above, the EU engagement has been 
assessed as high. More specifi cally, in relation to ambition, the Joint Com-
mittee shows evidence of ambition in both the EU and Mercosur in achiev-
ing an association agreement. The development of an association agreement 
which includes the fi rst inter-regional FTA is quite exceptional. But, as in 
the previous stages of the policy, caution should be taken when analysing 
the level of ambition, since the pressure from Mercosur countries to achieve 
progress has been key for the development of the policy, which undermines 
the level of EU ambition. An example of this was the pressure put on the 
French embassies to achieve the signing of the negotiating mandate. The 
fact that the EU did not offer enough concessions to achieve the association 
agreement since it was linked to the WTO negotiations also undermines the 
apparent ambition. With the departure of Marin, the Commission had 
lower ambition, as the pronouncements of commissioners Lamy and Patten 
showed. 
 In relation to commitment, the outcome is similar for ambition because, 
even though the negotiations were launched, the commitment was slow. 
This is shown in the lack of progress in the Joint Committee, to the point 
where it was embarrassing for the EU representatives, who had to come up 
with snapshots and other exercises to gain time. Moreover, the EU did not 
achieve a successful end of the negotiations. As a consequence, the assess-
ment given to commitment is high. And, since ambition achieved the same 
assessment, the fi nal outcome is high. 
 Finally, this chapter has shown that the EU did not have a clear and 
coherent strategy towards Mercosur. Instead, the EU tended to follow both 
the initiatives and interests put forward by the Iberian countries, and the 
EU once again undertook the role of the responsive actor that simply 
reacted to the demands of Mercosur countries. 
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 The second attempt to negotiate the 
association agreement 
 Introduction 
 From the moment the EU and Mercosur stopped negotiations there was no 
progress or a real intention to restart the negotiations until 2010. Offi cially 
the EU and Mercosur continued negotiating the association agreement, but 
it is fair to say that after such a failure at the last minute in October 2004, 
both sides had become cautious in their hopes for a successful agreement. 
Considering that the negotiations had failed publicly, it is understandable 
that some years of ‘healing’ were needed before a new attempt could be 
broached. 
 One more time, the right momentum was necessary to facilitate the 
relaunch of the negotiations. The economic environment was completely 
different from 2004. At this moment Europe was recovering from a fi nancial 
crisis and from a weak eurozone, while the international crisis had not had 
that much of an effect in Latin America. However, in 2004 Brazil and 
Argentina were recovering from the economic crisis of the late 1990s and 
early 2000s. The negotiations between the EU and other Latin American 
regional groups and individual countries had been successful. At the same 
time, a third major investor and trader became an important piece of the 
puzzle – China. To some extent this could be seen as a more promising 
context for reaching a successful agreement between the EU and Mercosur. 
The facilitator of the relaunching of the negotiations was once again the 
Spanish presidency of 2010. Since then, several meetings have taken place 
between the EU and Mercosur, the last one in Brussels in mid-June 2015. 
Throughout 2015, a new kind of scenario became possible – a two-speed 
type of negotiation: one with Brazil and other countries such as Uruguay 
and Paraguay, and another one with Argentina. Venezuela did not partici-
pate in the negotiations because its protectionist approach made it particu-
larly diffi cult for the country to take part. Venezuela ’ s restricted participation 
was further complicated by the fact that it became a member of Mercosur 
after the negotiations had already started. Considering both the views of 
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Evo Morales and the economic development of this Andean country, 
Bolivia ’ s potential membership of Mercosur would also further slow down 
the negotiations. 
 The overall argument is again supported through these negotiations. The 
EU ’ s policy towards Mercosur is a reaction to the agenda being put forward 
by other actors. Mercosur in general and Brazil in particular are very keen 
to develop an agreement after the failure of the Doha Round. The facilita-
tion of the negotiations had been made possible by the continued interest 
of the Iberian countries, especially Spain. The fact that Mercosur countries 
are willing to negotiate individually with the EU indicates how keen and 
proactive they are to develop this agreement. The diplomatic efforts of 
Spain were necessary in order to: (1) facilitate dialogue between the two 
regions; (2) bring Mercosur ’ s views to the EU table; and (3) pursue a 
favourable EU reaction to Mercosur ’ s suggestions. 
 The relaunch of the negotiations and the actors involved 
 The relaunching of the negotiations, as has been mentioned, was during the 
2010 summit in Madrid. Although the negotiations had stopped in 2004, 
it did not mean a complete breakdown of the relationship. In fact, at the 
2008 EU–Mercosur summit in Lima an agreement was signed to expand 
relations to three new areas: science and technology, infrastructure and 
renewable energy. 
 Leaders emphasized the close cultural, economic and political values 
which bonded the two regions together. They underlined that, with a 
combined population of more than 700 million people, high combined GDP 
and biregional trade close to  € 100 billion annually, cooperation between 
the two blocs generates reciprocal advantages and positive spillovers at the 
global level. ‘The leaders are aware that substantial efforts will have to be 
made, and underlined their full commitment to engage in these negotiations’ 
(EU–Mercosur). Both sides stressed their commitment to strive for a conclu-
sion of the negotiations without delay’ (EU–Mercosur Summit Joint Com-
muniqué Madrid, 17 May 2010). In the meantime the EU continued to 
support the development of the Mercosur project. 
 The Regional Indicative Programme attached to the 2007–2013 EU–
Mercosur Regional Strategy Paper outlined provisions for a total budget of 
 € 50 million, focusing on three key areas: institutional support, preparation 
for a future EU–Mercosur association agreement and support for civil 
society. After a mid-term revision, a decision was made to focus on two key 
issues:  € 2 million of support for the development of bio-technologies in 
Mercosur (replacing the previously anticipated support to strengthen Mer-
cosur institutions) and  € 15 million towards further developing the Mercosur 
project, including the implementation of the future association agreement 
( European Commission  2015 ). 
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 How did it happen? 
 Just before the beginning of the Spanish presidency, there were talks about 
the relaunching of the negotiations between the EU and Mercosur. European 
foreign affairs ministers placed these negotiations within EU–Latin America 
relations, which also includes association agreements with the Andean 
Community and Central America ( Agence Europe  10/12/2009 ). 
 It is important to understand that there were some substantial changes 
in context between the 1995 and 1999 agreements and the relaunch of 
negotiations in 2010 ( Caetano et al.  2010 ). In the previous negotiations there 
was progress in the areas of cooperation and political dialogue, however 
there was little progress in terms of trade. Furthermore, there was a lack of 
progress in relation to dealing with the lack of social cohesion and the uneven 
distribution of economic and political power in Mercosur ( Caetano  2010 ). 
 There are several reasons to believe that the EU considers the negotia-
tions with Latin America relevant ( Caetano et al.  2010 ). Caetano et al. 
point to reasons provided by  Celestino del Arenal ( 2009 ), the most impor-
tant of which are: a change in the international arena focusing more on the 
Asia-Pacifi c region; the international economic crisis and changes in US 
foreign policy; the enlargement of the EU and the shift towards right-wing 
governments across the EU; and the weakness of the Latin American lobbies. 
 It is of extreme importance to remember the asymmetries between the 
two blocs to understand the weight that each side carries in the negotiations. 
Table  7.1 shows the disparities that exist between the EU and Mercosur in 
terms economic resources. We also need to identify the EU and Mercosur ’ s 
main trading partners before the relaunch of the negotiations in order to 
identify both the actors and the different interests which kick-started the 
relaunch of negotiations. Table  7.2 helps us to understand the priorities of 
different actors. 
 With the economic crisis having a profound impact and the lack of a 
successful outcome during the Doha Round of negotiations in 2010, Spanish 
and Argentinean presidencies of their respective was yet another for the 
relaunch of the negotiations. On the Mercosur side the possibility was 
discussed during the last summit in Montevideo in 2009. The offi cial docu-
ments described the positive view:
 Table 7.1  GDP of the EU and Mercosur, 2007 
Region GDP (millions) GDP per capita
Mercosur $1,630,558 $6,753
EU-27  € 12,303,961 (around $9,000,000 – 450% 
more than Mercosur 
 € 24,800
 Source :  Caetano et al.  ( 2010 ). 
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 [the Presidents] celebrated the Meeting between Mercosur and the European 
Commission in Lisbon on November 4 to 6, 2009, and expressed their support 
to furthering the relations, inclusively before the end of 2009, between the 
future Pro Tempore President of Mercosur (Argentina) and the European 
Commission as well as advancing work in order to reach the greatest possible 
progress in the negotiations in view of the presidential meeting scheduled 
within the LAC–EU Summit for May 2010 under Spain ’ s EU Presidency. 
 ( Pena  2009 ) 
 At the same time, the pressure on Mercosur also came from other actors 
that had been present during the previous negotiations – the business 
associations. The presidents of the MEBF, Inaki Urdangarin on the Euro-
pean side and Carlos Mariani Bittencourt on the Mercosur side, provided 
a declaration to the four Mercosur countries explaining the need to end the 
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negotiations successfully ( Pena  2009 ). It is interesting to see that even at 
the time of the relaunch of the negotiations there was an attempt to create 
a two-speed process that would facilitate fl exible negotiations ( Pena  2009 ). 
In doing so, it seems that different degrees of commitment were expected 
by certain Mercosur countries. This issue will be explored further at the 
end of this chapter. 
 The EU decided to relaunch the negotiations with Mercosur as there were 
clear economic benefi ts for both the EU and Mercosur ( European Commis-
sion  2010 ). According to the European Commissioner for Trade, Karel De 
Gucht:
 negotiations such as these are challenging but the moment is right to take a 
fresh look at the state of discussions so far. Any agreement must be ambitious 
bringing increased access for a range of EU businesses, including agriculture, 
into the Mercosur region. It is critical that certain key EU demands are 
met if these negotiations are to be fruitful at the end of the day.  ( European 
Commission  2010 ) 
 The biggest obstacle to the agreement was the negotiations in the agriculture 
sector. The EU wanted better access to the industrial sector, while Mercosur 
asked for lowers obstacles to their agricultural exports to Europe. 
 Once again Spain and Portugal were key actors in terms of facilitating 
EU–Mercosur relations. After the actions of the Iberian countries have been 
discussed, the remainder of this chapter will focus on the actions of other 
EU countries. The relative importance of these negotiations in EU external 
issues does not generally provoke discussion and opinions in the twenty-
eight countries, and therefore the analyses will focus on the countries that 
have a strong opinion on this policy – France, Ireland and Greece – since 
they are the ones acting in a distinct way. After focusing on the EU member 
states, the discussion will turn to focus on the role of EU institutions, 
particularly the actions of the European Commission and the EP, which 
have had opposing views on this policy. Finally we will examine how the 
position of Mercosur countries has been underestimated by showing that 
they did have considerable infl uence in the relaunch, as they had done the 
fi rst time around in the 1990s. 
 The European Union 
 Spain and Portugal 
 The Iberian countries traditionally give more importance to EU relations 
with Latin America than other European countries do. The Iberian support 
for the relaunch of the EU–Mercosur negotiations has been shown on 
several occasions. In November 2009 – almost a month before the start of 
the Spanish presidency, there was a meeting in Madrid where the role of 
Spain was specifi cally discussed by Juan Pablo de Laiglesia, the Spanish 
secretary of state for Iberoamerica ( El País  25/11/2009 ). Here it was decided 
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that they would push for the negotiations at the following Iberoamerica 
summit a month later ( El País  25/11/2009 ). 
 The importance of the Spanish presidency of the EU in advancing the 
negotiations with Mercosur was highlighted by the director of the European 
Commission on Latin America ( El País  25/11/2009 ). On the other side of 
the Atlantic, this was also observed when an MEP claimed: ‘if with the 
Spanish presidency there is not progress with Latin America, forget about 
it’ ( Clarin  2/1/2010 ). The sub-secretariat of economic integration in Mer-
cosur, Eduardo Sigal, admitted that the Spanish presidency and the role of 
Spain was one of the key factors in terms of improving this relationship 
( Clarin  7/3/2010 ). Moreover, the Spanish vice-president at that time went 
to Buenos Aires to discuss the issue with the president of Argentina and 
was straightforward: ‘This is a very important occasion, it is not going to 
be repeated in a long time, Spain will preside over the EU, and Argentina 
over Mercosur, and we both can infl uence the priorities and the agendas of 
the organizations’ ( El País  9/11/2010 ) Spain knew that the next presidencies 
of the EU would ignore Latin America and therefore pressed forward any 
agreement talks with this region ( Agence Europe  20/5/2010 ). 
 Spain planned and tried to conclude negotiations with Mercosur during 
the six months of its presidency, but it was obvious that there were some 
doubts about what could be achieved. According to the Spanish minister 
of foreign affairs, Moratinos: ‘We will continue the ambitious negotiations 
but will it be possible to conclude talks by May? It is diffi cult to say but 
we will do all we can to achieve this in Madrid’ ( Agence Europe  5/2/2010 ). 
Statements such as this reveal just how different the political rhetoric was 
from the reality of the negotiations. The conclusion of the negotiations in 
May 2010 was entirely unfeasible. 
 Other EU countries 
 Although there was complaints from France during the fi rst EU–Mercosur 
association negotiations, the number of countries complaining increased 
considerably during the second round of negotiations. Crucially, during the 
negotiations that ended in 2004, there was only fi fteen EU member states. 
By the time of the second round of negotiations the EU had expanded to 
twenty-eight member states. Moreover, most of the new members consid-
ered the agricultural sector to be important to their national economies. In 
2010 the economic situation was not the same as it had been in 2004, 
especially for countries such as Ireland and Greece. 
 These complaints increased in intensity in the weeks before the summit 
of the heads of state of the EU and Latin America which was held in May 
2010 in Madrid, during the Spanish presidency of the EU. The French 
minister Bruno Le Maire declared that the EU could not go ahead with the 
negotiations due to the negative infl uence that they would have on the 
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French and European agricultural sector ( Clarin  6/5/2010 ;  El País  7/5/2010 ). 
In fact, the main farmers’ trade union in France asked French President 
Nicolas Sarkozy to veto the negotiations altogether ( El País  7/5/2010 ). 
Bruno le Maire argued that the EU had already made concessions that 
would benefi t the Brazilian agricultural sector during the Doha Round 
negotiations in July 2008 ( Clarin  6/5/2010 ). On the other side, the Argen-
tinean newspaper , Clarin , criticized that fact that France received more than 
20% of the aid budget that provided for the agricultural sector, which 
disadvantaged Mercosur agricultural products ( Clarin  6/5/2010 ). This 
debate echoes the situation in the late 1990s before the fi rst Rio Summit, 
as has been explained in Chapter  4 . 
 Initially, seven countries expressed their dissatisfaction when the Euro-
pean Commission announced on 4 May 2010 that the negotiations would 
be resumed: Austria, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland and Poland 
( Agence Europe  15/5/2010 ). A few days later, the ministers of agriculture 
of several EU countries complained again about the offi cial relaunch of the 
negotiations on 17 May 2010 during the summit: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, 
France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia ( Agence Europe  18/5/2010 ). The 
argument used was again related to the concessions granted in July 2008 
and the fact that the countries felt that they would pay for the concessions 
twice, leading them to ask the Commission to conduct further research into 
the effects of this agreement. 
 The level of dissatisfaction continued, this centring on the discussions 
relating to, among other things, the standard of Brazilian products, with 
the French minister Bruno Le Maire arguing that: ‘agriculture is not an 
exchange currency. We will not go further on the negotiations with the 
WTO. Europe is not an outlet for agricultural products from South Ameri-
can countries’ ( Agence Europe  16/9/2010 ). The Irish MEP Marian Harkin 
also complained that ‘the Russians and the Americans will not permit the 
importation of Brazilian beef and have good reasons for those decisions. 
The EU has been far less demanding in regard to standards and traceability 
of food products. Commissioner De Gucht ’ s suggestion that a trade agree-
ment would benefi t EU exporters and investors has to be viewed with 
suspicion’ ( Agence Europe  16/9/2010 ). The answer from European Trade 
Commissioner De Gucht was clear: ‘The Commission does the negotiating, 
and it has to be respected. The French position is well-known – it ’ s the same 
as it always says’ ( Agence Europe  18/9/2010 ). A few months later the Irish 
Farmers’ Association claimed that De Gucht had failed to represent Euro-
pean interest, while also accusing the trade commissioner of double stand-
ards when dealing with EU and non-EU agricultural products ( Agence 
Europe  23/2/2011 ). It is clear by now that both France and Ireland were 
the countries that most vehemently rejected the negotiations. However, 
Mercosur had a supporter of some weight within the EU. The German 
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Chancellor, Angela Merkel supported the agreement and considered it 
benefi cial for Europe ( Clarin  18/10/2011 ). 
 European Union 
 The EU decided to relaunch the negotiations in 2010 but it is crucial to 
remember that, only a couple of years before, there had been no intention 
on either side to relaunch them until the Doha Round was completed 
( Agence Europe  20/5/2008 ). This supports the overall argument of presented 
throughout this monograph: that there was a lack of a clear EU strategy 
towards Mercosur. In fact, the EU followed the momentum created every 
so often by the Spanish and Portuguese presidencies of the EU to improve 
EU–Mercosur relations. More often than not, any momentum in this direc-
tion was not initiated by the EU, even though Commissioner Ferrero-Walder 
tried to give a different impression during the EU–Latin American Summit 
of 2008: ‘We are confi dent that, if we continue with the same will, we will 
be able to conclude the agreements before the end of 2009’ ( Agence Europe 
 7/5/2008 ). At the same time, Ferrero-Walder hoped that the summit would 
give ‘renewed momentum’ to the WTO. This, again, suggests that there was 
clear discrepancy between the rhetoric and reality when it comes to the 
progress of these negotiations. 
 In 2010, the Spanish presidency of the EU and the Argentinean presi-
dency of Mercosur lead the European Commission to believe that there was 
now right the momentum required time to relaunch negotiations ( El País 
 25/11/2009 ). As the Spanish Minister of External Affairs pointed out, the 
Doha negotiations was going nowhere at this point ( El País  25/11/2009 ). 
It was in this moment that the Director of the Latin American Area for 
the European Commission admitted that in the context of the fi nancial 
crisis both regions needed new markets to help improve their respective 
economic situations ( El País  25/11/2009 ). However, it seemed that in 
contrast to France and Germany, some countries within the EU, such 
as Spain, were willing to be more generous towards Mercosur ( El País 
 25/11/2009 ). 
 During the negotiations, the EU clearly accused Mercosur in general and 
Argentina in particular of being responsible for stopping the progress 
between the regions. In fact, Commissioner De Gucht directly accused 
Argentina ’ s protectionist stance of causing problems to the point where he 
threatened the Mercosur country with an offi cial complaint to the WTO 
( Clarin  15/4/2011 ). Here De Gucht was alluding to the barriers faced by 
European exporters to Argentina – a matter that had also been raised by 
several EU countries. Argentina responded immediately, claiming that the 
De Gucht was trying to create divisions amongst Mercosur countries ( Clarin 
 15/4/2011 ). However, in contrast to Argentina, it seems that Paraguay and 
Brazil were showing greater more fl exibility in their efforts to reach an 
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agreement, although Argentina would claim that Brazil was simply just 
better at disguising its real strategy ( Clarin  5/5/2011 ). Support for the 
agreement also came from other EU actors such as Catherine Aston; the 
EU high representative for foreign affairs stated that ‘negotiations with 
Mercosur must be resumed’ ( Agence Europe  22/4/2010 ). 
 Mercosur 
 The discussion of the negotiations should cover the views of all the actors, 
especially since Mercosur has been very active in EU–Latin American rela-
tions. Mercosur countries wanted this agreement in the fi rst place, and it 
was felt that the second opportunity which the Spanish presidency of 2010 
presented was not to be ignored. Argentina and Brazil tried to put aside 
their problems and drive the agreement ( El País  18/5/2010 ). At this point, 
there were several reasons why Mercosur wanted to reach an agreement. 
While Uruguay had always supported the agreement, the reasons for reach-
ing an agreement included improving Argentina ’ s image on the international 
stage through an agreement with the EU, and broader concerns within 
Mercosur that Brazil would make its individual agreements with the EU ( El 
País  18/5/2010 ). 
 Argentina had always been the Mercosur country with deeper reserva-
tions regarding any agreement with the EU ( El País  18/4/2010 ), and on 
this occasion, Argentina again presented further some obstacles in terms 
of blocking imports from the EU. Countries affected by this issue, such as 
Greece, complained directly at the European level since it violated inter-
national norms of commerce, and the EU as a consequence asked Argentina 
to halt these actions ( Clarin  28/6/2010 ). It also seems that Greek exports, 
valued at $2,400 million, had also been cancelled or suspended ( Clarin 
 28/6/2010 ). When Greece asked Argentina for an explanation, the latter 
refused to give one. As a result Greece threatened to block negotiations 
between the EU and Mercosur ( Clarin  28/6/2010 ). Argentina justifi ed the 
blocking of exports as being occasional rather policy and they claimed 
in a meeting of the WTO that the European accusations were politically 
motivated ( Clarin  5/7/2010 ). 
 Brazil tried to keep the negotiations going. This included President Lula 
organizing meeting in Brasilia with the president of the European Commis-
sion, José Manuel Barroso, and the president of the European Council, 
Herman Van Rompuy ( El País  15/7/2010a ). Brazil had been in a similar 
position with Argentina, with Brazilian products being blocked at the 
Argentinean border. However, on this occasion Lula was trying to progress 
the required preparatory work for reaching an agreement before he left the 
Brazilian presidency ( El País  15/7/2010a ). When discussing his role as 
president of Mercosur, Lula clearly stated that: ‘I have assumed the presi-
dency of Mercosur and I have the task of trying to persuade the EU to sign 
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an agreement’ ( Agence Europe  17/7/2010 ). Lula also referred to the French 
president ’ s view on the agreement, noting that: ‘As the comrade who has 
done most … is my great friend Nicolas Sarkozy, it will be my responsibility 
to try to convince [him], to win the hearts of the French to get this agree-
ment before the end of my presidential term of offi ce’ ( Agence Europe 
 17/7/2010 ). 
 At the same time, Argentina needed both the EU and Spain to be more 
diplomatic if it was to be persuaded to change its stance towards Europe. 
This led to the Argentinean president holding discussions with the president 
of the European Commission, José Manual Barroso in 2008 during the 
EU–Latin America summit, as well as further talks with the Spanish vice-
president during her visit to Buenos Aires in 2009 with a view to improving 
political relations ( El País  18/4/2010 ). 
 Another reason for Argentina to improve relations with the EU and Spain 
was to improve the image of Mercosur ( El País  18/4/2010 ). The accusations 
of lack of progress in the Mercosur integration project came from all sides, 
including Latin American countries. At this stage, Uruguay considered that 
the end of 2010 pivotal for the integration project in Mercosur, primarily 
because of the lack of political economic coordination in Mercosur and the 
growing strength of other regional projects such as the Union of South 
American Nations (UNASUR) ( El País  10/12/2010 ). Even Spanish politi-
cians such as Carlos Solchaga, the former Minister of Finance, commented 
on the fragility of the Mercosur project ( El País  15/7/2010b ). However, the 
most worrying issue for Argentina was the fact that some sectors in Brazil 
wanted to develop individual agreements with the EU, believing that Brazil 
could further advance its own interest independently of the other Mercosur 
countries ( El País  17/7/2010 ). 
 Mercosur: a happy family of fi ve? 
 As well as the lack of regional integration, Mercosur had to deal with two 
diffi cult issues that were, to some extent, interlinked: the suspension of 
Paraguay ’ s membership of Mercosur and Venezuela becoming a Mercosur 
member state. To be more specifi c, a political crisis in Paraguay provoked 
the suspension of its membership of Mercosur, which was used as an 
opportunity to let Venezuela offi cially join the regional group. 
 In June 2012 the president of Paraguay was removed from offi ce, alleg-
edly in response to the way that he had handled domestic issues such as the 
massacre at Curuguaty, and his choice of the security minister without 
consulting the government ’ s coalition partners ( MercoPress  18/4/2013 ). 
President Lugo had three days to respond, after which the Senate voted 
against him, the Senate with 120 out of 125, to remove him from offi ce. 
Lugo was later replaced by Federico Franco, who at the time was the 
country ’ s vice-president ( MercoPress  18/4/2013 ). Mercosur and UNASUR 
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claimed that this was a coup and suspended Paraguay ’ s membership of 
Mercosur was suspended until after the next general election in Paraguay. 
In fact, Paraguay was also suspended from other groups and summits which 
included the Iberoamerican summit, the meeting of Latin American and 
Arab countries and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States 
(CELAC) ( MercoPress  26/1/2013 ). However, with the support of the US 
and Canada, Paraguay managed to remain a part of the Organization of 
American States, even though Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, Venezuela, 
Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Cuba and Nicaragua did not agree ( MercoPress 
 26/1/2013 ). According to the head of the Paraguayan delegation to the 
Parliament of Mercosur, the suspension from so many forums was orches-
trated, with Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela masterminding the plot to limit 
Paraguay ’ s infl uence in the international arena. 
 In January 2013 Paraguay decided not to attend the EU–CELAC summit 
after Mercosur and UNASUR countries had argued that Paraguay should 
not be invited ( MercoPress  26/1/2013 ). In fact, the Paraguayan president, 
Federico Franco stated that ‘Paraguay had not been invited’ ( MercoPress 
 26/1/2013 ). This was a critical moment in diplomatic relations given that 
Paraguay had not encountered any problems with CELAC. 
 By April 2013 Paraguay was still dealing with this diplomatic problem. 
However, attention had shifted to the upcoming Paraguayan national elec-
tions. In order to ensure that the elections were democratic, the elections 
were observed by, among others, three Nobel Prize-winners, the EU and 
the Organization of American States ( MercoPress  18/4/2013 ). Occupying 
an increasingly peripheral position in the international arena meant that 
Paraguay could not object to such an imposition. 
 The suspension of Paraguay was used by the other Mercosur countries 
as a chance to incorporate Venezuela in the regional group; because of its 
long-standing political dislike of Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez, Para-
guay had for years refused to allow Venezuela to become a member of 
Mercosur. This created even more friction between Paraguay and Venezuela, 
particularly between Chavez and Paraguay. Even after Nicolas Maduro 
became president after Chavez ’ s death, relations did not improve, primarily 
because Maduro appeared to support the President Lugo following the 
aforementioned calls from the Paraguayan Congress that he be removed 
from offi ce. In fact, Maduro called for the Paraguayan people to take to 
the streets to protest against Lugo ’ s removal ( MercoPress  18/4/2013 ). For 
Paraguay, however, what really mattered was that the EU acknowledged 
that Paraguayan was part of Mercosur and that Paraguay could rejoin 
Mercosur ’ s negotiations with the EU ( MercoPress  18/4/2013 ). Brazil played 
a key role as a regional leader in forcing Paraguay to accept Venezuela as 
a member of Mercosur. In principle the suspension was until the elections 
were held, but after the elections Brazil set the condition that Paraguay 
could only return to Mercosur if it gave its approval to the Venezuelan 
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membership ( MercoPress ( 23/4/2013 ).What this issue again reveals is that 
there were clear asymmetries of power within Mercosur. 
 At this point, Paraguay demanded respect for ‘the country ’ s dignity and 
rule of the law’ ( MercoPress  27/5/2013 ). It was felt that Venezuela ’ s mem-
bership of Mercosur had been imposed on Paraguay because the latter ’ s 
Congress had not ratifi ed the former ’ s membership. By June 2013 Paraguay 
stated its intention to become a member of the Alliance of the Pacifi c 
( MercoPress  16/6/2013 ). This should be seen as a move towards Mercosur ’ s 
‘rival’ regional group in Latin America, which not only expressed a more 
liberal agenda, but also enjoyed better relations with the US. Paraguay also 
had other options apart from Mercosur. The balance of power had certainly 
changed in Latin America since the creation of Mercosur, and this would 
have an impact on the need to develop agreements with other regions and 
countries, particularly in relation to the EU. If the non-Mercosur countries 
achieved individual better agreements with the EU and the US, this would 
negatively affect Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay because their 
exports were not that different from other Latin American countries in 
terms competitive agricultural and farming products. This helps us to see 
the economic reality for countries and regional groups such as the Alliance 
of the Pacifi c and Mercosur. However, there was also the political agenda 
at play. Mercosur had not embraced neoliberal economic policies in the 
same way that the Alliance of the Pacifi c had done. Changes in the regional 
power dynamics were also evident: Mercosur, with the weight of Brazil and 
Argentina, could be seen as the main regional leader, until Mexico and Chile 
came together with other Latin American countries to form create the 
Alliance of the Pacifi c. 
 Matters were not helped in the fi rst half of 2014 when it was the turn 
of Paraguay to hold the presidency of Mercosur, which instead was passed 
to Venezuela. From a diplomatic point of view, Mercosur in general and 
Brazil in particular behaved in a high-handed way. Paraguay tried to use 
the weight of the EU to support its case. According to a representative of 
Paraguay: ‘There ’ s no need to rush, Mercosur has a low rating in inter-
national politics. Mercosur has violated the law. The European Union will 
not negotiate with an entity that violates the law and, as comments from 
acknowledged personalities from Argentina and Brazil have stated, Merco-
sur is disintegrating politically and juridically’ ( MercoPress  16/6/2013 ). 
 At the same time, Venezuela tried to become an accepted by the other 
countries as member of Mercosur. For example, it supported the negotia-
tions with the EU but did not demand that it participated in them. Also, 
Maduro promised to the left-wing president of Uruguay, José Mujica, a 
‘permanent’ supply of petroleum, as well as the signing of a strategic alli-
ance in the energy sector ( MercoPress  8/5/2013 ). 
 Brazil attempted to mediate in Venezuelan domestic politics, asking 
Maduro to develop a political dialogue with his political opponents, 
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including Henrique Capriles ( MercoPress  14/5/2013 ). At the same time, 
Brazil was prepared to supply emergency shipments of food, up to 700,000 
tonnes, to help the Maduro administration ( MercoPress  14/5/2013 ). 
 Other problems that had to be dealt with in Mercosur involved the lack 
of economic and political consensus between Brazil and Argentina, a situ-
ation in which other Mercosur countries were reluctant to intervene. The 
level of economic and political disagreement between these two countries 
was not the same level as that which existed between Venezuela and Para-
guay. The presidents of the two countries, Fernandez and Rousseff, had 
different views on both investment and trade – an issue which had the 
potential to affect the very foundations of Mercosur ( MercoPress  20/5/2013 ). 
In addition to this, Argentina had started to develop strong links with 
Russia as a response to the nation ’ s severe economic problems and more 
specifi cally because of its high levels external debt. Since Argentina ’ s eco-
nomic problems would, sooner or later, have an impact on the Brazilian 
economy, it was widely felt that Brazil should be the one helping Argentina 
as one of its main trading partners ( El País  1/8/2014 ). 
 The 2015 Brussels Summit: the end of biregional negotiations? 
 The summits that took place in 1999 between the EU, Latin American and 
Caribbean countries are indicative of the way that cooperation developed 
between these regions. However, over time, these summits became an 
increasingly diffi cult forum within which to develop bilateral discussions 
due to expanding number of participants taking part in the discussions 
( Maihold  2009 ). 
 The impetus for the fi rst EU–Latin America summit (Rio de Janeiro, 
1999) came from Iberia. It was Spain who would put forward the idea 
during the Iberoamerican summit of November 1996. This was considered 
to be the exact moment to try and further advance biregional relations into 
the twenty fi rst century. The role of Spain in pushing for this particular, and 
also subsequent, summits was key ( Maihold  2009 ). The second summit 
(Madrid, 2002) was key feature of the Spanish presidency of the EU and 
was used to boost the cooperation and negotiations between the EU with 
regional groups such as Mercosur. The 2010 summit in Madrid further 
demonstrated Spanish interest in relaunching EU–Mercosur negotiations 
and the signing of the EU–CACM agreement. Although these summits put 
pressure on both sides to reach agreements, the declarations emerged from 
the meetings were, despite good intentions, considered to be rather vague. 
However, these summits did help to create an EU–Latin American agenda 
that was subsequently used to reach common positions in relation to issues 
discussed at other international forums such as the United Nations ( Maihold 
 2009 ). Furthermore, these summits were also occasionally used by various 
national presidents to enhance their own personal image and to project their 
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personalities as playing a key role in the outcome of the summit ( Maihold 
 2009 ). The politicization of the summits – as was the case of the 2010 and 
2013 summits – can also negatively affect the development of agreements, 
especially if a country ’ s president feels the need to react to the fact that 
other countries have tried to sabotage their attendance at a summit in 
response to internal national political issues, as happened with Honduras 
in 2010 and Paraguay in 2013. 
 In 2014 there were also several announcements that there would be a 
renegotiation of tariffs, but this did not happen. According to the president 
of Brazil, Dilma Rousseff, the South Americans created barriers to the 
proposals while the EU was more proactive. The negotiations have taken 
so long and the reasons for this were deemed to be quite evident and so 
diffi cult to overcome that the option of negotiating individual national 
agreements with the EU, as opposed to a broader regional group agreement, 
was considered to be a more feasible solution for some of the Mercosur 
countries. The former president of Uruguay, José Alberto ‘Pepe’ Mujica, 
claimed that the Mercosur project had stalled and risked becoming obsolete 
if it did not have needed trade agreements with third parties. According to 
Mujica, Mercosur had become a ‘poor customs union’ ( MercoPress 
 2/3/2013 ): ‘We can ’ t and should not cheat ourselves: in recent years Mer-
cosur is stalled and with growing diffi culties to trade among its partners … 
although there is the manifest bilateral determination which we believe will 
continue to advance with Brazil … The truth is that in the whole bloc we 
have pachyderm size diffi culties to advance or to try to advance’ ( Merco-
Press  2/3/2013 ) .  Mujica also issued a warning about the state of negotiations 
between the EU and the US: ‘How do you penetrate such a huge free trade 
space? We must lift our heads and look around to what is happening in the 
world. Imagine the growing diffi culties for those left out in the cold to have 
access to those agreements’ ( MercoPress  2/3/2013 ). 
 According to a representative of Brazil, it was EU Commissioner De 
Gucht who suggested that they cancel the following meeting where both 
blocs were meant to exchange proposals for the agreement. The EU insisted 
that they had not given up and that they were waiting to hear positive news 
from Mercosur in order to speed up the negotiations ( Clarin  13/12/2013 ). 
 For the EU, the main problem was Argentina since the other three 
countries had offered the expected outcome which stated that 90% of 
products would not be subjected to custom tariffs, while Argentinean 
president, Cristina Fernandez would offer no more than 80% ( Clarin 
 13/12/2013 ). Mercosur adopted a two-speed approach so that Argentina 
could move more slowly, even though it was felt that the EU would rather 
see Argentina on the outside of the agreement ( Clarin  13/12/2013 ). Just 
before the summit in Brussels in June 2015, the president of Brazil warned 
Argentina of the risk of being left behind ( Clarin  11/6/15 ). In Brussels, 
Brazil announced that Mercosur was ready to present an offer, while at the 
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same time appearing to put pressure on Argentina, who were opposed the 
agreement ( Clarin  11/6/15 ). This was similar to what had happened in 
2004, when again it was Argentina that had refused to sign the agreement 
at the last minute. In 2015, Argentinean representatives also disagreed with 
the timetable that Brazil had offered to Europe ( Clarin  11/6/15 ). It is also 
crucial to point out that the president of Argentina, Cristina Fernandez had 
decided not to attend the summit. 
 Given that Brazil needed to improve the competitiveness of its exports, 
they therefore felt that negotiations had to begin as soon as possible. 
However, the renegotiation of tariffs had to be done by both sides at 
the same time, meaning that the EU would also have to agree to the 
renegotiate tariffs ( Clarin  11/6/15 ). In contrast to Brazil, the respective 
interests of the other Mercosur countries were equal, if not even higher. 
For example, Uruguay had signed a cooperation agreement with the EU 
and other developing countries. Uruguay explained how important this 
agreement with the EU was and that it would reach agreement one way or 
another ( Clarin  11/6/15 ). 
 The fact that Mercosur needed to negotiate as a group is something that 
was brought to the discussion because it seems that many South American 
countries wanted to change this rule so that they could develop their own 
intendent national-level agreements with the EU. In fact, two weeks before 
the summit in Brussels, both Uruguay and Brazil discussed the excluding 
Argentina from the discussions with the EU ( Clarin  4/6/2015 ). Both coun-
tries also appeared to be worried about being displaced by the US when it 
comes to food exports ( Clarin  4/6/2015 ). 
 Uruguay also admitted that it had tried to advance talks with the EU on 
its own during the Brussels Summit, while Brazil waited for the outcome 
of the elections in Argentina to initiate a change in negotiation with the EU 
( Clarin  9/6/2015 ). In a manner similar to Uruguay, Paraguay had also 
discussed the negotiation of an individual trade agreement with the EU ( La 
Nacion  11/5/2015 ). 
 Brazilian agricultural groups also pointed out that it was extremely 
important to sign the Mercosur regional agreement with the EU and that 
if Argentina did not want to participate, Mercosur should push on with the 
negotiations ( El País  25/2/2014 ). At the same time, they were also concerned 
about negotiations between the EU and the US which could have had a 
catastrophic impact on the Brazilian agricultural sector ( El País  25/2/2014 ). 
 According to European Commissioner Cecilia Malmstrom, there was a 
need for more technical meetings before renegotiation of tariffs could take 
place (MercoPress  12/6/2015 ). Malmstrom also explained that attempts 
were being made to progress further discussions, claiming that the negotia-
tions are ‘in a dead-end street … we are seeing if we can fi nd an exit … 
there is willingness’ ( Iprofesional  20/4/2015 ). Malmstrom also suggested 
that there are problems with the level of ambition being expressed: ‘it needs 
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to be seen if the ambitions are the same, if we want the same, there are 
discussions [sic] meetings to see if it is the case’ ( Iprofesional  20/4/2015 ). 
Spain also seemed to be suggest that a pragmatic agreement between the 
EU and Mercosur which would also sanction individual agreements between 
Mercosur countries and the EU ( EUBrasil  27/4/2015 ), while it also appears 
that the EU was considering the same issue. 
 Christian Leffl er, head of the EU Desk for the Americas, did not discount 
the possibility of advancing separate national-level agreements with Merco-
sur as long as this became ‘an offi cial, formal communication’. In fact, Leffl er 
admitted during a video conference with Latin American journalists: ‘At that 
point we would have to consider the situation and fi nd a solution’, but the fact 
was that the EU ‘wants to reach an agreement with all Mercosur members 
… The objective, our main goal is an association agreement between the EU 
and Mercosur, and we are convinced that this would be the best option both 
for Mercosur countries and for the EU’ ( MercoPress  30/5/2015 ). In effect, 
this statement suggested that the decision to push on with the negotiations 
without Argentina had to come from Mercosur, for it seems that the EU did 
not want to be seen as responsible making this decision. 
 After the summit in Brussels, it seemed that the EU would now accept a 
two-speed agreement with both Mercosur and individual Mercosur member 
states, with the Vice-president of Uruguay stating that ‘I think the most 
positive side of the meeting in Brussels was the fact that German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel insisted on the need to formalize as soon as possible an EU/
Mercosur agreement, and if necessary a “two-speed” approach was accept-
able’ ( MercoPress  18/6/2015 ). 
 EU engagement with Mercosur 
 In order to assess the level of ambition shown at the different stages of the 
negotiation process, it is necessary to contrast the presence of: (1) offers of 
negotiation mandates or agreements; (2) EU offi cial policy pronouncements; 
(3) EU promises to Mercosur; and (4) plans for a potential relationship (see 
Figure  7.1 ). Furthermore, the negotiations discussed above demonstrate a 
high level of ambition due to the presence of the following:
 •  EU offi cial policy pronouncements 
 •  Promises to Mercosur 
 •  Plans for a potential relationship. 
 In addition to ambition, these negotiations also demonstrate a high level 
of commitment based on the following factors (Figure  7.2 ): 
 •  Substantial content of agreements and of offers (including clear tariff 
arrangements) during the negotiations 
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 Figure 7.1  Level of ambition: fourth stage 
Scenario 2: HighEU official policy pronouncements
Promises to Mercosur






 Figure 7.2  Level of commitment: fourth stage 
Scenario 2: HighSubstanal content of agreements and of
offers during the negoaons
Aid, funding, or technical help provided by the EU
Meengs either official or unofficial at any level: civil servant level,








 •  Aid, funding or technical help provided by the EU 
 •  Meetings, either offi cial or unoffi cial, at any level: civil servant level, 
ministerial level, and/or heads of state level. 
 Engagement is thus measured as high (Table 7.3). In light of the evidence 
presented above, the fi nal section here will consider the six different argu-
ments that were laid out in Chapter  2 (Table  7.4 ). 
 Counterbalancing the US 
 The argument that the EU was trying to counterbalance the infl uence of the 
US does not appear to be applicable during this period, particularly when 
we consider the fact that the EU and US were also negotiating the Trans-
atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) agreement. 
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 Global aspirations 
 The global aspirations argument suggests that an increase in the EU ’ s 
involvement in Latin America would be an important part of the EU ’ s 
attempt to secure a more infl uential role in the international arena. The fact 
that Mercosur has played a leading role in initiating negotiations during 
this period challenges this argument. At this particular moment, both 
Europe and the EU project were preoccupied by the economic crisis in the 
‘eurozone’ which diverted their attention away from pursuing broader 
global aspirations. 
 External federator 
 In regard to promoting regional trade agreements, the EU continued to 
provide both funding and technical expertise. This is a role that the EU has 
played from the very outset. The EU continued to play this role by providing 
funding for the regional integration project in South America. However, the 
EU ’ s strategic partnership with Brazil in 2007 and the cooperation agree-
ment with Uruguay in 2015, alongside the fact that the EU also seemed to 
accept bilateral negotiations with Mercosur countries, challenges the ‘exter-
nal federator’ argument. 
 Long-standing political, economic and cultural ties 
 The suggestion that the EU ’ s involvement in Latin America would increase 
as a result of the historical ties and shared values between the two regions 




Top High Medium Low None
Top



















c07.indd   196 12/15/2016   12:44:11 PM














































































































































   ↑ U
S 

























































































































































































































































































































































































   ↑ S
P 



















































.   
c07.indd   197 12/15/2016   12:44:11 PM
198 The EU’s policy towards Mercosur
does seem applicable to the third stage of EU–Mercosur relations. This is 
evidenced by the fact most EU member states showed a serious lack of 
interest in the region. Moreover, the fact that the EU was developing 
additional trade agreements with Asian and African countries – which could 
be seen as less similar to Europe – further counters this argument. 
 Interdependence 
 This argument suggests that an increase in the EU ’ s involvement in Latin 
America will in response to increasing trade and FDI in Mercosur. The 
evidence presented above does not support this argument during this par-
ticular stage of the negotiations. The infl uence of business associations, such 
as the MEBF, played a more proactive role in Latin America than in the 
EU. Again, it is important to note that trade agreements with South America 
was not a key priority for all EU member states (see Tables  6.1 and  6.2 ). 
 Spanish and Portuguese infl uence in the EU 
 This argument suggests that the increase in the EU ’ s interest in Latin 
America as a result of the infl uence of Iberian countries in the EU cannot 
be sustained. While the EU ’ s Iberian member states created forums that 
would facilitate the negotiations, this momentum was primarily instigated 
by Mercosur countries. In other words, these negotiations could not be 
sustained by Iberian interest alone.
 In summary, this section has assessed the dependent variable as well as 
linking it to the values of the independent variables at the third stage of 
policy negotiations. It has shown how, during this particular stage, none of 
the aforementioned arguments is suffi cient terms of explaining how events 
unfolded. It has also shown that the degree of Europeanization declined. 
This supports the core argument this put forward here. The development 
of the EU policy towards Mercosur very much required the infl uence its 
Iberian members. However, this alone was not suffi cient by itself. The 
realization of the EU ’ s policy towards Mercosur was also dependent upon 
the proactive role played by Mercosur member states. 
 Conclusion 
 This chapter has examined the relaunching of the negotiations of an associa-
tion agreement between the EU and Mercosur since 2010. It has explained 
how the different possible explanations for the fi rst round of EU–Mercosur 
negotiations are not fully applicable to this second stage of agreement 
negotiations. This is due to the fact that these explanations have underesti-
mated the importance of political ‘momentum’ when it comes to developing 
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EU–Mercosur trade negotiations, especially the role of Mercosur. They have 
also underestimated the role played by Spain and Portugal inside the EU, 
both in relation to Latin America in general and Mercosur in particular. 
 This chapter has also described how the expansion of EU, which included 
the integration of twelve new member states who placed strong emphasis 
on the agricultural sphere of their national economies, also made negotia-
tions more diffi cult. However, the fact that an agreement was not reached 
during the Doha Round appears to have helped the Mercosur and 
the EU to come closer together. We must also acknowledge that was that 
Mercosur had to improve its reputation as a regional group after variety of 
concerns expressed on this issue was also an important factor. More impor-
tantly, the interest shown by both Spain and Portugal, demonstrated through 
the Spanish presidency and the efforts of Barroso in his role as president 
of the European Commission, were also crucial to the relaunch of the 
negotiations. 
 Overall, this second round of negotiations encountered additional obsta-
cles, primarily in response to the impact of the 2007 economic crisis, the 
reluctance shown by both existing and new EU member states towards 
develop a regional trade agreement with Mercosur and, in particular, 
Argentina. However, these two regional groups do not relaunch such 
negotiations if there is no realistic chance of achieving a successful agree-
ment, as was the case with the CACM. 
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 Lessons to be learned from the EU 
policy towards Mercosur 
 Introduction 
 Russia and China, as well as partners in Latin-America, deserve a clear 
European strategy. Africa has, unfortunately, been absent from the EU ’ s 
strategic agenda for years and needs to be reengaged … The Union can be a 
global actor considering we possess the objectives, principles and instruments. 
Unfortunately the political will is often lacking and the question is whether 
the EU Member States will take action to change this.  ( Moratinos  2010 ) 
 The views of Miguel Angel Moratinos, Spanish minister of foreign affairs 
and cooperation, in a speech of 20 January 2010, during the Spanish presi-
dency of the EU, recognize a series of gaps in the strategic behaviour, the 
existence of partiality in the strategic agenda, and a lack of will in EU 
external relations. This quote suggests that if this was the situation in 2010, 
then EU policies during the 1980s and 1990s towards a Latin American 
region such as Mercosur were not the most structured nor were they 
developed to their full potential. At the same time, the EU ’ s internal insti-
tutional and legal frameworks also changed as a result of different treaties 
and enlargements. These internal changes affected EU relations with Latin 
America both positively and negatively. On the one hand, the Iberian 
membership of the EU affected EU policy positively towards Latin America; 
on the other hand, policy towards Central and Eastern European countries 
which culminated in the 2004 enlargement negatively affecting EU–Latin 
America relations. 
 This monograph has analysed the reasons behind the EU ’ s strategic 
actions towards Mercosur from 1985. The dependent variable has been the 
degree of engagement the EU demonstrated in its policy. It has been assessed 
in relative terms instead of absolute terms with the analyses of two criteria: 
ambition and commitment. 
 In relation to ambition, the focus has been on what the actor – the EU 
– wanted, desired and aspired to do. This book has analysed ambition by 
looking at how far the EU tried to shift away from its status quo, examining 
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EU policy pronouncements and long-term plans in relation to Mercosur. 
With regard to commitment, the focus is on what the actors promised to 
do or say – and a review of how much of this was done. It is crucial to 
refl ect how hard the EU tried to achieve its objectives and at what price it 
did so. The number of meetings and the rank of the actors present at those 
meetings are a way of assessing this. Another indicator was the funding or 
aid agreed by the EU for Mercosur. 
 More specifi cally, this study has analysed the way that the most important 
policy-makers from both the Council and the Commission as a whole, and 
individuals within each institution, have positioned themselves during dif-
ferent stages of the policy-making process. This has brought new insights 
on two important fronts: fi rst, it has shed light on the different arguments 
in the existing literature which seek to explain the development of EU 
foreign policy towards Mercosur; and secondly, the results have been 
examined in relation to the fi ndings in wider and more general debates 
on EU foreign policy, particularly in relation to the notion of the EU as a 
global actor. 
 To complement this analysis, this book has examined the different argu-
ments in the literature on EU policy towards Mercosur at the different 
stages in order to examine their real explanatory capacity over time. In 
doing so, this study contributes to an incomplete debate on the reasons 
behind EU foreign policy towards Latin America, and Mercosur in particu-
lar. These fi ndings are relevant in that they contribute to what is a puzzling 
debate on EU foreign policy in terms of both theoretical and empirical 
issues by paying special attention to the important discussion on the EU 
as a global actor. Such a debate is so crucial that it is mentioned continu-
ally in offi cial EU views, such as those expressed above by Miguel Angel 
Moratinos. 
 This monograph fi nds considerable evidence of how the EU has been a 
responsive actor to Mercosur demands at the different stages of the relations 
instead of being a strategic actor that has initiated EU–Mercosur relations. 
This argument also corresponds with the work of  Jorg Monar ( 1997 ), who 
suggests that third parties are the actors who have sought to upgrade 
EU–Mercosur policies. It also shows how the Iberian membership created 
a crucial juncture in the development of EU relations towards the region. 
Finally, this analysis also implies that the EU is far from being interested in 
the region in general and that the development of this policy was only 
possible due to the infl uence of both Spain and Portugal and the proactive 
behaviour of Mercosur. The actions of Spain and Portugal and the EU ’ s 
reaction to them in relation to Mercosur can be identifi ed as a consequence 
of the path dependence created with the Iberian membership. This under-
mines the argument that considers the EU to be a global actor. As Miguel 
Angel Moratinos claims, the EU has the capacity but not the will to develop 
relations with certain regions such as Africa which are treated differently 
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from others; whilst the EU has not developed a clear and coherent strategy 
in relation to Latin America. 
 The remainder of this chapter is divided into three sections. The fi rst 
section will summarize the most important fi ndings provided by this study. 
It will then translate these fi ndings into a broader discussion on EU foreign 
policy towards Mercosur in the second section. Other explanations for the 
development of EU–Mercosur relations that can be found in the existing 
literature will be examined in the third section. The chapter will then be 
concluded by developing an analysis of the role of the EU as a global actor. 
 Empirical evidence of EU–Mercosur relations 
 In order to understand fully the conclusions reached in this monograph, it 
is important to summarize the fi ndings presented in the previous chapters. 
This section will begin by discussing the concept of the strategic actor by 
focusing on the lack of proper EU strategy towards Mercosur. This will 
then be followed by a discussion of EU internal actors and an examination 
of which actors have shown the most interest in developing EU strategy 
towards Mercosur. 
 Lack of strategy? 
 This section discusses the issue of the existence of a strategy to some extent. 
Without claiming that there is a complete lack of an EU strategy, there are 
fl aws in EU behaviour. In fact, the EU ’ s actions can be seen as being at the 
lowest degree of ‘strategic’. Therefore, it could be said that the EU is 
strategically weak. We will fi rst focus on the actions of the EU and move 
on to look at the actions of Mercosur. The actions of the latter will be used 
to undermine the suggestion that the EU has been a strategic actor. 
 As this monograph pointed out in the fi rst chapter the conceptual con-
tribution is related to the defi nition by  Smith and Xie  ( 2010 ) of the concept 
of strategic actor. As was stated in the introduction, for an actor to hold a 
strategy, he or she should undertake consistently intentional actions. There-
fore, following the defi nitions of  Moore  ( 1959 ), ‘design for action’, or 
 Drucker  ( 1974 ) ‘purposeful action’, and  Mintzberg  ( 1987 ), who relies on 
the work of the former, a strategy should have  consciously intended 
actions. 
 In general terms the EU strategy towards Mercosur should have a plan, 
an objective(s), the resources to reach that objective, the capacity to become 
a ‘EU’ plan in the sense that it involves all the EU actors. It must also have 
a strategy that is fl exible enough to accommodate changes in the interna-
tional scene. This monograph has shown that the EU fails to do this. 
However, this defi nition does not cover all the aspects of ‘strategic’ actor. 
This defi nition should have a part dedicated to the ‘intentionality’ behind 
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the strategy. The actor holding a strategy needs to undertake consistently 
intentional actions. This study has tried to make a conceptual contribution 
to Smith and Xie ’ s defi nition of the importance of ‘intentionality’. 
 Mintzberg himself highlights the part of the defi nition that Smith and 
Xie do not develop – ‘consciously intended’. As he says, it has to be 
developed consciously and purposely. The signifi cance of the intentionality 
behind the action is that otherwise, accidental actions would be considered 
strategies. This would mean that some actors would seem to be what they 
are not and would be described as strategic players when it was not the 
case. It is necessary to explain that the development of patterns of behaviour 
without previous preconceptions should not be considered strategies, which 
goes against Mintzberg ’ s argument: ‘Thus, the defi nition of strategy as plan 
and pattern can be quite independent of each other: plans may go unreal-
ized, while patterns may appear without preconceptions. To paraphrase 
Hume, strategies may result from human actions but not human designs’ 
( Mintzberg  1987 : 13). 
 Moreover, in the opposite case, inaction should not be considered a 
strategy either. This monograph argues explicitly that, for example, ignoring 
Mercosur or not giving Mercosur the attention that would be expected from 
a global actor such as the EU, should not automatically be considered a 
strategy, the strategy of ‘indifference’. If the EU was doing this on purpose 
it would have reasons to do so, and a plan that explains that indifference 
is going to show a pattern due to certain reasons. But, for this to be the 
case, the EU would have to know Mercosur well and have reasons that 
support this planned indifference. This point will be developed further in 
the conclusions. 
 In terms of ‘interest’, the actor does not need to have interest in the object 
affected by its strategy, since it could be part of a bigger plan. In other 
words, the EU could develop a strategy towards Mercosur as part of a 
global EU strategy and have no interest whatsoever in Mercosur per se. 
Mercosur could be the method through which to achieve something and 
not the end in itself. Therefore, ‘interest’ is not a necessary part of the 
defi nition. 
 In relation to the EU and Mercosur it is clear that for the period covered 
in this monograph, there was not a strategy. Drawing on the work of  Smith 
and Xie  ( 2010 ), the analysis offered here has been contextualized within 
the framework of what it takes for the EU to be a strategic actor. Smith 
and Xie argued that the EU ‘must demonstrate the capacity to extract and 
mobilise resources from its Member States and other relevant sources, and 
to do so consistently over a period of time’ ( Smith and Xie  2010 : 5). The 
fi ndings in this monograph suggest that there is a consistent extraction/
selection of resources towards Mercosur especially in relation to the transfer 
of know-how, which can be seen in the multi-annual strategic papers 
delivered by the Commission. However, caution is needed in the analysis 
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of the importance of that fact since this monograph has proved how the 
actual amount of resources is signifi cantly smaller than those provided to 
other regions, especially for Central and Eastern European countries since 
1989. The pyramid of preferences also proves how Mercosur has been 
continually placed at the bottom of the pyramid. Smith and Xie also 
contend that the EU ‘must show that it is possible to relate these resources 
to agreed medium and long term objectives, and to act positively in line 
with those objectives’ ( Smith and Xie  2010 : 5). The four empirical chapters 
demonstrated that the objectives of the EU were never part of a clear 
long-term plan and, in fact, these objectives repeatedly changed over time. 
Chapter  4 showed how the EU had barely started to consider a policy 
towards Latin America in general, let alone have specifi c objectives towards 
the region. In Chapter  5 , the discussion of EMIFCA proved just how unclear 
the EU ’ s objectives towards Mercosur actually were because the Commis-
sion suggested three different policy options. In addition to this, Chapter  6 
recounted how it was only at the last minute that the EU reached the 
decision to start negotiations with Mercosur, which suggests the decision 
was not well planned and strategically organized. Chapter  7 also demon-
strated how it was necessary again to have a Spanish presidency and the 
interest in Latin America to relaunch the negotiations. Even the Venezuela 
of Chavez encouraged Mercosur to negotiate with the EU despite this new 
member of Mercosur being unable to participate in the negotiations. Along-
side these negotiations with Mercosur, it has been shown that the EU 
developed a special partnership with one Mercosur country alone – which 
challenges the notion of the EU having a well-rounded and coherent policy 
towards Mercosur as a whole. 
 Smith and Xie also argue that the EU ‘must demonstrate that it is capable 
of generating a strategic narrative that shapes the expectations of both its 
member States and other EU bodies and also its key international interlocu-
tors’ ( Smith and Xie  2010 : 5). In Chapter  6 , it was shown that the EU did 
not match the expectations and desires of Mercosur. More specifi cally, it 
was shown that both parties were unable to reach an agreement. Chapter 
 7 demonstrated how it is even more diffi cult to reach agreement this time, 
considering the international fi nancial crisis, the new EU members and the 
situation of Argentina, even though the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership negotiations are certainly putting even more pressure on Mer-
cosur. Furthermore, in Chapter  4 it was also demonstrated that the EU 
failed to match the interests of member states such as Spain and Portugal, 
who tried to secure a more substantial set of commitments from the EU. In 
addition to this, it was suggested in Chapter  5 that there was a clear dif-
ference in expectations of the Commission and the Council during the 
setting up of EMIFCA, where it was apparent that there was clear disagree-
ments within the Council. Smith and Xie contend that the EU ‘must be able 
to adapt its aims, its resource allocations and its strategic narrative to 
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changes in the global context and to challenges that emerge from its devel-
oping international activities’ ( Smith and Xie  2010 : 5). The fact that the 
negotiations in the third stage (Chapters  6 and  7 ) were so linked to the state 
of affairs in the WTO proves how infl exible the EU was being in its relations 
with Mercosur. Interestingly, Smith and Xie recognize that the EU has 
developed strategies and in fact many of these strategies were developed 
through the Commission. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the Com-
mission can be referred to as a strategic actor. 
 The EU did not have a design for action nor a purposeful plan of action 
because, apart from other reasons, it did not know what to do with Mer-
cosur, as is demonstrated in the different stages. In fact, it was Mercosur 
that was offering the possible upgrades of policy. The EU did not have any 
sort of consciously intended actions at all, since it did not know the region; 
it was brand new to this area of external relations until the Iberian member-
ship. The EU did not have a long-term plan. 
 This monograph denies the consideration of accidental actions as strat-
egies to avoid the characterization of ‘strategic actor’ being mistakenly 
attached to a player when it is not appropriate. The EU ’ s actions are closer 
to accidental than to anything else due to the lack of strategy over time and 
the fact that the steps taken were promoted by Mercosur. In a way, the 
‘brain/thinker’ of the strategy/plan was not the EU but Mercosur. 
 When a strategy remains unnoticed even for the player exercising the 
strategy, it does not mean that there is not a strategy in itself, but that the 
player is not conscious of the strategy, which is different from an accidental 
action. In this case, the EU did not have a strategy; it is not that it was 
not aware of what was going on because only the Commission knew the 
plan, or just a few EU states were aware of what was going on. Simply put, 
there was not a strategy. In fact, with the lack of knowledge of the region, 
it was impossible that there could have been an unconscious strategy. This 
lack of knowledge is what makes it easy to prove that the EU did not have 
a strategy of ‘indifference’. In order to have had such a strategy, the EU 
would have had to know what it was ignoring and why, which was not the 
case. The EU was ignoring Mercosur countries until the Iberian member-
ship, but this was due to ignorance, not as a consequence of a deliberate 
plan. 
 Mercosur ’ s initiatives 
 This book has also established that there is enough evidence to suggest that 
Mercosur ’ s demands on the EU were a direct cause of the developments in 
the relations between the two regions. This supports the argument put 
forward by  Jorg Monar ( 1997 ), who suggests that third-party groups take 
the initiative and ask for upgrades in relations and/or policies with the EU. 
In the case of Mercosur, it was shown in Chapter  5 that this happened from 
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the very fi rst moment that EU–Mercosur relations started to develop. In 
fact, before Mercosur became a regional group ratifi ed by its member states, 
there was a meeting between the EU and the South American group. This 
sequence of events explains the speed at which things occurred. In March 
1991 Mercosur signed the Treaty of Asunción which created Mercosur, 
although ratifi cation of this treaty did not take place until the end of the 
year. In April 1991 Mercosur countries met with the EU in Brussels as part 
of the annual meeting with the Rio Group. This gathering was the fi rst 
formal institutionalized meeting of the Rio Group. Two days after this 
meeting, Mercosur met with the European Commission in order for the two 
groups to develop inter-regional relations. As a result of this meeting, the 
fi rst agreement on the transfer of knowledge was signed on 2 May 1992. 
At the EU–Rio Group annual meeting that took place at the end of May, 
the two groups reached an inter-institutional agreement. However, this 
agreement was not enough for Mercosur, and after these events, the minis-
ters of Mercosur countries asked the Commission to work on possible ways 
of improving relations. Mercosur had already criticized the EU ’ s agricultural 
protectionism. During the annual EU–Rio Group meeting in 1993 there 
were discussions about improving relations. Once again it was Mercosur 
who asked the EU for an upgrade of relations/policies, and this upgrade 
was developed the next year following the next EU–Rio Group meeting. 
 The upgrade that the EU offered and signed in 1995 required unanimous 
agreement of the member states of the EU in order to start negotiations. 
Again the pressure applied by Mercosur countries was crucial over the years 
and especially in the run-up to the fi rst meeting of the heads of states of 
Latin America and the EU in 1999, as discussed in Chapter  6 . The dynamic 
of third parties demanding commitments from the EU at the start of rela-
tions and their upgrading of these commitments was not only characteristic 
of EU–Mercosur relations. It was demonstrated in Chapters  4 ,  5 ,  6 and  7 
that this was in fact characteristic of EU–Rio Group relations as well. This 
set of fi ndings suggests that there was a lack of proactive behaviour by the 
EU in terms of developing policies towards Mercosur. It also suggests that 
the EU was more responsive in its approach to external suggestions. This 
dynamic could be seen as a consequence of the asymmetries in both groups 
in terms of economic power, with Mercosur countries being in a weaker 
economic and political position, as well as the diffi culty Mercosur faced 
when trying to gain access to the EU market. 
 The discussion so far has explained one half of the argument which 
suggests that it was Mercosur that showed proactive strategic behaviour 
towards EU–Mercosur relations, whilst the EU displayed a more responsive 
approach in reacting to Mercosur ’ s demands. However, the reasons have 
not yet been discussed. The following section will explore these issues in 
relation to both the support and opposition for a policy towards Mercosur 
within the EU. 
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 Iberian interest versus EU lack of interest 
 Once Spain and Portugal joined the EU on 1 January 1986, EU relations 
with Latin America changed to the point where a ‘before and after’ line can 
be drawn. This monograph has presented enough evidence to suggest that 
the extraordinary interests of Spain and Portugal in their former colonies 
in Latin America were crucial in the responsive attitude of the EU to 
Mercosur ’ s demands. Moreover, given the fact that Spain and Portugal are 
not the most powerful countries within the EU and that many other EU 
countries have their own special relationships with their former colonies in 
Africa, the Pacifi c and Asia, this policy is almost unexpected. In other 
words, the Iberian support for Mercosur demands and a very persistent 
Spanish commissioner in charge of relations with this region made the 
development of a policy possible against the backdrop of the lack of support 
and interest in the region shown by the majority of EU member states. 
 Chapter  4 explained the impact of Iberian membership in terms of 
offi cial declarations by both the EU and Iberian countries at the time of the 
signature of the Act of Accession in June 1985. However, the impact that 
Spain and Portugal could have was lower than expected because of the lack 
of interest in that region and consequently little more than declarations 
were achieved instead of real commitments. Iberian support did not only 
occur at the time of the Iberian membership; it has been a clear feature of 
the Spanish and Portuguese actions in the different EU institutions over the 
years. Chapters  5 and  6 have shown how Manuel Marin had to fi ght within 
the Commission against the French commissioners and the agriculture 
commissioner during the launch of the 1995 agreement with Mercosur – 
discussions which were only resolved by an internal voting issue. 
 In the Council, Spain and Portugal promised support in areas of interest 
for the other member states in exchange for other members’ support on 
anything related to Latin America (Interview 6). Chapter  5 demonstrated 
Spanish and Portuguese support for the creation of the 1995 agreement. 
The continued Spanish and Portuguese calls for supportive action were 
persistent, especially during the presidencies of Spain and Portugal. It is not 
a surprise that many of the negotiators on the EU side were Spanish, and 
this issue helped to smooth the negotiation, according to a negotiator from 
the Argentinean team. 
 However, all the support and attention given by Spain and Portugal was 
not automatically replicated by the other member states and commissioners 
for different reasons. Firstly, in relative terms there was not a signifi cant 
trade interest on the EU side towards Latin America. Secondly, there are 
other former colonies of other member states such as the UK and France 
that continue to be prioritized over Latin America in the EU because Spain 
and Portugal are not as powerful as the UK and France (see Chapters  5 and 
 6 ). Thirdly, from the moment that Eastern European countries became 
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independent from the former Soviet Union, the EU focused politically and 
economically on them until most of them became member states in 2004 
(see Chapters  4 ,  5 and  6 ). During the second attempt to negotiate the 
agreement (Chapter  7 ) these Eastern European countries became part of the 
negotiating team since they are part of the EU and some of them have a 
special interest in the agricultural sector (e.g. Poland). What was once EU 
foreign policy is now part of what the EU actually is, and therefore part of 
what it wants. In relation to the last two points, the discussion of the 
substance of the agreements in Chapter  4 highlighted the intentions of the 
EU in relation to different groups of countries. The legal material in agree-
ments with ACP or Eastern European countries, and the absence of it in 
relation to Mercosur, shows the lack of interest in that group by the 
majority of EU member states. Moreover, even in the offi cial documents in 
which Mercosur is mentioned, it is not clear which kind of interest – if there 
was any interest at all – the EU showed towards Mercosur (see Chapters 
 5 ,  6 and  7 ). Therefore, the EU had a lack of interest towards Mercosur 
compared with other external relations, but that should not undermine the 
importance of Mercosur within the EU–Latin America relationship. Mer-
cosur was such a priority within EU relations towards Latin America that 
to some extent, as explained in Chapter  3 , EU policy towards Latin America 
was synonymous with EU policy towards Mercosur. And, as has been 
explained in Chapters  5 and  6 , the EU had a clear interest towards Mercosur 
as a region, an interest slightly superior to its interest in Mercosur countries 
individually. In fact, the EU prioritized agreements with the region over 
individual agreements. 
 Finally, as mentioned earlier, the possibility of the EU having a consistent 
policy of neglect towards Mercosur could be sustained only if the EU knew 
Mercosur countries and institutions well, and if the EU disliked the region/
countries, and had an argument against the country/region. Central to the 
argument developed in this monograph is the fact that the EU did not care 
enough about Mercosur since it had a very reactive attitude and Mercosur 
had to be the proactive player, together with Spain and Portugal. This 
monograph it is not claiming that the EU did not care at all about Mercosur 
because in that case there would not have been a policy at all. 
 What does the evidence tell us about EU policy towards Mercosur? 
 The study of the degree of EU engagement towards Mercosur has been 
developed through the whole of this monograph. At the different stages, 
there have been different outcomes but, as has been shown, the tendency 
was to increase both ambition and commitment at each stage, which is 
paradoxical since the path dependence was created in the fi rst stage. It might 
have been expected that the EU would have great ambition and commit-
ment at that stage which might or might not have continued. 
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 Ambition 
 At the fi rst stage, the level of ambition was low. There were some moves 
towards the development of new guidelines; the declaration of the EU and 
the Iberian countries independently from the Treaty of Accession – as Spain 
and Portugal wanted – from a legal point of view, showed a low level of 
ambition as well. In the second stage ambition was medium, due to several 
pieces of evidence showing growing ambition on the EU side. The guidelines 
established new goals towards Latin America and the fi rst proper guidelines 
towards Mercosur showed a positive ambition. Also the agreement on the 
association agreement was important for the level of ambition. However, 
the requests from the Latin American side in relation to loans from the EIB, 
the institutionalization of the Rio Group and the development of agree-
ments between Mercosur and the EU undermined the EU ambition shown 
at this stage. The lack of legal content of the EU–Mercosur agreements did 
not help increase the level of ambition either. 
 At the third stage the ambition was high, from the plans to achieve 
association agreement, as the establishment of the Joint Committee showed. 
However, the pressure to upgrade the existing EU–Mercosur relations again 
came from the Mercosur side, which reduces the level of EU ambition. 
Moreover, the linking of the EU–Mercosur negotiations to the WTO nego-
tiations was evidence against a high level of ambition as well as the attitude 
of the new commissioners in charge of the agreement, Lamy and Patten. 
 Commitment 
 The meetings with the EU–Rio Group after the San José process are evidence 
of low but existent commitment at the fi rst stage which should not be 
confused with none. The level of aid attributed is another example of the 
level of commitment. At the second stage, the level of commitment is high 
since these are the most productive years of EU–Mercosur relations. The 
amount of aid assigned in the guidelines, the upgrading of the investment 
facilities and the visits of Delors to the region prove that level. But more 
importantly the signature of two EU–Mercosur agreements in such a short 
period of time helps the assessment. On the negative side the reorganization 
of the GSP and the legal emptiness of the EU agreements with Mercosur 
let down the EU level of commitment. 
 At the last stage of the policy the assessment of commitment was high. 
The Joint Committee did not achieve much due to resistance in the EU 
towards any progress in the development of the association agreement, and 
the lack of a fi nal agreement in October 2004 evidences a vague EU com-
mitment since the European side was the one linking the EU–Mercosur 
negotiations with the WTO negotiations. The relaunch of the negotiations 
also demonstrates a high level of commitment.
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 Throughout this monograph there has been a discussion of the arguments 
that are put forward in the existing literature to explain the reasons behind 
EU policy towards Mercosur. The different arguments are not completely 
incompatible with each other, but one thing that they do have in common 
is that they do not explain the reason behind the development of EU atti-
tudes across all stages of policy development. In some cases they do not 
really explain the policy at any stage. The last part of this section will 
discuss these different explanations and why they fail at some stage to 
explain EU policy towards Mercosur. Table  8.1 shows the fi nal outcomes 
of the six different arguments in the different stages of the policy. 
 Counterbalancing the US 
 Within the existing literature there is an argument that focuses on the 
infl uence that the US already had in Latin America and how the EU was 
trying to minimize this infl uence by developing agreements within the 
sub-regions of Latin America. Since Mercosur covered a vast segment of 
Latin America, involving the most developed countries in the region apart 
from Mexico and Chile, and because it can be dealt with as a region it is 
not a surprise that the EU wanted to achieve relations with Mercosur. 
Unfortunately, this argument fails in the fi rst and third stages of policy 
development. In the fi rst stage (Chapter  4 ), the EU had anything but a plan 
towards Latin America and it was at this stage that the EU was elaborating 
ideas and plans. In the third stage (Chapters  6 and  7 ), again this argument 
cannot be accepted because the EU was not willing to compromise on 
economic issues during the negotiations in order to achieve an agreement 
with the region. In the second stage (Chapter  5 ), there was some interest 
and consideration of the US and the creation of NAFTA as a force to 
develop relations. However, this point should be considered with caution. 
Not all of the members of the Commission or the Council were thinking 
in those terms, and defi nitely not the ‘father’ of the agreement, Manuel 
Marin. There was a semblance of consideration of this situation within the 
directorate general of trade. Some member states, though, admitted that 
not only was the EU not competing against the US, but the EU could not 
compete with the US since it was in a weaker position. 
 Global aspirations 
 In the literature, there are also some thoughts about the EU ’ s global aspira-
tions which imply an increase in its involvement in world politics as a 
whole. As a consequence, the focus of the EU ’ s actions should be an 
arithmetic progression in EU relations/agreements/partnerships with  all  the 
regions in the world. This was not the case during the fi rst and third stages. 
During the fi rst stage, the EU did not yet have any clear policy objectives 
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towards Latin America as a region or towards individual countries in the 
region. In fact, EU external relations were not that developed in general. 
The notion that the EU held global aspirations during the 1980s would 
certainly be an exaggeration. During the third stage (Chapter  6 ), the EU 
proved again not to have much interest in the ratifi cation of EMIFCA, 
which was done more ‘in extremis’ as a last-minute decision before a 
meeting with the heads of state of Latin America. At the time of making 
an economic commitment to Mercosur, the EU was again not ready to do 
so and the negotiations stopped in 2004. The pyramid of preference also 
clearly shows the unequal treatment of regions and countries by the EU, 
not due to the countries’ needs but a result of the EU ’ s interests. The Central 
and Eastern European countries became the highest priority for EU external 
relations after 1989, until they became members of the EU in 2004. There 
was a prioritization of regions due to the economic, security or political 
interests that the EU might have towards them. 
 External federator 
 The argument which suggests the EU ’ s role was that of an external federator 
can be accepted in the fi rst (Chapter  4 ) and second stages (Chapter  5 ) but 
not in the third stage (Chapters  6 and  7 ). Alongside the argument of 
counterbalancing the US, this is the most common argument in the existing 
literature. It is clear that the EU had allocated resources to Mercosur institu-
tions and other Latin American regional groups in order to promote regional 
integration. The EU had even created the Centre for Economic and Financial 
Research to support regional integration in Montevideo, Uruguay. However, 
in the second stage of the policy, the EU started to offer agreements to both 
the Mercosur group and individual Mercosur member states. It is somewhat 
confusing that the EU was trying to promote different policies with different 
approaches. By 2007, there was no room for misunderstandings because 
the EU offered a very ambitious partnership to the biggest country of 
Mercosur. The EU singled out Brazil, prioritizing it over other countries 
and placing it at the level of other global players such as China, India and 
Russia – the BRIC countries. Chapter  7 demonstrates that the EU is not 
completely against the idea of launching individual agreements with Mer-
cosur countries, rejecting the idea of prioritizing regional integration over 
trade agreements. 
 Long-standing political and economic cultural ties 
 The EU and Mercosur shared cultural ties as a result of the Mercosur 
countries being former colonies of some EU states. These cultural ties 
include languages (i.e. Spanish and Portuguese) and political systems. In the 
area of political ties, again the fact that some countries were former colonies 
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also shaped their political organization. Economically, since the mid-1980s, 
Mercosur countries embraced open trade policies after the failure of import 
substitution policies. This argument is not very common in the existing 
literature and it could be that those political, economic and cultural ties 
have existed since the creation of the EU (and before) but were not appeal-
ing enough for the EU in terms of developing relations with Mercosur. 
Fundamentally, Latin America did not become any sort of priority for the 
EU until the Iberian membership. 
 Interdependence 
 The argument in the current literature relating to interdependence is similar 
to the previous argument but is focused on the trade tendencies at the 
international level. This is related to increased global interdependence and 
how this infl uenced EU–Mercosur relations. It appears that this argument 
is not applicable at any of the three stages because trade numbers show 
how the importance of trade with Mercosur is, in relative terms, of minimal 
importance to the EU. 
 Spanish and Portuguese infl uence in the EU 
 The Iberian membership of the EU in 1986 seems to have an effect on EU 
relations with Latin America since there was a distinct ‘before’ and ‘after’ 
phase. A new set of policies were considered towards Latin America and 
Mercosur which were developed further after 1986. But Spain and Portugal 
were not amongst the most powerful countries in the EU because they 
were the new member states and were only just leaving the ‘developing 
country’ tag behind them. The further enlargements of the EU in 1995 and 
then again in 2004 meant that the EU now had twenty-fi ve member states, 
which diluted the power of Spain and Portugal inside the EU. Therefore, 
in the last stage of policy development (Chapter  5 ), it was not possible for 
these countries to successfully direct signifi cant policy development towards 
Mercosur. In fact, it was shown in Chapter  4 that the Iberian countries 
were crucial but not the only force contributing to the development of 
EMIFCA. 
 What does this say about EU foreign policy? 
 This fi nal section of this chapter will bring together the argument made in 
the previous two sections in order to develop a wider discussion about the 
nature of EU foreign policy. Two main arguments will be discussed: fi rstly, 
institutionalization/Europeanization as a way of explaining the develop-
ment of EU foreign policy; secondly, the development of the EU as a global 
actor. 
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 Institutionalization/Europeanization 
 The crucial importance of the Iberian membership in 1986 for the develop-
ment of an EU policy towards Mercosur has been discussed in Chapter  3 
and in the fi rst section of this chapter. The bottom-up system/procedure can 
be used to explain to some extent the infl uence of Spain and Portugal when 
they became members of the EU, and even before, in terms of developing 
the EU ’ s interests in Latin America. As a consequence, since 1986 it seems, 
to a certain extent, that EU relations with Latin America and Mercosur 
have become increasingly institutionalized. This monograph has proven 
that the continued efforts of Spanish offi cials at the national and European 
level in terms of developing relations with Mercosur were crucial. The 
bottom-up explanation not only explains relations when the Iberian coun-
tries became members of the EU, it also explains Spain ’ s continued desire 
to infl uence the EU in its international relations with Latin America. 
 Following  Wong ’ s ( 2008 ) work on Europeanization of the fi ve perspec-
tives of national projection – which include the processes of policy projec-
tion, policy learning and policy transfer – this monograph explains the 
Europeanization of Spanish and Portuguese national foreign policies using 
the uploading model. According to this school of thought, Spain and Por-
tugal would have tried to bring their national foreign policies to the EU 
supranational level by infl uencing the Commission and other EU states 
about this new policy area. However, the bottom-up approach is limited 
and there was the indifference and opposition of almost all other EU 
member states to contend with. It could be said that there has been a partial 
institutionalization/Europeanization of this policy. 
 This is not the only time that, as soon as they joined the EU, new 
members tried to bring their own national foreign policies to the supra-
national level. When the EU was created the EDF was also created in order 
to deal with the special relationship between EU member states and some 
of their former colonies such as France ’ s relation with former colonies 
in Africa. This approach was further developed once the UK, which had 
its own relationship with former colonies, also became a member of the 
EU. It cannot be argued that this is why the bottom-up process never 
completely materialized. It did not help that there was nothing in Latin 
America and Mercosur that was of particular interest to the EU. There 
were no economic incentives because these countries were still developing 
their economies and political systems. Furthermore, there was not any 
immediate humanitarian incentive because these countries were the wealthi-
est countries in Latin America, and Latin America was not, for example, 
as poor as Africa. Neither were there any security incentives because the 
problems in Latin America were mainly restricted to local issues which did 
not threaten EU security as international terrorism would do, for example. 
Therefore, Latin America is very much a remote region and still very much 
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under the infl uence of the US. This brings us to the question of whether 
the EU really is a global actor or a partially global actor in international 
relations. 
 Is the EU a global actor? Not really 
 According to  Bretherton and Vogler  ( 2006 ) the EU ’ s global ‘actorness’ can 
be explained in terms of presence, opportunity and capability. Each of these 
different aspects was outlined in the introductory chapter. In relation to 
these characteristics, if the EU was to be referred to as a global actor then 
it needed to behave like a global actor in its dealings with third parties 
seeking to develop relations with the EU. Secondly, the EU had to want to 
behave like a global actor. And thirdly, the EU needed to have the capability 
to behave like a global actor. In its dealings with Mercosur, the EU only 
behaved like a global actor in terms of developing relations. The EU may 
have looked like a global actor in terms of its relationship with Mercosur, 
but did not behave as such despite having the opportunity and capability 
of doing so. In relation to ‘presence’, it can be said that in relation to 
Mercosur the EU did manage to create expectations since Mercosur was 
the one demanding a relationship and the subsequent upgrading of the 
relationship. Mercosur ’ s demands could easily be due to the EU presence. 
 It is in relation to opportunity that the EU failed miserably to achieve 
its role as a global actor. The EU had nothing to lose with Mercosur. It was 
not a sensitive issue such as relations with Russia or China, the Cold War 
no longer constrained international relations and Mercosur was very keen 
on the development of relations. Therefore, there is no justifi cation for the 
lack of EU efforts towards Mercosur, other than it was not interested. If 
that was the case, then the EU cannot use the discourse of global actor. If 
you are a global actor, that includes the whole world – not everything bar 
almost a whole continent such as Latin America. It is not that the EU does 
not want to get involved with a country like Cuba, which for obvious 
reasons is a very complex and sensitive issue that nobody wants to deal 
with. But to ignore the whole of Latin America is not justifi able for a global 
actor; it is justifi able for a regional actor, but that is a different debate. 
 In relation to capability the EU was not constrained but rather showed 
a lack of capability since its relations with Mercosur were based on coopera-
tion, political dialogue and trade negotiations at the lowest level possible. 
The EU cannot justify the lack of agreement with a lack of capabilities. 
 Conclusion 
 This chapter started with a quotation from the Spanish minister of foreign 
affairs in which he admitted that the EU could be a global actor, but there 
was no political motivation for it to do so. It could be argued that the EU 
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could behave as a global actor but chose not to because it did not have the 
necessary political will. 
 This monograph has proved that the reasons behind the EU ’ s actions 
towards Mercosur were, for a certain period of time, different for the main 
actors, different EU member states and the Commission. This book has 
examined the various other explanations of EU foreign policy towards 
Mercosur provided in the existing literature. For the fi rst time, these expla-
nations have been tested across three distinct stages in the policy develop-
ment process and as a result this study has contributed to the ongoing 
debate on EU foreign policy in both general terms and in relation to two 
specifi c issues: the institutionalization/Europeanization of foreign policies 
and the EU ’ s behaviour as a global strategic actor. In conclusion, this mono-
graph has argued that the EU was a responsive rather than proactive actor 
towards Mercosur over the course of the three distinct phases of EU–Mer-
cosur policy development. 
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